

Eudaimonia is Actualized by Intrinsically Motivated Work:
Using Aristotle and Montessori to Develop a New Account of Eudaimonia

by

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This is to certify that the accompanying thesis by John D. Eiford has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in Philosophy.

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Abstract

This paper develops a new account of eudaimonia, i.e. the highest good for human beings. To develop this account, I draw extensively on the accounts of eudaimonia offered by Aristotle and alternative educator Maria Montessori. I argue that eudaimonia is the only end desired for its own sake, and that this intrinsically desired end is actualized by intrinsically motivated work. I define intrinsically motivated work as effortful engagement in activity for the sake of itself, and I use Aristotle and Montessori to show that individual instances of this work constitute eudaimonia as a whole. Further, I claim that only a certain *kind* of intrinsically motivated work actualizes eudaimonia: this work must be excellent in a progressive sense, rational, respectful of others and their ability to actualize eudaimonia, and promote human culture. In addition to intrinsically motivated work, I argue that integrated extrinsically motivated work can actualize eudaimonia when this work is situated in the context of larger-scale intrinsically motivated work. In order to integrate extrinsically motivated work, I claim that one must reflectively endorse their actions at the highest level of reflection that is possible given their stage of development. I conclude by suggesting that this account of eudaimonia has profound implications for the way we educate, work, and live in contemporary industrialized society.

Introduction

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle provides an account of eudaimonia, i.e. the highest good for humans.¹ He observes that every activity is engaged in for the sake of an end (1094a7-8). He then identifies a teleology among these ends: “in all of these [arts] the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued” (1094a14-16). Aristotle seeks to determine where this teleology of ends *stops*, i.e. he wants to identify the “end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this)” (1094a 18-19).² This final end, which ultimately motivates *all* our actions, is what Aristotle identifies as the highest good.

If there is a highest good, then Aristotle is right to pose the following rhetorical question: “Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least to determine what it is” (1094a21-26). Whether or not one agrees with *how* Aristotle conceptualizes the highest good, his inclination to *examine* this good is particularly legitimate. As human beings, we should strive to live a life that is in accordance with what is best for us.

Establishing an accurate account of eudaimonia is therefore vital to human life.

This paper engages with two such accounts. One is offered by Aristotle. The second is

¹ In the text I work with (McKeon) and others (e.g., Irwin), eudaimonia is translated as happiness. However, this translation is problematic. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the highest good for humans (1095a13-20), which he rightly argues is actualized by a certain kind of excellent activity (1098a17-19). The contemporary conception of happiness refers to an overall state of feeling pleasure and satisfaction. This subjective and hedonic account of human good should thus be distinguished from Aristotle’s objective account of the highest human good. I therefore leave eudaimonia untranslated, and define it as the highest good for humans.

² Aristotle rightly dismisses the notion that this teleology of ends could be infinite. If so, “our desire would be empty and vain” (1094a20-21) because it would not have a proper end goal or purpose.

offered by child psychologist and alternative educator Maria Montessori. Despite being best known for the system of education that bears her name, Montessori should also be considered as a philosopher in her own right. Although she is not explicit about the need to develop an account of eudaimonia in the way that Aristotle is, she nevertheless offers her own account because her pedagogy demands it. In order to educate the best kind of human beings, Montessori must examine and articulate *the kind of character* which those individuals should possess (Absorbent 190-196). She therefore develops her own account of eudaimonia in order to set that account as the goal of her educational program.

This paper develops a *new* account of eudaimonia by drawing on the accounts offered by Aristotle and Montessori. Note that this paper is not an exegetical compare-and-contrast analysis of Aristotle and Montessori's views on eudaimonia. Instead, I use Aristotle and Montessori to construct my own account of eudaimonia and illustrate why that account is legitimate—a process that will require significant scholarly engagement with both philosophers. In addition to Aristotle and Montessori, I also draw extensively on the work of Richard Ryan and Edward Deci. These psychologists offer a framework of motivation³ that applies to Aristotle and Montessori's accounts of eudaimonia in important and relevant ways—this framework is therefore central to my account of eudaimonia.

The account of eudaimonia developed in this paper argues that eudaimonia is actualized by intrinsically motivated work. I begin [1] by defining intrinsically motivated work. I then argue [2] that eudaimonia is intrinsically desired, and the third section [3] expands this account of eudaimonia by showing that eudaimonia is actualized by

³ Although Ryan and Deci's framework of motivation is informed by empirical research, I develop their constructs in a properly philosophical way (see section 1).

intrinsically motivated work. Having established these claims in the first three sections, the next four sections [4-7] determine the *kind* of intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia. Next, I argue [8] that eudaimonia can also be actualized by integrated extrinsically motivated work when such work is situated in the context of larger-scale intrinsically motivated work. The final section [9] claims that integrating extrinsically motivated work requires one to engage in the highest level of reflection, and that what counts as the highest order depends on the individual's period of development.

[1] Intrinsically Motivated Work

Before arguing that eudaimonia is actualized by intrinsically motivated work, I need to first establish my conception of intrinsically motivated work. My conception is based on the psychological construct of intrinsic motivation. Psychologists Richard Ryan and Edward Deci define intrinsic motivation as “the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence. When intrinsically motivated a person is moved to act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures, or rewards” (56).⁴ In other words, intrinsic motivation is engaging in an activity for the sake of itself⁵ rather than for the sake of outcomes or factors that are external to the activity. Another way to put it is that intrinsically motivated activities are *intrinsically* desirable rather than *instrumentally* desirable. For example, I am intrinsically motivated to read fantasy novels because I engage in that activity *for its own sake* rather than for the sake of factors that are external to reading—I find reading *itself* to be desirable rather than desirable for the sake of an external outcome. Ryan and Deci also

⁴ In this passage, Ryan and Deci seem to claim that one engages in an intrinsically motivated activity because the activity is intrinsically pleasurable. This claim is not true of the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia (see footnote 47).

⁵ By ‘for the sake of itself’ I mean the activity *by itself* or *on its own*, as well as *internal* components of the activity.

explain that one who is intrinsically motivated has an “internal perceived locus of causality” (58), i.e. intrinsically motivated individuals perceive the cause of their engagement in activity to be located *within* their own selves. Given that such individuals act for the sake of itself rather than for the sake of external factors, they feel their own selves—rather than external factors—to be the cause of their engagement in activity.

Although up to this point I have followed Ryan and Deci in using terms like ‘intrinsic desire’ and ‘intrinsic motivation’ as essentially synonymous, there is an important difference between intrinsically *motivated* and intrinsically *desired*. In order to explain this difference, I need to introduce another psychological construct, extrinsic motivation. As Ryan and Deci define it, “*extrinsic motivation* ... refers to doing something because it leads to a separable outcome” (55). In other words, extrinsic motivation is engaging in an activity for the sake of outcomes and factors that are external to that activity (e.g., rewards and punishments). Another way to put it is that the activity is only *instrumentally* desirable, i.e. it is only desirable insofar as it leads to an external outcome. For example, I am often extrinsically motivated to study for tests because studying is instrumentally desirable—I only study for the sake of avoiding the punishment of a bad grade and obtaining the reward of a good grade. One who is extrinsically motivated also has an “external perceived locus of causality” (59), i.e. extrinsically motivated individuals perceive the cause of their engagement in activity to be located *outside* of themselves. Given that such individuals act for the sake of external factors, they perceive these factors—rather than their own selves—to be the cause of their engagement in activity.

To return to the issue of intrinsic motivation versus intrinsic desire, the difference

is that *motivation* refers to activities while *desire* refers to *both* activities and ends. In the case of intrinsically desired *activities*, this difference is insignificant—if I desire an *activity* for its own sake, then my engagement in that activity will necessarily be intrinsically motivated.⁶ However, in the case of an intrinsically desired *end*, this difference *is* significant—one need not be intrinsically *motivated* to achieve an intrinsically desired end. In fact, one could be *extrinsically* motivated to obtain an intrinsically desired end if the activity that produced the end was desired instrumentally. For example, imagine that one intrinsically desires the end of a new car.⁷ In order to achieve this end, one engages in the activity of making money. If the individual instrumentally desires the activity of money making—i.e. she only engages in money making for the sake of buying a new car—then she would be *extrinsically* motivated to engage in that activity.

So far, this section has established that intrinsically motivated activity is activity engaged in for the sake of itself. To complete my account of intrinsically motivated *work*, I need to explain my conception of work. I define work as *effortful engagement in activity*. Thus, while all possible kinds of work are activities, not all kinds of activities are work. Here ‘effort’ is understood as a vigorous and sustained attempt in which one exerts considerable energy. Engaging in an activity without making an effortful attempt therefore does not count as work. For example, absently browsing the Internet is not work because my engagement in that activity is not effortful. However, writing this philosophy

⁶ The same is true of extrinsically desired activities. If I desire an activity only insofar as it is instrumental to producing an external outcome, then I will be extrinsically motivated to engage in that activity.

⁷ Note that per Aristotle’s teleology of ends, such an end is also *extrinsically* desired for the sake of eudaimonia (see section 2). The important point here is to show that an intrinsically desired end need not be intrinsically *motivated*.

paper *is* work because my engagement in this activity is effortful.⁸

Given my account of work, intrinsically motivated *work* is therefore effortful engagement in an activity for the sake of itself. Having established this conception of intrinsically motivated work, the rest of this paper will defend and elaborate on the claim that eudaimonia is actualized by precisely this kind of work. The following section continues to lay the groundwork for this claim by arguing that eudaimonia is the only intrinsically desired end.

[2] Eudaimonia is the Only Intrinsically Desired End

In this section, I use Aristotle and Montessori to argue that eudaimonia is the only intrinsically desired end. Further, it is built-in to the *definition* of ‘the highest good’ that it be desired for its own sake. In other words, the highest good ought to be *defined* as the only intrinsically desired end.

As discussed in the introduction, Aristotle argues that all human activities have an end. He also argues that there is a hierarchy of ends, and that the endpoint in this hierarchy is the *final* end. This final end, because it is not pursued for the sake of an end other than itself, is therefore desired for its own sake: “there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this)” (1094a17-18). Given that all human actions are ultimately desired for the sake of the final end, Aristotle asserts that the final end is the highest good for humans: “we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else ... such a thing eudaimonia, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else” (1097a37-1097b1).

⁸ Note that writing this philosophy paper would not be work if I engaged in this activity without exerting effort, and that browsing the Internet would be work if I exerted effort while engaging in that activity.

Eudaimonia is therefore the *only* end desired for the sake of itself. Further, it is essential to the *definition* of eudaimonia that it be intrinsically desired—eudaimonia just *is* the only end desired for its own sake.⁹

Montessori also argues that the highest good is intrinsically desired. She makes this claim by asserting that all human activity ultimately tends towards progress:

all [humans] have a tendency, however vague and unconscious, to raise themselves up ... And this tendency ... exerts sooner or later a pressure towards improvement. Both the individual and the society have this in common: a continuous tendency to progress ... there is a tiny light in the unconscious of mankind which guides it towards better things ... man's behavior is not invariable ... but it can progress, and it is natural for man to feel this urge to go forward (Absorbent 191).

Here, Montessori argues that human behavior intentionally gravitates towards progress—humans deliberately strive to become better and better. This notion of human progress is intimately related to what Montessori calls perfection.¹⁰ Perfection means that human individuals and societies are progressing: “let us consider a purely human center of perfection, the progress of mankind. Someone makes a discovery and society progresses along that line” (195). Given that humans become more perfect as they progress, when Montessori claims that human activity tends towards progress, she also argues that humans tend towards *perfection*. She therefore establishes a teleology of human actions

⁹ Note that there are some ends that are “desirable both in themselves and forth the sake of that other thing [i.e. eudaimonia]” (1097a33-34). These kinds of ends are therefore *both* intrinsically and extrinsically desired. So to be completely accurate, eudaimonia is the only intrinsically desired end that is *only* intrinsically desired.

