Date of Thesis Acceptance
Major Department or Program
“Freedom and Bondage in Spinoza’s Ethics” concerns the availability of a ‘freedom worth wanting’ in Baruch Spinoza’s opus that is unthreatened by his metaphysics of determinism and substance monism. These metaphysical commitments seem to threaten a freedom that allows for phenomenology of choice and ethical responsibility, but, through a rigorous reading of the text, these are of no concern; Spinoza makes available a worthy theory of freedom. However, this reading argues that since freedom necessitates perfect adequate knowledge of the affects, only infinite modes can be free. Contrary to other scholarship on the matter, this reading further argues that humans are totally bound to the affects through their imperfection.
Benedictus de Spinoza (1632-1677), Liberty -- Philosophy, Ethics, Responsibility -- Ethical responsibility, Phenomenology -- Choice, Freedom, Monism, Rene Descartes (1596-1650) -- Metaphysics, Determinism (Philosophy), Syllogism, Metaphysics, Conatus, Whitman College 2017 -- Dissertation collection -- Philosophy Department
Public Accessible Thesis
Pitts, Alexander M., "Freedom and Bondage in Spinoza's Ethics" (2017). Honors Theses. 359.
In Copyright. URI: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).