¹⁰ Montessori considers perfection to be the process of *becoming* more and more perfect rather than *attaining* a static final state of perfection. See section 5.

in which perfection is the final end.¹¹

Montessori also shows that the final end—perfection—is desired for its own sake. If all humans are intentionally oriented towards progress, then they must desire perfection for the sake of itself. This intrinsic desire is most evident in individuals that are explicitly oriented towards self-perfection. Montessori presents a diagram of human character types (193) in which different characters are represented by concentric circles. In the central circle is the most optimal character—*self-perfecting* individuals that “are drawn towards perfection naturally and without effort” (193). She argues that people in this circle possess “superior¹² evolution” (193) because they are innately oriented towards becoming more perfect: “it is not the fear of imprisonment that stops them from stealing ... nor are they tempted to acts of violence from which they refrain by a pretense of virtue. They simply do not want other people’s things and violence repels them. Perfection attracts them because it is in their nature” (194). Self-perfecting individuals do not desire perfection for the sake of external factors or outcomes, but rather, desire perfection for its own sake because it is in their nature to strive towards it.

For Montessori, given that all human activity is ultimately desired for the sake of the final end of perfection, this final end must be the highest good for humans. And because all other activities are desired for the sake of this end, eudaimonia is the *only* intrinsically desired end. Further, that eudaimonia is intrinsically desired is vital to its definition—eudaimonia should be defined as the end that all humans (especially self-perfecting individuals) desire for its own sake.

¹¹ Although Montessori’s teleology is different and less explicit than Aristotle’s, both philosophers identify a final end of human action.

¹² Montessori means ‘superior’ here not as an innate difference between classes people, but as having an inherent orientation towards the highest good for humans. Individuals who have this orientation are ‘superior’ only because they are directly motivated by a desire for perfection that is latent in most people.

This section has used Aristotle and Montessori to argue that the highest good for humans is the only intrinsically desired end—and we can see that this claim is true because being the only intrinsically desired end is *built-in* to the concept of the highest good. In a word, the highest good cannot be an *extrinsically* desired end because in this case the highest good would be desired for the sake of something else—*the something else* would therefore be the highest good. However, to claim that eudaimonia is the only intrinsically desired end is vague because it does not describe what will actualize or constitute eudaimonia. The next section argues that it is intrinsically motivated work that actualizes the intrinsically desired end of eudaimonia.

[3] Eudaimonia is Actualized by Intrinsically Motivated Work

In the previous section, I established that eudaimonia is the only intrinsically desired end. This section argues that this intrinsically desired end is actualized by intrinsically motivated work. Individual instances of intrinsically motivated work therefore constitute eudaimonia as a whole. To make this claim, I draw on Aristotle and Montessori, who both argue that eudaimonia arises when individuals do work for the sake of itself rather than for the sake of external factors.

Having established that eudaimonia is the final end, Aristotle proceeds to provide an account of the kind of activity that will actualize the intrinsically desired end of eudaimonia. Note that this shift from an intrinsically desired *end* to a certain kind of *activity* means a corresponding shift from intrinsic *desire* to intrinsic *motivation*. Aristotle moves in this direction by examining the function of humans. He asserts that “all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function” (1079b27-28). By discerning our human function, Aristotle argues that we can

find our highest good in our particular kind of activity.¹³ He posits that the function of humans is to engage in rational activity—this activity is what makes humans the kind of creatures that we are: “we are seeking what is peculiar to man ... There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle” (1098a2-3). Aristotle then argues that the function of a good (i.e. eudaimon) human must be to engage in rational activity well, or excellently. In this way, Aristotle defines what eudaimonia is: “human good turns out to be the [rational] activity of soul in accordance with virtue” (1098a16-17).

According to Aristotle, virtue fundamentally involves *virtuous activity*. This is evident from his assertion that *moral* virtues are states of character in which one engages in activities that are in accordance with the mean in regards to contrary actions and passions (1106b36-1107a3), and that *intellectual* virtues are excellences of the active use of purely mental capacities (1138b35-1139a16). A virtuous person is virtuous because she *exercises* the virtues rather than *possesses* them. As Aristotle explains, “for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good [i.e. eudaimonia] in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some way quite inactive” (1098b31-1099a2). Further, virtuous activity must “proceed from a firm and unchangeable character” (1105c33-34)—a virtuous individual has cultivated her character in such a way that she reliably engages in virtuous activity. If eudaimonia is activity of soul in accordance with virtue, then virtuous activity is what *actualizes* eudaimonia. Put another way, eudaimonia is *constituted* by virtuous activities—individual acts of virtue make up the whole of eudaimonia. Given that this

¹³ For example, knowing the function of a knife (to cut things) allows me to determine and evaluate both what a good knife is (i.e. one that is sharp) and what is good for a knife (e.g., being sharpened).

end is constituted by a certain kind of activity, intrinsically desiring this end will necessarily involve being *motivated* in a certain way to engage in the activity that actualizes this end.

Unfortunately, Aristotle does not make clear how individuals are motivated to engage in the virtuous activity that actualizes eudaimonia. In certain passages, Aristotle asserts that virtue is desired for the sake of eudaimonia. For example, “we choose them [the virtues] also for the sake of eudaimonia, judging that by means of them we shall be eudaimon” (1097b4-5). This passage suggests that virtuous activity is extrinsically motivated because it seems that individuals desire virtuous activity *instrumentally*—they only desire virtue insofar as it promotes the end of eudaimonia. Recall that activity desired for the sake of an external outcome is extrinsically motivated. Per this passage, virtue seems to be of this nature.

Aristotle appears to contradict this statement in several other passages which suggest that eudaimon individuals will be *intrinsically* motivated to engage in the virtuous activity that actualizes eudaimonia. As he explains, “those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And of this nature virtuous actions are thought to be; for to do noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake” (1176b8-10). This passage suggests that virtuous activity is intrinsically motivated because it seems that individuals desire virtue intrinsically—they desire virtue entirely for the sake of itself. Recall that activity desired for the sake of itself is intrinsically motivated. Here, virtue seems to have this quality. As he puts it in another passage, “every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them)” (1097b2-4). So even if virtuous activity did

not actualize eudaimonia, Aristotle argues that it would still be desirable for its own sake, and therefore intrinsically motivated. It therefore seems contradictory for Aristotle to argue that virtue is desired for the sake of eudaimonia, as this suggests that virtue is *extrinsically* motivated.

Viewing virtue as what *actualizes* eudaimonia allows this issue to be resolved, and demonstrates that virtue is *intrinsically* motivated rather than extrinsically motivated. If we see virtuous activities as what actualize the intrinsically desired end of eudaimonia, then we can see that desiring virtue for the sake of eudaimonia is actually desiring virtue for the sake of *itself*. In other words, to desire virtue for the sake of eudaimonia *just is* to desire virtue for its own sake because virtuous activity *is what constitute eudaimonia as a whole*. Virtuous activity is therefore *intrinsically* motivated because to desire this kind of activity for its own sake *just is* what actualizes the intrinsically desired end of eudaimonia. Another way to put this is that virtue cannot be instrumentally desired for the sake of eudaimonia because eudaimonia is itself *constituted* by virtuous activity. If virtuous activity is not instrumentally desired, then it is not extrinsically motivated, and should therefore be understood as being intrinsically motivated. Aristotle's claim that virtue is desired for the sake of eudaimonia is intended to differentiate between the virtues and eudaimonia—eudaimonia is the highest good overall, while the virtues are the individual acts that make up that whole.

Thus far in this section, I have used Aristotle to argue that eudaimonia is the only intrinsically desired end, and that the kind of activity that actualizes this end is *intrinsically motivated* activity. However, not *any* intrinsically motivated activity will actualize eudaimonia. In fact, there are some intrinsically motivated activities (e.g.,

watching TV and eating Cheetos) that would seem to *inhibit* engagement with the highest human good. This concern can be resolved by considering Aristotle’s claim that a particular kind of intrinsically motivated activity—i.e. virtue—actualizes eudaimonia (1098a16-17).¹⁴ Per my terminology, Aristotelian virtue should be understood as intrinsically motivated *work*, i.e. *effortful* engagement in activity. Aristotle explains that engaging in virtue involves exertion: “the eudaimon life is thought to be virtuous; now a virtuous life requires exertion” (1177a1-2). He uses this assertion to rightly distinguish virtue from what he calls “pleasant amusements” (1176b8), i.e. intrinsically desired activities that are not effortful (e.g., watching TV and eating Cheetos). Aristotle claims that these amusements cannot actualize eudaimonia (1176a32-33). The virtuous activity that actualizes eudaimonia requires effort—it is therefore *work* rather than mere activity.

To summarize, Aristotle illustrates that the intrinsically desired end of eudaimonia is actualized by virtuous activity, i.e. intrinsically motivated work. Aristotle therefore shows that eudaimonia is actualized by intrinsically motivated work. In other words, individual instances of intrinsically motivated work constitute eudaimonia as a whole. An eudaimon individual will therefore have a character that is oriented towards intrinsically motivated work, and live a life in which they consistently engage in that kind of work.

Montessori is also committed to the claim that intrinsically motivated work actualizes the highest good for humans. She argues that “work is instinctive to man and characteristic of the species” (Secret 186). Similar to Aristotle’s function argument, Montessori views engagement with work as a fundamental feature of what it means to be a human being. Montessori specifies that it is *intrinsically motivated* work that is truly

¹⁴ Aristotle is interested in virtuous activity because it is *excellent*. Sections 4 and 5 examine the relationship between excellence and intrinsically motivated work in more detail.

characteristic of humanity (186), and she shows that intrinsically motivated work actualizes eudaimonia (i.e. self-perfection) in the context of both children and adults.

In the context of children, the process of what Montessori calls normalization illustrates that children actualize perfection by engaging in intrinsically motivated work. Normalization is a psychological transition from an abnormal personality to a ‘normal’ character that is focused on perfecting oneself through intrinsically motivated work (Absorbent 185). Montessori explains that “[normalization’s] principal feature never changes. It is ‘application to work.’ An interesting piece of work, freely chosen, which has the virtue of inducing concentration rather than fatigue, adds to the child’s energies and mental capacities, and leads him to self-mastery” (185-188). As this passage illustrates, normalization occurs when children freely choose to concentrate on an interesting work and spontaneously engage in that work for the sake of itself.¹⁵ This work is therefore intrinsically motivated because the children who engage in it have an internal perceived locus of causality, i.e. they perceive their own selves to be the cause of this freely chosen work. Further, this work is intrinsically motivated because the child’s “objective in working is the work itself” (Secret 196). In a word, the child becomes normalized by engaging in intrinsically motivated work because normalization just *is* the process of forming one’s self into a person with a character that engages in intrinsically motivated work.

¹⁵ This claim has important pedagogical implications that are beyond the scope of this paper but worth mentioning briefly. In order to cultivate normalized children, Montessori classrooms are composed of a number of interesting and attractive manipulative tasks that are designed to encourage intrinsically motivated work (Absorbent 188). Children are free to choose their own work (184), providing them with an internally perceived locus of causality that bolsters their intrinsically motivated engagement in work. The *prepared environment* is therefore vital for cultivating normalization: “when the attractions of the new environment exert their spell, offering motives for constructive activity, then all these energies combine and the deviations can be dispersed. A unique type of child appears, a ‘new child’, but really it is the child’s true ‘personality’ allowed to construct itself normally” (185).

To take this claim a step further, Montessori argues that normalized children actualize the highest good (i.e. perfection) by engaging in intrinsically motivated work. The intrinsically motivated work of children is directed towards creating and perfecting an independent adult human being (Absorbent 193, Secret 193-194). Normalized children therefore actualize eudaimonia by perfecting *themselves* through intrinsically motivated work: “the children are performing spiritual exercises, having found the path of self-perfectionment and of ascent to the inner heights of the soul” (Absorbent 189). Put another way, normalized children possess what Montessori calls superior evolution because they innately desire perfection and form themselves into more perfect individuals through intrinsically motivated work. Montessori even uses the language of ‘normal’ to refer to those with superior evolution who “represent the stronger and more balanced type of human being, those approximating to the ideal or ‘normal’ type” (191). Normalized children are thus inherently oriented towards perfection, and actualize perfection by constructing themselves into independent adults through intrinsically motivated work.

Montessori explains that adults also actualize perfection by engaging in intrinsically motivated work.

When ... work flows naturally from an *inner* impulse, it assumes an entirely different character, *even in adults*. When this happens, work becomes fascinating and irresistible and raises a man above his diverted self ... When a man is engaged in such work, he becomes possessed of an extraordinary power and experiences again that natural instinct that enables him to express his own individuality (Secret 186, my emphasis).

This passage illustrates that the work of adults is desirable for its own sake—as such, this

work is intrinsically motivated. Further, people engage in this kind of activity due to an *internal* source of motivation, and as such, perceive the cause of their engagement in that work as being located *within* themselves. In other words, adults who work in this way have an internal perceived locus of causality, and are therefore intrinsically motivated.

However, given Ryan and Deci's account of intrinsic motivation, the adult's work might seem to also be *extrinsically* motivated. While the child's work is focused on constructing an independent adult, the adult's work is focused on constructing and perfecting what Montessori calls a "transcendental environment" (191) or "supra-nature" (Adolescence 3). Supra-nature is the man-made physical and cultural environment that is fashioned by human beings. To bring about this environment, the adult's work follows "the law of minimum effort" (Secret 196) in which "one seeks to attain the maximum productivity with the least expenditure of energy" (191). The adult therefore seeks to *produce* as much as possible (191); in other words, the *end* of the adult's work seems to be largely what motivates the adult to *engage* in work. If so, then the adult's work would be *instrumentally* desired for the sake of its end, i.e. extrinsically motivated.

In order to show that the adult's work is truly intrinsically motivated, I will briefly introduce some useful terminology provided by Christine Korsgaard. While Ryan and Deci, Aristotle, and Montessori refer to 'activity,' Korsgaard differentiates between two kinds of activity—*acts* and *actions*.¹⁶ An *act* is merely doing something while an *action* is doing something for the sake of an end: "an *action*, then, involves both an *act* and an *end*, an act done for the sake of an end" (11). For example, drinking water is an *act* and drinking-water-for-the-sake-of-quenching-one's-thirst is an *action*. Korsgaard also

¹⁶ Note that when I use the words 'act' and 'action' outside of this context in which I use Korsgaard, I do *not* use them in the sense that she does.

explains that “*acts* are also sometimes done for their own sakes, for no further end, from some non-instrumental motive” (12). In these cases, “doing the act is itself the end” (12)—the action is therefore doing the act for the sake of itself. For instance, one might engage in the *act* of drinking water for its own sake, in which case the *action* is drinking-water-for-the-sake-of-drinking-water.

This terminology is helpful for understanding how the adult’s work is intrinsically motivated. The adult’s work is an *action*—i.e. an act done for the sake of an end. This is evident from the examples¹⁷ of intrinsically motivated adult work that Montessori provides (Secret 186) and from her claim that the adult’s work results in products that contribute to the transcendental environment. What motivates the adult to engage in this work is an *intrinsic desire* to engage in the overall *action* of acting-for-the-sake-of-making-a-product-that-improves-the-human-environment. For example, an inventor is intrinsically motivated to engage in the *action* of inventing-for-the-sake-of-making-an-invention. The inventor therefore does not engage in work for the sake of the *end* of the invention, rather, it is the action of inventing-for-the-sake-of-that-end that is intrinsically motivated. The following passage regarding the child’s work applies to the adult and illustrates this point: “the ostensible aim of the child’s work is not its ultimate purpose; all the child does is obey an inner impulse” (Absorbent 148). Similarly, the ultimate purpose or end of the inventor’s work (i.e. the invention) is not what motivates the inventor. What motivates her is an inner impulse to engage in the action of inventing-for-the-sake-of-making-an-invention.¹⁸ As such, the adult’s work is *not* instrumentally

¹⁷ The inventor, explorer, and painter all engage in acts for the sake of ends.

¹⁸ The difference between the work of the child and the work of the adult is that the child’s inner impulse is to engage in the action of constructing *herself*, which has no external product or end beyond the individual, while the adult’s inner impulse is to engage in the action of constructing the *environment*, which *does* have

desired for the sake of the end that it secures, i.e. it is not extrinsically motivated. Another way to put this is that if it was possible for the adult to achieve the end (i.e. the invention) *without* engaging in the work of creating the invention (i.e. the act), she would not be motivated to achieve the end through this means. What the adult *is* motivated to do is bring about the invention *through* her work *for its own sake*. The adult's work is therefore intrinsically motivated because it stems from an inner impulse to engage in work that constructs the man-made environment for its own sake.

Like the work of the child, the intrinsically motivated work of the adult actualizes perfection. For Montessori, the creation and progress of supra-nature is essential to the advance of civilization: “progress in civilization is directly linked with their [human's] manifold ability to create an environment that will make life more easy and comfortable” (Secret 187). In other words, the adult's intrinsically motivated work actualizes perfection by improving the man-made environment. As Montessori puts it in a different passage, “it [intrinsically motivated work] is the source of true progress in civilization” (187). The intrinsically motivated work of the adult therefore actualizes the perfection of human civilization: “someone makes a discovery and society progresses along that line ... we see this constant progress, because in every age some man has added a point to the circle of perfection which fascinated him and drove him to action” (Absorbent 195). Note that the adult also perfects *herself* by engaging in this kind of work—to be a self-perfecting *adult* is to engage in the intrinsically motivated work of improving human civilization.¹⁹ In sum, the intrinsically motivated work of both children and adults

an external product beyond the individual. So although the adult *seems* to engage in work for the sake of its end, the adult actually works for the sake of the action that includes this end.

¹⁹ Note that the adolescent's work blends the work of the child and the work of the adult. The adolescent is intrinsically motivated to engage in the work of becoming the kind of person that can make her own money

actualizes eudaimonia (i.e. perfection). Given that perfection is the highest good for Montessori, intrinsically motivated work actualizes eudaimonia, and individual instances of intrinsically motivated work make up eudaimonia as a whole.

Aristotle and Montessori both show that the intrinsically desired end of eudaimonia is actualized by intrinsically motivated work. Individual acts of intrinsically motivated work therefore constitute eudaimonia as a whole. This section therefore claims that what it means to desire the end of eudaimonia for its own sake is to intrinsically desire engagement in the intrinsically motivated work that constitutes this end.²⁰

[4] Intrinsically Motivated Work Has an Internal Standard of Excellence

The opening three sections have established that eudaimonia is the only intrinsically desired end, and that this end is actualized by intrinsically motivated work. However, not *all* intrinsically motivated work actualizes eudaimonia. The following four sections work to determine the *kind* of intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia. The current section begins this task by asserting that the intrinsically motivated work which actualizes eudaimonia must necessarily have an internal standard of excellence.

Aristotle claims that virtuous activities²¹ are fine,²² and that virtuous individuals

(Adolescence 64-66). So although the adolescent's work (like the child's) is focused on developing the adolescent into an independent adult, the work of money making is nevertheless *productive* (like the adult's). The adolescent is therefore intrinsically motivated to engage in the *action* of making-money-for-the-sake-of-being-capable-of-making-their-own-money rather than for the sake of the end of money.

²⁰ Note that most people actually *lack* an intrinsic desire to engage in intrinsically motivated work. While all people ultimately *do* have an intrinsic desire to achieve the highest good, most do not understand that the highest good is *actually* constituted by intrinsically motivated work. Montessori captures this point by arguing that *only* self-perfecting individuals realize perfection is actualized by intrinsically motivated work. These individuals are therefore the only people that engage in the kind of work that actualizes eudaimonia (Absorbent 194).

²¹ As argued in section 3, according to my terminology, by 'virtue or 'virtuous activity(ies)' Aristotle means intrinsically motivated work, i.e. an effortful intrinsically motivated activity. However, I refer to 'virtue' and 'virtuous activity(ies)' when engaging with Aristotle because it is the terminology *he* uses.

desire these activities *because* they are fine: “Now virtuous acts are fine and done for the sake of the fine” (1120a23). By asserting that virtuous activity is fine, Aristotle indicates that virtue must have a standard of excellence.²³ In other words, virtuous activity must be fine in order to be virtuous. Based on the passage above, the fine might appear to be an end *other* than the virtuous activity itself which motivates one to engage in virtue. This might suggest that the activity of virtue is instrumentally desired insofar as it promotes the fine—in this case, virtue might seem to be an *extrinsically* motivated activity. However, the fine is not distinct from virtuous activity; it is an *internal* (rather than external) component of virtuous activity. For example, consider the virtue of temperance. When an individual engages in a temperate act, the fineness of that temperate act is *internal* to the act rather than external to it—it is *part* of that act. But the fine is more than just a component of virtuous activity; rather, this standard of excellence is what makes virtuous activity virtuous. For instance, if the fine was removed from a temperate act, that act would no longer be temperate—the act of temperance is considered virtuous insofar as it has a standard of excellence. The intrinsically motivated work that counts as virtue—and thereby actualizes eudaimonia—must necessarily have an internal standard of excellence, i.e. it must be fine. Put another way, in order to actualize eudaimonia, one must be intrinsically motivated to engage in work according to an internal standard of excellence. As Aristotle explains, only “a true lover of what is fine” (1179a9-10) will be intrinsically motivated to engage in virtue. Aristotle therefore illustrates that the intrinsically motivated work which actualizes eudaimonia must have an internal standard

²² McKeon translates the Greek ‘*kalon*’ as ‘noble’, but like others (e.g., Irwin) I translate it as ‘fine’ because it is easier to see how what is ‘fine’ inherently refers to a standard of excellence.

²³ Also consider that per Aristotle’s view, virtue is a certain kind of excellence (1098a10-15). Virtue is therefore necessarily intrinsically motivated work with an internal standard of excellence.

of excellence.

Montessori also shows that the intrinsically motivated work which actualizes eudaimonia has an internal standard of excellence. Montessori argues that *perfection* is the standard of excellence that is internal to intrinsically motivated work. Note that perfection is here understood not as the highest good, but as striving to engage in an activity *rightly* or *as excellently as possible* rather than merely engaging in it. For Montessori, perhaps the most paradigmatic feature of perfection is *precision*, i.e. exactness and accuracy. She argues that children desire precision in their work: “in thousands of cases we have seen that the child not only needs something interesting to do but also likes to be shown exactly how to do it. Precision is found to attract him deeply, and it is this that keeps him at work” (Absorbent 164). The child is therefore intrinsically motivated to engage in work because he is fascinated by doing that work with precision. Further, this precision is a standard of excellence that is an *internal* part of that work rather than an external factor. For example, when a child removes and replaces cylinders from a wooden block precisely, this precision is a basic *part* of the work itself.²⁴ Montessori’s account of the relationship between intrinsically motivated work and excellence is therefore stronger than Aristotle’s—for her, engaging in intrinsically motivated work *requires* striving towards a standard of excellence (i.e. precision). As she puts it, “if we showed them exactly how to do something, this precision itself seemed to hold their interest ... the exact way of doing it acted like a support which rendered the child stable in his efforts ... order and precision we found, were the keys to spontaneous work in the school” (169). As a matter of fact, it turns out that work must have an internal

²⁴ I here refer to the cylinder block work. This work consists of a wooden block with cylindrical insets. These insets have a round knob on top, and by grasping this knob with a specific grip, the child removes the insets from the block. Using the same grip, she then replaces the insets.

standard of excellence in order to be intrinsically motivated.

Given this observation, Montessori posits that perfection (using precision as a key example) is an internal standard of excellence that is necessary for intrinsically motivated work to occur. Further, working in accordance with this internal standard of excellence will actualize perfection²⁵ because individuals who are intrinsically motivated to work with excellence will necessarily strive to become better and better through their work. As such, the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must have an internal standard of excellence.

To conclude this section, the fine and perfection both illustrate that the intrinsically motivated work which actualizes eudaimonia must have an internal standard of excellence. It is therefore *excellent* intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia. However, this claim fails to specify what *counts* as excellent intrinsically motivated work. Montessori and Aristotle differ in regards to this issue, and in the following section I examine this difference to form my own account of what counts as excellent intrinsically motivated work.

[5] Perfection and Excellent Intrinsically Motivated Work

Aristotle and Montessori offer differing accounts of what counts as excellent intrinsically motivated work. Both of these accounts are informed by how these philosophers view the relationship between perfection and excellent intrinsically motivated work. For Aristotle this relationship is conservative, and for Montessori it is progressive. This section examines these accounts of the relationship between perfection and excellent intrinsically motivated work and argues for a progressive account of this

²⁵ Here understood as the highest good or eudaimonia.

relationship. As such, one engages in *excellent* intrinsically motivated work when they strive to make themselves, their civilization, and even their work, more and more perfect.

For Aristotle, the relationship between perfection and excellent intrinsically motivated work is conservative—one *achieves* perfection by attaining a static final state in which one engages in excellent intrinsically motivated work flawlessly. This view is evident from his conception of virtue as *the most perfect kind of human activity*. In other words, virtuous activity is *the highest and most perfect level of excellence* that is possible for human beings to achieve—this is simply fundamental to what it means for virtuous activity to be virtuous. For example, a person who is courageous flawlessly acts in accordance with what is moderate “with respect to things that inspire confidence and fear” (1116a10). Only when he has developed his character such that he is capable of perfectly choosing and acting in accordance with this mean will his activity actually count as virtue. And even though what counts as courage will indeed vary by circumstance, the individual’s performance of those courageous acts will be the *most excellent* kind of engagement possible. In a word, individuals are not virtuous until they have formed a character that acts in accordance with the highest possible standard of excellence. Strictly speaking, for a truly virtuous person to continue to *improve* at virtue is therefore impossible because becoming *better* indicates that one’s prior level of excellence was not the most perfect. The relationship between perfection and excellent intrinsically motivated work is therefore static and conservative—a truly courageous man will be just as courageous as his courageous descendants thousands of years in the future, and that same man will exercise courage at the age of sixty just as courageously as he did when he was thirty.

The result of this view is that only *perfect* engagement in virtuous activity counts as excellent intrinsically motivated work. In other words, one's intrinsically motivated work is not excellent *until* one is capable of performing that work at the highest level of perfection possible. The virtues therefore represent the most excellent kind of intrinsically motivated work possible, and it is *only* work performed at this level that will actualize eudaimonia.

For Montessori, the relationship between perfection and excellent intrinsically motivated work is progressive—one *engages* in perfection by constantly becoming better and better through intrinsically motivated work, and seeking to engage in that work more and more excellently. There is therefore *constant* progress towards an infinite pinnacle of perfection: “let us consider a purely human center of perfection, the progress of mankind. Someone makes a discovery and society progresses along that line ... we see this constant progress, because in every age some man has added a point to the circle of perfection which fascinated him and drove him to action” (Absorbent 195). Rather than viewing perfection as a static final state in which one has achieved the highest possible level of excellence (as Aristotle does), perfection for Montessori involves becoming better and better. This progress has no end—it is infinite. She even seems to reject something similar to Aristotle's account: “What is perfection? Is it the possession of all the virtues, carried to the highest level, and if so to reach what? Here again we must try to be clear. By character we mean the behavior of men (though often unconsciously) to make progress” (194). In other words, through excellent intrinsically motivated work, individuals perfect themselves, their civilization, and even their work itself. Most importantly, even the *standards of excellence* to which intrinsically motivated workers

aspire to become more and more perfect through their work. An inventor therefore develops inventions that are better and better over the course of his career, and with each new point of progress there are more and *more* ways to for the inventor to raise his standards of excellence even higher. As individuals manifest this progress through their own intrinsically motivated work, wider human civilization becomes more and more perfect, collectively aspiring for excellences that earlier generations could not have even *conceived of*.

What this account shows is that intrinsically motivated work in which one constantly strives to make one's self, one's society, and one's work more excellent is capable of actualizing the intrinsically desired end of eudaimonia (i.e. perfection). As such, this kind of intrinsically motivated work *also* counts as excellent intrinsically motivated work. Aristotle's conservative view is therefore wrong to claim that what counts as excellent intrinsically motivated work is *only* achieving the most perfect level of excellence.²⁶ Rather, one can engage in excellent intrinsically motivated work by striving to become *more* excellent through their work.

As it turns out in the world, a vital component of what makes intrinsically motivated work desirable for its own sake is that such work involves striving to become more and more excellent in the way that the progressive view of what counts as excellent intrinsically motivated work describes. Intrinsically motivated work is intrinsically desirable because it allows individuals to continually improve, i.e. to work towards

²⁶ Also note that per the progressive view, setting a highest level of excellence would *limit* the progress of individuals, civilization, and excellent intrinsically motivated work, thereby *preventing* the actualization of eudaimonia.

*mastery*²⁷ (e.g., Nakumara and Csikszentmihalyi 89-102; Dweck 1040-1046). As Montessori explains, “a man builds himself by carrying out manual labor in which he uses his hands as the instruments of his personality and as an expression of his intellect and will, helping him to dominate his environment” (Secret 186). Although she puts it more in the terms of growth, development, and improvement, Montessori illustrates that the need for mastery is an essential component of what makes intrinsically motivated work worth engaging in for the sake of itself. Montessori’s view of what counts as excellent intrinsically motivated work—i.e. work that is oriented towards constant and infinite progress—therefore *supports* this need to for mastery, to become better and better, through intrinsically motivated work. In contrast, Aristotle’s account of what counts as excellent intrinsically motivated work is detrimental to the need for mastery. Once one is truly virtuous, they have accomplished the highest level of excellence and mastery possible. And given that intrinsically motivated work is intrinsically desirable because it involves a powerful urge to master that work, virtuous activity would seem to *lose* the vital quality of being intrinsically motivated because there is no way for an individual to continue improving.²⁸ For example, a truly courageous person cannot engage in intrinsically motivated work that makes him *more* courageous because he has already reached the height of perfect courage. Unable to improve this virtue further, the individual might become *amotivated* to engage in this activity. Note that the progressive account of perfection avoids this issue because there is no highest level of excellence,

²⁷ ‘Mastery’ might seem to imply that once we have ‘mastered’ an activity, we can no longer improve at it. However, what these psychologists really mean by ‘mastery’ is constantly working to improve one’s ability, in contrast to ‘performance’, which is proving that one’s ability is adequate, and need not be improved (Dweck 1040).

²⁸ A potentially helpful analogy is when one has ‘beat the game’ in a video game. Once one has achieved this highest level of excellence, and is thus incapable of working towards mastery and self-improvement, playing the game is no longer intrinsically interesting or desirable.

rather, individuals are *constantly* striving to improve themselves, which prevents the intrinsically motivated work that they engage in from becoming amotivated. What counts as the *excellent* intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia is therefore the process of striving for continual perfection through that work, *rather* than engaging in work at the highest and most perfect level of excellence.

[6] Intrinsically Motivated Work and Rationality

Taken together, the previous two sections argue that the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia is excellent, and that what *counts* as excellent intrinsically motivated work is engaging in the process of striving *towards* a progressive sense of perfection through this work. However, an internal standard of excellence is not the only feature of the kind of intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia. This section argues that the excellent intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must be *rational*, and that—despite what I expect is a common intuition—children *are* capable of engaging in this kind of work.²⁹

Aristotle is explicit that eudaimonia is actualized by excellent *rational* activity, i.e. virtue (1098a16-17). Recall that in the function argument, Aristotle argues that rationality is the characteristic feature of humans (1098a2-3). Our highest good is thus the excellent use of this rational capacity, i.e. virtuous activity. The excellent intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must therefore be rational.

In order to understand what kind of intrinsically motivated work is both excellent *and* rational, it is important to be precise about what rationality actually *is*. By drawing

²⁹ Although part of showing that children are capable of this kind of work involves making empirical claims about children, I begin by developing a conceptual account of ‘rational’ in order to evaluate and apply such empirical claims to my account of eudaimonia.

on Aristotle's discussions of rationality in *Metaphysics*, *De Anima*, and *Posterior Analytics*, I argue that in the most basic sense rationality is a capacity to know the reason *why*. In *Metaphysics*, Aristotle explains that those with knowledge "know the why and the cause" (981a30-31). In other words, knowledge entails an understanding of *why* something is the way that it is, i.e. what *caused* it.³⁰ Given that our ability to possess knowledge seems to be an important feature of our *rational* capacity, rationality itself must be a capacity to comprehend the reason why.³¹

However, our rational capacity is not limited to merely *knowing* why. As Aristotle illustrates, people *develop* an understanding of the reason why through experience: "science and art [which both grasp the reason why] come to men *through* experience ... art arises when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about a class of objects is produced" (981a2-7). In *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle explains that we form experiences out of repeated memories that are initially formed through sense-perception (100a4-6). In other words, through the experience of perceiving a certain number of particulars (e.g., different kinds of chairs) we construct an understanding of the universal (e.g., what a chair *is*) (100a9-100b 6). The universal, i.e. the cause and the why of a thing, therefore emerges out of the repeated experience of particulars, and Aristotle argues that "the [rational] soul is so constituted as to be capable of this *process*" (100a13-14, my emphasis). Rationality is therefore not only a capacity to *know* the why, but is rather a capacity to *form* an understanding of the why through experience.

Given this account of rationality, when Aristotle argues that eudaimonia is excellent rational activity, he means that the excellent intrinsically motivated work that

³⁰ Note that 'cause' here refers to the four causes: material, formal, efficient, and final (194b23-195a3).

³¹ One way in which Aristotle suggests this point is through the central role that knowledge plays in contemplation, an activity that is purely rational in nature (see 1177a12-19 and 1140b31-1141b5).

actualizes eudaimonia must involve exercising one's rational capacity to *form* an understanding of the reason why. Note that this condition hardly constrains the kind of intrinsically motivated work that will actualize eudaimonia—any goal-directed human behavior is informed by one's capacity to know the reason why, i.e. 'I will do this particular activity *because* it is conducive to this particular goal'. For example, I lock the door when I leave my apartment *because* I know that my personal belongings will be safer. And while most animals certainly seem capable of goal-directed behavior too, animals engage in such behavior due to *instinct* rather than because they have a conscious understanding of the reason *why* their actions will be conducive to a particular outcome.³² Even though human behavior can also seem 'instinctual,' we all possess a capacity to form an understanding of the reason why—and act using this capacity—that animals lack. So Aristotle is correct when he asserts that a capacity to know the reason why is unique to humans. As such, most intrinsically motivated work that *humans* engage in will meet the rationality requirement, merely insofar as it is goal-directed human behavior.

However, there is a common intuition that the behavior of *children* is importantly different from the behavior of adults in that it is not rational. If this intuition is correct, then children would seem to be incapable of the excellent rational intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia. In what follows, I argue that this intuition is incorrect because it underestimates the kind of work that children are capable of engaging in, and overestimates the requirements for rationality. Given the account of rationality developed thus far, children *are* capable of engaging in rational intrinsically motivated work.

Both Aristotle and Montessori claim that children possess a rational capacity at

³² For another way in which this point can be articulated, see Schapiro (Child 722, 735).

least in some sense. For Aristotle, this point follows from his assertion that rationality is the characteristic feature of human beings (1098a2-3). Given that children are *created* from human beings, they must also be human beings, and must therefore possess a rational capacity (at least in *potential*). Put another way, if children lacked rationality then they would not actually be *human*. Montessori demonstrates this point by providing compelling illustrations of how children can exercise their rationality. For example, consider the cylinder block exercise. Children engage with this work by removing cylindrical insets from a wooden block and then placing them back into their corresponding holes. If the child places at least one inset into the wrong hole, then there will be at least one other hole that cannot be filled because it is too small for the remaining block. When faced with a block that does not fit, the child must determine *why* that block does not fit in order to complete the work. At a very basic level, the child therefore exercises his rational capacity to determine the reason why through experience.

However, there are two important differences between the child's rational capacity and the adult's rational capacity that, although they motivate the intuition that children are not rational, do *not* mean that children lack a rational capacity altogether. The first difference is that, compared to adults, children tend to lack understanding of the reason why in the majority of cases. That is, their activity is largely focused on the process of *forming* this understanding rather than engaging in action *based* on that understanding. Although this difference might make it *seem* like children are not rational, just because children tend to lack *understanding* of the reason why does not mean that they lack the rational capacity to *form* that understanding. The second difference is that when children *do* gain an understanding of the reason why, this understanding tends to be

unconscious rather than conscious. Montessori explains that consciousness emerges around age seven, and before this point, the child may not actually possess *conscious* knowledge of the reason why. For instance, the child who uses her rational capacity to solve the problem of why the last cylinder block does not fit may not be *aware* that she understands this reason why. The child might therefore *seem* irrational because she cannot *articulate* the reason why even though she (unconsciously) knows it. However, this does not mean that the child [1] does not know the reason why or [2] lacks the capacity to *consciously* know the reason why once she gains greater self-awareness. In a word, the child seems irrational because her kind of rationality is different than ours—this does not mean that her rationality does not count as rationality.

Although children seem capable of rational intrinsically motivated work, it is unclear whether they are capable of the *excellent* rational intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia. As previously discussed, Aristotle asserts that it is *excellent* rational activity—i.e. the moral³³ and intellectual virtues—that actualizes eudaimonia. Children, Aristotle says, will not be capable of engaging in practical reason—“a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found” (1142a12-13)—and will also be incapable of intellectual virtues such as science and contemplation. But the reason that children will be incapable of virtue is not that they lack a rational capacity, but that they lack the experience to engage in that capacity *excellently* per Aristotle’s account of what counts as excellent. In a word, children lack the extensive experience that is necessary for knowing the reason why at the highest level, i.e. the complex practical and intellectual topics (such

³³ Moral virtue—i.e. hitting the mean in regards to contrary actions or passions—also requires that one exercise the rational capacity of practical wisdom. As Aristotle explains, one chooses the mean as “determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it” (1107a1-2). In other words, practical wisdom allows one to “take the right means” (1144a9) in order to hit the mean. Moral virtue is therefore also excellent rational activity.

as science and morality) that virtue requires knowledge of. For example, children lack practical reason because “such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives experience” (1142a13-16). For Aristotle, in order to engage in *excellent* rational intrinsically motivated work, one must perform virtuous actions flawlessly—this requires knowledge of the reason why at a level far beyond what children can achieve given their limited experience.

Although I disagree with Aristotle’s conditions for what counts as *excellent* intrinsically motivated work (see section 5), I do endorse his claim that children’s *understanding* of the reason why is considerably less developed than adults. Because children lack experience relative to adults, they have had considerably less time to form universal objects of knowledge out of sensory experience and memory. Again, this is not to say that children are not *rational*—they certainly possess a rational capacity insofar as they are engaged in the work of *constructing* their knowledge of the reason why. But children actually have *knowledge* of the why in considerably fewer cases than adults. However—as I will argue next—an underdeveloped understanding of the why does *not* prevent children from engaging in *excellent* intrinsically motivated work.

In the previous section, I argued that Aristotle’s conservative account of excellence is problematic because it wrongly limits the kind of intrinsically motivated work that counts as excellent, and has the potential to interfere with the intrinsically desirable nature of intrinsically motivated work. I therefore claimed that what counts as excellent intrinsically motivated work is the process of striving for continual perfection through that work. Given this claim, the rational intrinsically motivated work of children

is excellent because what counts as excellent intrinsically motivated work is not possessing the highest level of excellence (as Aristotle argues), but rather, striving to become more perfect through one's work. So although children do possess a far less developed understanding of the reason why than adults, they need not possess this understanding at the highest level (i.e. virtue) in order to engage in rational intrinsically motivated work excellently. Instead, they can engage in rational intrinsically motivated work excellently by striving to continually *improve* their knowledge of the reason why through their work. To conclude this section, the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must be both excellent and *rational*, and even children are capable of engaging in this kind of work.

[7] Intrinsically Motivated Work Must Respect Others and Promote Human Culture

The previous two sections have worked to establish that the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must be both rational and excellent. In this section, I use Montessori to develop two additional features of the kind of intrinsically motivated work that will actualize eudaimonia. Insofar as perfection involves the improvement of human beings at the cultural and social level, the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must [a.] respect other individuals and their ability to engage in intrinsically motivated work and [b.] be relevant for promoting human culture. The latter feature takes different forms for children and adults: the work of children must cultivate the culturally relevant skills that they need to adapt to their environment, and the work of adults must contribute to the production of supra-nature.

The intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia needs to respect others and their ability to engage in intrinsically motivated work. Montessori shows the

importance of this point by developing her classroom in a way that encourages children to learn this respect. Because there is only one copy of each work in the classroom, children must negotiate among themselves and decide the order in which they will use works that multiple children are interested in working on. If another child is already using a desired work, then other interested children must wait for the work to become available. Montessori argues that “important social qualities derive from this. The child comes to see that he must respect the work of others, not because someone has said he must, but because this is a reality that he meets in his daily experience” (Absorbent 203). Through these experiences, children learn to respect others and their ability to engage in intrinsically motivated work. Learning this respect is important because the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must respect others and their ability to engage in intrinsically motivated work. There are two reasons why intrinsically motivated work must be respectful. First, given that this paper establishes a general account of eudaimonia, prioritizing one person’s eudaimonia *over* another’s cannot be justified. The intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia therefore cannot interfere with other people’s ability to engage in intrinsically motivated work. Second, and very relatedly, the perfection that one actualizes through intrinsically motivated work involves a fundamentally *socio-cultural* nature—it is the perfection of human civilization and the human species as a *whole*.³⁴ Any intrinsically motivated work that is aversive or

³⁴ One of the ways in which Montessori shows this point is by arguing for what she calls “cohesion in the social unit” (Absorbent 212). Social cohesion requires respect for other people and their work, and occurs when individuals identify their personal work as being constitutive of the work of the group (213). From this identification emerges a sense that by engaging in the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes perfection at the individual level, the group as a *whole* perceives itself to be working towards the perfection of the group via intrinsically motivated work. In a word, the group is “oriented towards something that gives them solidarity and makes them into a group” (216). The intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must therefore respect others because this respect allows for the kind of group cohesion that actualizes perfection in the socio-cultural sense.

disrespectful to other human beings and their ability to engage in work will not actualize eudaimonia because this kind of work will interfere with perfection in the socio-cultural sense. For instance, if one was intrinsically motivated to engage in the work of warfare, that work could not actualize eudaimonia because it would destroy individuals and societies and therefore *prevent* their process of becoming more perfect. Given these two reasons, the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia needs to respect others and their ability to actualize eudaimonia.

Because perfection involves constant progress in a socio-cultural sense, the kind of intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must also be relevant for promoting and improving human culture. For children, this point means that their work must develop the culturally relevant skills necessary for them to achieve independence within their environment, preparing them to participate as a *producer* in that environment. Montessori emphasizes that children inherently desire to become independent (76). Achieving independence requires that children are capable of adapting to their environment so that they can function as fully independent individuals *within* that environment. Montessori describes the child's adaption to the environment as "a transformation of one's self of such a kind as to make one suited to one's surroundings, which then become a part of one's being" (93). Given that the child "constructs" (94) this adaptation to his environment "in himself" (94), education must provide opportunities for action that prepare children with the culturally relevant skills they need to adapt to their environment and participate in it fully.³⁵ All Montessori works are therefore designed to

³⁵ Montessori explains that children intrinsically desire learn these culturally relevant skills; they "take part in the activities going on about them ... using and handling the same things as the grown-ups. When the mother washes out some linen, or makes some bread and little cakes, the child joins in. Though his action is

cultivate competence in the culturally relevant skills of the society in which the Montessori classroom is situated. For example, the sandpaper letters work—in which children trace sandpaper letters with their fingers and then repeat the sound which that letter makes—prepares children to read and write in their native language.³⁶ Through these works, children adapt to their environment and achieve independence *within* that environment, ultimately allowing them to fully *participate* in that environment and improve it. For example, a child who works on the sandpaper letters will be capable of using the culturally relevant skill of writing to *participate in and ultimately improve* her culture. The intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia for children must therefore provide them with the culturally relevant skills necessary for becoming independent because this allows one to take part in the perfection of one’s culture. Note that independence actualizes perfection at the *individual* level as well—the child *self-perfects* by working to form herself into an independent adult capable of contributing to her culture. Further, the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes perfection for children must teach kids where their culture is at *currently* in order for them to be capable of advancing it to the next level through production.³⁷

For adults, the requirement for cultural production means that the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must contribute to the construction and perfection of the man-made environment. Montessori explains that “an adult has his own task to perform, that of building up a transcendent environment” (Secret 191), and is

imitative, it is a selective and intelligent imitation, through which the child prepares himself to play his part in the world” (154).

³⁶ Note that the *content* of this work depends on the culture in which the Montessori school is situated; Chinese children will trace sandpaper characters while American children will trace sandpaper letters.

³⁷ What counts as self-perfection is therefore affected by cultural context—the intrinsically motivated work that allows a Chinese child to become independent will be different than the intrinsically motivated work that allows an American child to become independent.

explicit that it is this kind of intrinsically motivated work that actualizes perfection in two senses. First, the intrinsically motivated work that improves supra-nature actualizes the perfection of civilization: “it is through work that their [i.e. adult’s] environment is perfected ... progress in civilization is directly linked with their manifold ability to create an environment” (187). For adults, work that does not improve the man-made social and physical environment therefore cannot actualize eudaimonia. Second, perfecting the environment through intrinsically motivated work is what actualizes perfection at the *individual* level: “a man builds *himself* through working” (186, my emphasis). In other words, the adult simultaneously actualizes *self*-perfection through the intrinsically motivated work that perfects the *environment* because what counts as excellent work for the adult just *is* the kind of work that builds up and advances supra-nature.

This section has examined two further features of the kind of intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia, both of which follow from the socio-cultural nature of perfection. First, this work must respect others and their ability to engage intrinsically motivated work. Second, the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must support the production of human culture. For *children*, this means that their work must provide them with the culturally relevant skills they need to become independent and fully actualize perfection at the social level. For *adults*, this means that their work needs to directly build and improve supra-nature.

[8] Integrated Extrinsic Motivation and Eudaimonia

To summarize the previous four sections, the intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia must be excellent in the progressive sense of *constant progress*, rational, respectful of others and their ability to work, and facilitate the production of

human culture. This, then, is the kind of intrinsically motivated work that will actualize eudaimonia. In this section, I consider an additional kind of motivation posited by Ryan and Deci—integrated extrinsic motivation. Work that is motivated in this way can actualize eudaimonia when such work is situated in the context of higher-order intrinsically motivated work. In order to make this claim, I need to first provide a brief description of integrated extrinsic motivation.

According to Ryan and Deci, integrated extrinsic motivation is engaging in an extrinsically motivated activity when the external factors that are motivating one to act have been integrated into one's conception of self and one's personal goals (62). Although the extrinsically motivated activity is still instrumentally desired for the sake of the end or outcome that it brings about, the activity has been reflectively endorsed and chosen by the individual because it promotes an end that is integrated into one's self (Gangé and Deci 334-335). As Ryan and Deci explain, "integration occurs when identified regulations have been fully assimilated to the self. This occurs through self-examination and bringing new regulations into congruence with one's other values and needs. The more one internalizes the reasons for an action and assimilates them to the self, the more one's extrinsically motivated actions become self-determined" (62). In a word, one integrates extrinsically motivated actions into the self by consciously reflecting on how such actions are conducive to one's personal goals, values, and needs, i.e. to the *ends* that one intrinsically desires. For example, I often feel extrinsically motivated to engage in the activity of studying for tests because I instrumentally desire this activity for the sake of its end, i.e. receiving a good grade. However, one could integrate this activity by reflecting on the fact that receiving a good grade meets an end that she intrinsically

desires³⁸—perhaps the personal goal of being a successful student. This individual’s engagement in studying would therefore gain an *internal* perceived locus of causality because she would feel *her own commitment to a personal goal* to be the cause of her engagement in this work.

Integration can also occur when one consciously reflects on how extrinsically motivated activities are situated in the context of larger-scale activities that are intrinsically motivated. As Ryan and Deci argue, intrinsically motivated activities are inherently integrated into the self and perceived as self-determined because one has chosen to engage in those activities entirely for their own sakes (58). Situating an activity that is *not* perceived as self-determined into the context of an activity that *is* perceived as self-determined therefore allows the individual to perceive her engagement in the first activity as self-determined. To return to the studying example, situating the work of studying for a particular test into the larger intrinsically motivated work of majoring in philosophy allows me to perceive my studying as self-determined. Through this process, studying gains an *internal* perceived locus of causality because *I* have reflected on how this work is a part of larger-scale work that I desire for its own sake. In other words, I perceive the cause of my engagement in the work of studying as being *my own intrinsic desire* to engage in the larger intrinsically motivated work of majoring in philosophy.³⁹

In sum, extrinsically motivated work can be integrated by reflecting on how that activity is conducive to one’s intrinsically desired *ends* or by situating that action in the

³⁸ Recall that this end is *also* desired for the sake of eudaimonia, and is therefore also *extrinsically* desired.

³⁹ Note that the integrated extrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia does not *itself* become intrinsically motivated in order to actualize eudaimonia. Such work remains extrinsically motivated, i.e. it is still *instrumentally* desired for the sake of the intrinsically motivated work that it is a part of. To again utilize the studying example, when I engage in the integrated extrinsically motivated work of studying as part of the larger intrinsically motivated work of majoring in philosophy, the work of studying is only desired insofar as it is situated within the context of the work that *is* intrinsically motivated.

context of a larger intrinsically motivated *activity*. Given that it is intrinsically motivated *work* which actualizes eudaimonia—work being an activity rather than an end—integrated extrinsically motivated work that is situated in the context of larger intrinsically motivated work is capable of actualizing eudaimonia because it is *part* of intrinsically motivated work. In contrast, extrinsically motivated work that is integrated by reflecting on how such work results in an intrinsically desired *end* will *not* actualize eudaimonia because this work is not incorporated into intrinsically motivated *work*.⁴⁰

An example offered by Montessori illustrates that it is doing extrinsically motivated work in the context of intrinsically motivated *work* (rather than doing extrinsically motivated work for the sake of an intrinsically desired *end*) that actualizes eudaimonia. Montessori describes a self-perfecting individual named Admiral Byrd who actualized eudaimonia by engaging in the intrinsically motivated work of discovering the South Pole (Absorbent 195). Byrd engaged in the work of begging in order to raise money sufficient for funding his expedition (195). This work was extrinsically motivated because it was instrumentally desired—Byrd engaged in it for the sake of being able to engage in the intrinsically motivated work of conducting his expedition. However, I argue that this work was *integrated* because it was situated within the context of a larger work that Byrd was intrinsically motivated to engage in—the process of discovering the South Pole. As such, the work of begging actualized eudaimonia as part of a larger work that was intrinsically motivated. Begging therefore actualized eudaimonia *not* because it achieved an intrinsically desired end, but because it was part of a larger intrinsically motivated task.

⁴⁰ Note that integrated extrinsically motivated work that is pursued *for the sake of eudaimonia* cannot actualize eudaimonia because eudaimonia is an intrinsically desired *end* rather than an intrinsically motivated *work*.

[9] Integrated Extrinsic Motivation, Reflection, and Children

The previous section argued that integrated extrinsically motivated work can actualize eudaimonia when an individual places that work within the context of a larger intrinsically motivated work. This section examines the process of integration from a developmental perspective, i.e. at what point (and to what extent) children become capable of integrating extrinsically motivated work via conscious reflection on their motivational impulses. To support and develop this account, I draw on Montessori, as well as the work of Tamar Schapiro.

Integrating extrinsically motivated work requires one to engage in self-reflection. As Ryan and Deci put it, an individual who internalizes an extrinsically motivated work “reflectively embraces an activity as his or her own, endorsing it at the highest order of reflection” (Ryan, Huta, and Deci 157). So in order to locate extrinsically motivated work in the context of a larger intrinsically motivated work, the individual must *reflect* on her motivational impulses and determine if and/or how the extrinsically motivated work will promote her engagement with intrinsically motivated work and the actualization of eudaimonia. Schapiro argues something similar: “in order to act, an agent must resolve conflicts among her various motivational impulses ... the resolution ... must express her will, her capacity for *reflective* choice” (Child 728, my emphasis). Although Schapiro is interested in the Kantian notion of autonomy rather than the integration of extrinsically motivated work, her observations regarding the extent to which children can reflect on their motivational impulses in order to choose their own work is relevant. Further, while Ryan and Deci are ambiguous as to what counts as the *highest* order of reflection, Schapiro is explicit about the requirements for being fully reflective.

Schapiro articulates two capacities that are required for individuals to reflectively evaluate and endorse their engagement in activity at the highest level. The first requirement is the capacity to consciously reflect on one's self (Childhood 588-589). The second requirement is the capacity to reflect on one's motivational impulses *in accordance with* what Schapiro calls a 'constitution' or a 'will', i.e. "a unified, regulative perspective which counts as the expression of her will" (Child 729). A constitution allows individuals to evaluate their motivational impulses in regards to *their own selves, values, and life goals* in order to determine the appropriate action. One's constitution therefore "stands in a determinate, authoritative relation to the various motivational forces within her" (729), allowing the individual to determine what activities are truly in accordance her self. In addition, Schapiro asserts that possessing a will is necessary for reflecting on one's life as a *whole*, and the kind of actions that are truly worth pursuing.

These two capacities—to consciously reflect on one's self and evaluate potential actions in terms of an established constitution—are what count as the *highest possible order* of reflection. However, these capacities are *not* what counts as the highest level of reflection for a given stage of development. Thus, in order to situate extrinsically motivated work within the context of larger intrinsically motivated work, individuals need only exercise these capacities *at the highest possible level given their developmental period*, rather than exercise these capacities at the *highest level possible for adult humans*. In what follows, I offer three examples of this point by examining the individual within each of the three planes of development.⁴¹

In the first plane of the development (age zero to seven), children lack both

⁴¹ I here refer to Montessori's developmental model, in which children display important developmental differences depending on the period or 'plane' of development in which they are in (Adolescent 1-2).

capacities proposed by Schapiro. Montessori explains that children are largely unconscious during this stage, meaning that they are not yet fully aware of their own selves. Similarly, Schapiro asserts that children are limited in their capacity to engage in this self-conscious reflection: “our capacity to reflect upon our perceptual and motivational impulses develops gradually” (Childhood 588). Further, as a result of being unconscious (and lacking extensive experience), the child has not established a constitution. At this stage, the highest level of reflection possible for children is therefore *little to no* reflection. However, children in this stage *need not* be very self-reflective in order to integrate extrinsically motivated work. Note that even the intrinsically motivated work that children engage in has micro-components that one could see as integrated extrinsically motivated. For example, the cylinder block work involves positioning one’s hands in ways that are initially uncomfortable and uninteresting—these fine motor movements could be considered extrinsically motivated because they are desired *instrumentally* for the sake of facilitating the larger work of completing the cylinder block exercise. However, because the work of positioning one’s hands occurs at such a micro level, the child need be only minimally self-reflective in order to integrate this work into the intrinsically motivated work of the cylinder blocks. Further, because small children follow a spontaneous impulse to engage in work for its own sake (Advanced 55) they need not reflect on their motivational impulses and align them with their constitution in order to integrate extrinsically motivated work.

In the second plane of development (age seven to twelve), children begin to develop both the capacities posited by Schapiro. For one, Montessori claims they start to become self-conscious—and as Schapiro suggests (Childhood 589)—self-reflective. The

normalized child has also fully constructed her own character, i.e. a character oriented towards intrinsically motivated work and self-perfection (Absorbent 190).⁴² Although the child now has a capacity to reflect on her motivational impulses, her *constitution* is not yet fully developed because the child has yet to establish the personal values and goals that will shape her life as a whole. The highest level of reflection possible in this plane is therefore the capacity to reflect on one's various motivational impulses in light of a character that strives for self-perfection via intrinsically motivated work—and this is precisely what is necessary for the child to integrate extrinsically motivated work. In the elementary classroom, children become interested in intrinsically motivated work that spans several months, is complex, and involves considerable planning.⁴³ As intrinsically motivated work becomes larger in scale, the extrinsically motivated components of this work also increase in scale, and therefore become apparent to children. For example, a child who is intrinsically motivated to engage in the work of creating a research report on red pandas might find the work of writing the report up less interesting than the work of reading about red pandas. Writing would therefore be *instrumentally* desired for the sake of completing the report, i.e. extrinsically motivated. Because this work is on a larger scale, the child becomes *aware* of this work as being instrumentally rather than intrinsically desirable. In order to integrate this work into the intrinsically motivated work of the report, the child must therefore [1] be capable of reflecting on his motivational impulses, and [2] be capable of considering these impulses in light of a character that

⁴² Although there are differences (beyond the scope of this paper) between what Montessori means by 'character' and what Schapiro means by 'constitution', both concepts are fundamental parts of the self that orient individuals towards the kind of work that is truly worth pursuing. Importantly, note that a child who has formed her *character* in Montessori's sense has *not* fully formed her *constitution* in Schapiro's sense.

⁴³ As they develop, children become interested in increasingly larger-scale work as part of an overall shift from the work of the child to the work of the adult. The adult's work is almost exclusively conducted on this scale. For example, consider Admiral Byrd's work, as well as Montessori's other examples of adult work: the inventor, explorer, and artist (Secret 186). These works are larger in both time and complexity.

desires to engage in intrinsically motivated work. The highest level of reflection that the child is capable of in this state—self-consciously reflecting and endorsing work that is in accordance with a character oriented towards self-perfection—is therefore precisely what the child needs to integrate extrinsically motivated work.

By the end of the third plane (age eighteen and above), the individual has fully developed the capacities that Schapiro establishes. The young adult is highly capable of self-reflection, and has fully developed their constitution. Rather than merely possessing a character oriented towards self-perfection, the individual has established personal values and goals, and aims to engage in intrinsically motivated work over the course of a complete adult life. As Montessori puts it, “‘the preparation of the organism’ is completed by the end of the eighteenth year” (Adolescence 82)—the individual is fully formed into an adult human being. At this point, what counts as the highest order of reflection is full use of the capacities Schapiro posits—reflectively endorsing one’s work via a constitution. And this fully formed constitution is needed to integrate large-scale extrinsically motivated work in to context of the *massive*-scale intrinsically motivated work of the adult (e.g., discovering the South Pole or inventing the next iPhone model).

In sum, the level of reflection necessary for situating extrinsically motivated in the context of intrinsically motivated work depends on the highest level of reflection that is possible given one’s developmental period. Human beings are therefore capable of actualizing eudaimonia through extrinsically motivated work once they are capable of engaging in intrinsically motivated work. Note that I am *not* arguing that young children are more reflective or have more developed constitutions than we commonly assume, but rather that in order to integrate extrinsically motivated work, children need not possess

these capacities at the highest level that is possible for *adults*.

Conclusion

This paper has developed a new conception of the highest good by drawing on the models of eudaimonia proposed by Aristotle and Montessori. This paper began by establishing the concept of intrinsically motivated work. I then argued that eudaimonia is the only intrinsically desired end, and that this end is actualized by intrinsically motivated work—in other words—individual instances of intrinsically motivated work constitute eudaimonia as a whole. I then examined the *kind* of intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia. I argued that the kind of intrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia has an internal standard of excellence that is progressive rather than conservative, is rational, must be respectful of others and *their* work, and must promote human culture. Next, I considered an additional form of motivation—integrated extrinsic motivation—and argued that work motivated in this way can actualize eudaimonia when it is situated in the context of larger intrinsically motivated work. Finally, I argued that the highest level of reflection is necessary for integrating extrinsically motivated work, and that what *counts* as the highest level of reflection is determined by the individual’s developmental stage—children can therefore integrate extrinsically motivated work *without* being capable of reflection at the highest possible level for *adults*.⁴⁴

I will conclude by suggesting that the account of eudaimonia laid out in this paper has profound implications for how we live, work, and educate children in contemporary industrialized society. First, we should regard the highest good not as being an overall

⁴⁴ In the appendices, I discuss two topics that are corollary to the account of eudaimonia posited in the body of this paper: [A] pleasure and [B] material goods.

experience of pleasure and well-being, i.e. happiness, but rather as arising from engagement with a certain kind of effortful activity. Second, we should focus our energies on engaging with *work* rather than with mere activity—this would require a shift from seeing work as grueling, unpleasant, and done for the sake of its outcome to seeing work as an attractive and beneficial way in which to exert energy towards personal and social improvement. Third, we should stop using rewards and punishments to motivate students, employees, and other individuals—these factors cause individuals to be *extrinsically* motivated, and therefore inhibit the kind of work that actualizes eudaimonia. Fourth, we should acknowledge that although children are not capable of engaging in rationality and self-reflection at the highest level possible for *adults*, they are nevertheless engaged in the *process of raising* these capacities to the adult level—we should thus consider this process as a genuine expression of both capacities. Finally, we should shift our energies towards the kind of work that allows ourselves and our societies to become more and more perfect; engaging in this constant human progress is indeed the highest good for human beings.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ As Montessori rightly claims, education is the best means to accomplish this goal:

“This is the difference between the new and the old education. We want to help the auto-construction of man at the right time so that mankind can go forward to something great. Society has build up walls, barriers. These the new education must cast down, revealing the free horizon. The new education is a revolution, but without violence. It is *the* non-violent revolution. After that, if it triumphs, violent revolution will have become forever impossible” (Absorbent 196).

Appendix A: The Highest Kind of Pleasure Supervenes on Intrinsically Motivated Work

This appendix considers an additional feature of intrinsically motivated work—that it gives rise to the highest kind of pleasure. However, pleasure should be introduced with caution. The account of eudaimonia I have developed is not hedonistic; it argues that the highest good is actualized by a certain kind of excellent work rather than pleasure. Arguing that intrinsically motivated work gives rise to pleasure could therefore seem to depict intrinsically motivated work as merely an instrumental means for maximizing pleasure, in which case *pleasure* would seem to be the highest good. In what follows, I use Aristotle and Montessori to show that this implication is false: pleasure can supervene⁴⁶ upon intrinsically motivated work *without* being what constitutes the highest good for humans.

Aristotle argues that the virtuous activity which constitutes eudaimonia is pleasurable to the individual who engages in it. He asserts that “to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant” (1099a9). Virtuous individuals love virtue (i.e. they desire virtue for its own sake) and therefore take pleasure in acting virtuously: “just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue” (1099a10-12). He extends this claim further, arguing that “the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly” (1099a17-19). In order to be considered virtuous at all, one must find virtuous activity pleasurable. Further, virtue is pleasant for the sake of itself: “virtuous

⁴⁶ Given that supervenience has a very particular definition when utilized by philosophers of mind, it might seem like the wrong word to use here. However, supervenience *is* the terminology utilized by Aristotle. I therefore use supervenience not to refer to mental states being consequent on neural activity in the brain, but rather, because it is the word that Aristotle uses to articulate the relationship between pleasure and intrinsically motivated work—pleasure is consequent on one’s engagement in intrinsically motivated work.

activities must be in themselves pleasant” (1099a20-21). In a word, virtue is pleasurable not for the sake of the external benefits that one receives from it, but for the sake of itself. Overall, these passages illustrate that for Aristotle, virtue (i.e. intrinsically motivated work) is itself pleasurable.

Although Aristotle seems to argue that virtue (i.e. intrinsically motivated work) is pleasurable, a closer analysis indicates that the relationship between pleasure and virtuous activity is more nuanced. Rather than *being* pleasurable, a certain kind of pleasure *supervenes* on virtuous activity: “pleasure completes the activity ... as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age” (1174b32-34). As this passage illustrates, for Aristotle, supervenience means that a thing is consequent on the existence of another. In this case, the pleasure proper to virtue is consequent on one’s engagement in virtuous activity. Another way to put it is that pleasure *arises from* virtuous activity. To say that pleasure *supervenes* on intrinsically motivated work therefore shows that pleasure is an external factor that is *consequent* on engagement in work for the sake of itself.⁴⁷ The language of supervenience also shows that the pleasure which arises from intrinsically motivated work is *not* the aim of this kind of work. The *aim* of this kind of work is engagement with the work *for its own sake*, and by working in this way, a certain kind of pleasure *arises from* the work.

Aristotle argues that the pleasure which arises from virtue is the highest kind of pleasure for human beings. He shows this point in three ways. First, Aristotle asserts that

⁴⁷ Recall that per Ryan and Deci’s definition of intrinsic motivation, it might seem as though intrinsic motivation is engaging in activity for the sake of the pleasure that is an *internal* part of that activity. Aristotle’s language of supervenience explicitly argues against this point—it asserts that the pleasure proper to intrinsically motivated work is an *external* factor that arises from engaging in this work *for its own sake*. I adopt Aristotle’s account because he shows that the view Ryan and Deci endorse does not count as the kind of work that actualizes eudaimonia. Rather, activity that is engaged in for the sake of its intrinsic pleasure is merely amusement rather than intrinsically motivated *work*. See footnote 51.

the pleasures which supervene on virtuous actions are naturally pleasant: “the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature” (1099a13-15). Pleasures that are naturally pleasant “stimulate the action of the healthy nature” (1154b20-21). Virtuous activity is therefore *naturally* pleasant because the pleasure that arises from the activity stimulates interest in doing the activity for its own sake (rather than for the sake of the pleasure). In other words, the pleasures that supervene on virtue are natural because they encourage virtuous activity—they are therefore conducive to the activity of a healthy (i.e. virtuous) character.

Second, Aristotle distinguishes the pleasure that supervenes on virtue from the pleasures that are produced by satisfying bodily appetites. The natural pleasures proper to virtue are therefore “noble pleasures” (1154a9), while the pleasures proper to the body are “the bodily pleasures” (1153a33); these latter pleasures involve satisfying an appetite in order to experience pleasure and ending the pain that results from leaving that appetite unsatisfied. A life focused entirely on satisfying the bodily pleasures would not be eudaimon because one would necessarily prioritize these pleasures over engaging in virtue. Aristotle therefore asserts that the virtuous person engages with the bodily pleasures in moderation: “(the man of practical wisdom pursues tranquil freedom from that kind [of pleasure]), viz. those which imply appetite and pain, i.e. the bodily pleasures ... This is why the temperate man avoids these pleasures; for even he has pleasures of his own” (1153a31-36).⁴⁸ Rather than maximizing the bodily pleasures, the virtuous person

⁴⁸ This is not to say that the virtuous person will not experience bodily pleasures. Aristotle argues that *all* people must experience the bodily pleasures that are necessary for survival: “all [people] ... enjoy in some way or another both dainty foods and wines and sexual intercourse” (1154a17-19). It is only a problem when these pleasures are pursued in excess. As Aristotle puts it, “there can be too much of bodily goods,

engages with them moderately (1154a15-17) and instead places her focus on virtue. She therefore experiences the noble pleasures that are at a more extraordinary level than the base pleasures of the body. Aristotle therefore illustrates that virtue gives rise to a higher kind of pleasure than merely satisfying bodily appetites.

Third, Aristotle argues that virtue gives rise to the best kind of pleasure for humans by appealing to virtue as our function or characteristic activity. As he puts it, “that which is proper and to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to reason [i.e. a virtuous life] is best and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else *is* man” (1178a5-9). Because activity of soul in accordance with virtue is our characteristic activity, it will be the most pleasant thing for us. Further, Aristotle argues that the activity most characteristic of our function as rational beings—contemplation—is the pleasantest of all the virtues because it is the most in accordance with our nature. As he asserts, “the activity of philosophic wisdom [i.e. contemplation] is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities; at all events the pursuit of it is thought to offer pleasures marvelous for their purity and their enduringness” (1177a24-27). Contemplation—being the virtue most in accordance with our function—therefore gives rise to the most noble pleasure; and virtue, because it involves exercising our function excellently, gives rise the noble pleasures overall. In sum, Aristotle shows that the pleasure which supervenes on virtuous activity is the highest kind of pleasure because it arises from our characteristic activity, and is both natural and noble.

Montessori also argues that the kind of pleasure proper to intrinsically motivated

and the bad man is bad by virtue of pursuing the excess” (1154a15-17). A virtuous person will therefore exercise the virtue of temperance and act in accordance with the mean in regards to bodily pleasures. But the important point here is that virtuous activity gives rise to a higher kind of pleasure than the pleasures one experiences merely by satisfying their bodily appetites.

work is a higher kind of pleasure: “a phenomenon of constant occurrence when the children begin to be interested in the work and to develop themselves is the lively joy which seems to possess them” (Advanced 72). By using the word *joy* to refer to the pleasure which arises from intrinsically motivated work, Montessori highlights that this pleasure is of a fundamentally higher kind. Aristotle’s language of supervenience is relevant for explaining the technical relationship between intrinsically motivated work and joy—joy is also consequent on engagement in work for its own sake. Joy can therefore be understood to *supervene* on intrinsically motivated work for Montessori in much the same way that it supervenes on virtue for Aristotle.

Further, Montessori emphasizes that the relationship between intrinsically motivated work and joy is not incidental; intrinsically motivated work is joyful *because* it allows the child to progress and perfect his character. Joy is therefore “the indication of internal growth ... the children themselves seem to have the ‘sensation’ of their spiritual growth, a consciousness of the acquisitions they are making by thus amplifying their own personalities; they demonstrate with joyous effusion the higher processes that are beginning within them” (72). Intrinsically motivated individuals experience joy because they rightly feel themselves to be actualizing perfection—they perceive that they are becoming better and better via their work. Montessori also argues that normalized individuals experience pleasures that most of humanity cannot access because they are *not* oriented towards intrinsically motivated work and perfection (Absorbent 195). She explains that “joys are open to” normalized people that “the others cannot dream of” (194)—self-perfecting individuals can experience this joy because they are constantly actualizing perfection through their engagement with intrinsically motivated work. As

these examples illustrate, the joy which arises from intrinsically motivated work is a higher kind of pleasure only accessible to those who strive to perfect themselves through that kind of work.⁴⁹

Both Aristotle and Montessori therefore illustrate that the pleasure which supervenes on intrinsically motivated work is the highest kind of pleasure for human beings. However, arguing that intrinsically motivated work *gives rise* to eudaimonia might suggest that intrinsically motivated work is merely an instrumental means to maximizing pleasure. If so, then *pleasure* would constitute eudaimonia rather than intrinsically motivated work. To overcome this concern, I use Aristotle and Montessori to demonstrate that understanding the relationship between intrinsically motivated work in terms of supervenience prevents this move. In a word, given that the intrinsically motivated work which actualizes eudaimonia cannot be engaged in for the sake of the pleasure that arises from it, intrinsically motivated work is not a means to maximizing pleasure, and therefore not what constitutes the highest good.

Aristotle argues that although pleasure supervenes on virtue, a virtuous person does *not* extrinsically desire virtuous activity for the sake of that pleasure. As he explains, “there are many things which we would be keen about even if they brought no pleasure, e.g. seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing the virtues. If pleasures necessarily do not accompany these, that makes no odds; we should still choose these even if no pleasure resulted” (1174a4-8). This passage illustrates that virtuous activity would be intrinsically desired (i.e. motivated)⁵⁰ *even if* no pleasure supervened upon this activity. In a word, the

⁴⁹ Montessori even takes this claim a step further by arguing that because intrinsically motivated work allows us to grow more and more perfect, it gives rise to *the only genuine pleasure for humans*: “the only stimulus worthy of man is the pleasure he derives from being conscious of his own growth” (Basic 44).

⁵⁰ Recall that intrinsically desired *activity* is intrinsically *motivated* activity.

aim of virtuous activity is not the external pleasure that *supervenes* on that activity, but rather, engaging in the activity *for its own sake*. As such, virtuous activity cannot be extrinsically desired for the sake of the pleasure that arises from it. In this case—i.e. one who engages in virtuous activity as an instrumental *means* to pleasure—the individual would be *extrinsically* motivated to engage in virtue and therefore be incapable of experiencing the pleasure that arises from engaging in virtuous activity for its own sake. Virtue therefore cannot be a means to maximizing pleasure because the highest kind of pleasure only arises when one engages in intrinsically motivated work, and one is not engaged in intrinsically motivated work when they work for the sake of maximizing pleasure. Intrinsically motivated work, rather than pleasure, is therefore what makes up the highest good.⁵¹

Montessori also demonstrates why intrinsically motivated work cannot be engaged in for the sake of the pleasure that supervenes on it. Montessori does this by distinguishing between pursuing an activity for the sake of the pleasure that it produces and experiencing joy as a result of freely choosing to engage in intrinsically motivated work. The following passage illustrates this difference:

“A lady of high rank once paid the school a visit, and being old-fashioned in her

⁵¹ Aristotle also argues that pleasure does not constitute the highest good by showing that activities chosen for the sake of pleasure are just *different* than intrinsically motivated work. He argues that eudaimonia does not consist in “pleasant amusements” (1176b8)—activities engaged in entirely for the sake of the pleasure and amusement which results. Pleasant activities seem to be like virtue in that they appear to be intrinsically motivated—“we choose them not for the sake of other things” (1176b8-9). But Aristotle disproves this assumption by distinctly separating pleasant amusements from the work that actualizes eudaimonia. Because one chooses pleasant amusements for the sake of the pleasure that is produced, these activities cannot be virtuous because they are actually *extrinsically* motivated. And given that we would still desire virtuous actions *even if no pleasure resulted* (1174a4-8), activity engaged in for the sake of pleasure cannot be virtue. By showing that pleasant amusements are different than virtue, Aristotle proves that intrinsically motivated work cannot be engaged in for the sake of maximizing pleasure because being motivated in this way typifies a different *kind* of activity. Thus, if intrinsically motivated work is not a means to maximizing pleasure, then pleasure cannot constitute eudaimonia.

views, she said to a little boy, ‘so this is the school where you do is you like?’

‘No ma'am’ said the child ‘it is not that we do what we like, but we like what we do’. The child had grasped the subtle difference between doing a thing because it gives one pleasure, and enjoying a piece of work that one has decided to do”

(Absorbent 231).

The ‘lady of high rank’ therefore levies a charge against children in Montessori schools: that they engage in the activities they find pleasurable *in order to experience that pleasure*, and are therefore *extrinsically* motivated. The child refutes this charge by asserting that he and his peers engage in work *not* for the sake of maximizing the external pleasure that supervenes on their work, but instead work for the sake of itself, and take joy in their work because it allows them to become more perfect. This passage therefore shows that intrinsically motivated work is not engaged in for the sake of the pleasure that arises from it, rather, one experiences that joy *because* they work for its own sake. Further, one who merely copies the work of a normalized child in order to experience the pleasure that arises from that work cannot experience that pleasure; for the imitator, the work is *extrinsically* motivated because it is engaged in *for the sake of* the pleasure. Montessori therefore illustrates that because the intrinsically motivated work which actualizes self-perfection cannot be engaged in as a means to maximizing pleasure, pleasure cannot be what constitutes eudaimonia.

To conclude this appendix, I have argued (with Aristotle and Montessori’s support) that the highest kind of pleasure supervenes on intrinsically motivated work. However, to argue that intrinsically motivated work gives rise to pleasure subjects my account of eudaimonia to the following concern: that intrinsically motivated work is

merely a means to pleasure, and if so, then pleasure would seem to constitute eudaimonia. This worry is resolved by considering that work cannot be *intrinsically* motivated if it is engaged in for the sake of the *external* pleasure that *supervenes* on it. If intrinsically motivated work cannot be a means to pleasure, then pleasure does not constitute eudaimonia. Thus, pleasure can supervene on intrinsically motivated work without making that work a means to pleasure—one will not even *experience* that pleasure if they engage in such work for the sake of the pleasure.

Appendix B: Material Goods and Eudaimonia

This appendix examines the role of material goods in my new conception of eudaimonia. If the highest good is actualized by a certain kind of work, then it is unclear what role material goods will serve. Aristotle and Montessori also address this issue, and by examining their treatment of the relationship between material goods and the work that actualizes eudaimonia, I develop my own position. I argue that material goods are only needed insofar as they provide two necessary conditions for engaging in intrinsically motivated work. First, material goods provide the equipment with which to *do* intrinsically motivated work. Second, they allow one to meet their basic physical needs. I also claim that although one's ability to engage in intrinsically motivated work can be facilitated by the material goods which provide good fortune, these goods are not *necessary* for engaging in intrinsically motivated work.

Aristotle explains that material goods are the necessary equipment with which one does virtuous activity, i.e. the materials upon which one conducts intrinsically motivated work. As Aristotle explains, "it [eudaimonia] needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments" (1099a31-1099b3). For example, one cannot exercise the virtue of liberality without having goods to be liberal with. Montessori also sees material goods as the necessary equipment for intrinsically motivated work. This point is evident by reconsidering Montessori's claim that intrinsically motivated work occurs when children are free to spontaneously engage with work. Without a material *environment* in which to freely choose such intrinsically desired "motives for activity" (Absorbent 188), children cannot engage in the intrinsically

motivated work that constitutes eudaimonia. More importantly, the materials *themselves* must be interesting and attractive in order for children to engage with them for their own sakes (88). Recall that Montessori works are manipulative exercises that involve specifically designed materials.⁵² These material goods which compose the environment are therefore essential equipment for facilitating intrinsically motivated work—Montessori emphasizes this point by placing considerable pedagogical importance on providing this prepared environment: “to ensure the psychical phenomena of growth, we must prepare the ‘environment’ in a definite manner, and from this environment offer the child the external means directly necessary for him” (Advanced 56). Thus, as both Aristotle and Montessori show, intrinsically motivated work requires external goods which serve as the material upon which one performs that work.⁵³

Engaging in intrinsically motivated work also requires that another condition is met in regards to material goods—one must be able to satisfy their basic physical needs. Aristotle makes this point by explaining that even engaging in contemplation, the most self-sufficient virtue (1177a28-1177b1) will require that one has the material goods one

⁵² For Montessori, these material goods must be precisely designed and “determined experimentally” (Advanced 55) in order for children to engage with them.

⁵³ Note that for Montessori, the external goods which provide the equipment upon which to do intrinsically motivated work must be interesting and attractive—this feature orients children towards engaging in these works. In contrast, Aristotle does not specify that the goods with which one does virtuous actions need to be interesting or attractive. I argue that the material upon which one does intrinsically motivated work—because it allows that work to occur—will necessarily be interesting and attractive to the individual who engages in it. However, as one uses these materials to engage in intrinsically motivated work, the materials themselves come to be of *instrumental* rather than *intrinsic* interest to the individual. As Montessori explains, “in the normalized child, his freedom to take an interest in all kinds of things leads to his focusing his attention not on the things themselves, but on the knowledge he derives from them” (Absorbent 199). The interesting and attractive manipulatives with which the normalized child works with become valuable not for their own sake, but for the sake the knowledge that can be gained from *working* on those materials. A child who examines a watch “opens it carefully to look at the wheels and levers which interlock and make it go. But this means he is no longer interested in the watch. His interest now is in the working of its complex mechanism; he wants not the object but the understanding of the object” (200). As this example illustrates, material goods are interesting and attractive to the intrinsically motivated worker *only insofar as they allow one to learn about or use that object by engaging in intrinsically motivated work.*

needs to meet their basic physical needs. Aristotle explains that, “being a man, one will also need external prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but our body must be healthy and must have food and other attention” (1178b33-1179a1). Although Montessori thinks that psychic wellness is largely more important than meeting physical needs (e.g., Basic 43) she nevertheless acknowledges that meeting these needs is vital in the basic senses of hygiene (Advanced 7-8) and nourishment (Basic 46). Having access to the material goods that are necessary for satisfying one’s basic physical needs is therefore a requirement for engaging in intrinsically motivated work.

There is a further issue in regards to material goods—possessing what I call good fortune—which I argue *facilitates* one’s ability to engage in intrinsically motivated work but is not *necessary* for engaging in that kind of work. Aristotle claims that “there are some things the lack of which takes the luster from eudaimonia, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born of solitary and childless is not very likely to be eudaimon, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death” (1099b3-7). Aristotle therefore argues that there are certain external goods—he here lists health, good children, an attractive appearance, belonging to a society, and good friends—which he thinks constitute “good fortune” (1099b9). For Aristotle, a life that lacks this good fortune cannot be considered to be fully eudaimon *even if* one is capable of engaging in virtuous activity. Lacking good fortune therefore interferes with eudaimonia irrespective of whether or not it prevents one from engaging with intrinsically motivated work. Aristotle seems to assume that this claim is backed by

common sense—a hideous and friendless person with sick children will not be fully eudaimon because such a life just appears difficult. Given that I place intrinsically motivated work at the center of my account of eudaimonia, lacking the material goods that constitute good fortune would only be problematic for my account insofar as it prevented one from engaging in that kind of work. Montessori’s perspective on this issue rightly illustrates that bad fortune hardly interferes with one’s ability to do intrinsically motivated work.

Montessori describes individuals who engaged in intrinsically motivated work even though they lacked the factors that Aristotle argues constitute good fortune. For example, Montessori explains that Admiral Byrd, “undertook the humiliating task of collecting money” in order to fund his expedition and then “exposed himself to all the torments of a polar expedition” (Absorbent 195). Given these conditions, Byrd would seem to lack the materials that constitute good fortune according to Aristotle. But Montessori asserts that Byrd’s actions are a paradigmatic example of the work that self-perfecting individuals engage in: “all he felt was the attraction of doing something never before done, and so he planted his banner among the others in the zone of perfection” (195). Montessori therefore illustrates that having bad fortune does not necessarily prevent one from engaging in the work that actualizes eudaimonia. Further, Montessori’s first schools were built in the slum districts of Rome (Method 56). These slum children—likely living in conditions that would constitute bad fortune—were able to engage in intrinsically motivated work so long as they were provided with the two conditions discussed above. Montessori’s perspective on this issue therefore illustrates that eudaimon individuals are capable of engaging in intrinsically motivated work even when

the factors that constitute ‘good fortune’ are lacking. Having the material goods which provide one with good fortune are therefore unnecessary for actualizing eudaimonia.

Although having good fortune is not a necessary condition for eudaimonia, it can nevertheless *facilitate* one’s ability to engage in intrinsically motivated work. For example, if Admiral Byrd had inherited a great sum of money, then this state of good fortune would have certainly *facilitated his ability to engage* in the intrinsically motivated work of discovering the South Pole. To consider another example, a supportive network of fellow intrinsically motivated workers can considerably enhance one’s ability to engage in intrinsically motivated work, as is the case when normalized children achieve social cohesion (e.g., Absorbent 212). Although these examples illustrate that having good fortune enhances one’s ability to engage in intrinsically motivated work, good fortune is not a *necessary* condition for engaging in the kind of work that actualizes eudaimonia.⁵⁴

To bring this appendix to a close, material goods are necessary for eudaimonia in two senses. First, they provide the materials with which to actually *do* intrinsically motivated work. Second, material goods allow one to meet their basic physical needs—a necessary condition for engaging in intrinsically motivated work. In addition, although

⁵⁴ A final implication of the arguments in this section is that external goods need only be *sufficient* for meeting the conditions that allow one to engage in intrinsically motivated work—they will definitely not be in excess. As Aristotle explains, “we must not think that the man who is to be eudaimon will need many things or great things ... even with moderate advantages one can act virtuously” (1179a 2-6). Montessori also shows her commitment to this claim by asserting that that an eudaimon person “is not preoccupied with external things. He only uses them at the proper time for the perfecting of his own inner life” (Secret 197). Eudaimon individuals will therefore use material goods merely to provide the conditions necessary for intrinsically motivated work. Further, maximizing the material goods that are necessary for intrinsically motivated work does not maximize eudaimonia—one only needs the material goods *sufficient* to engage with intrinsically motivated work. Also recall that these material goods are only of *instrumental* interest to the individuals who use them to engage in intrinsically motivated activity. This point is further evidence that material goods are a *means* rather than an end—to be interested in material goods for their own sake would therefore be problematic.

the material goods that provide one with good fortune enhance one's ability to do intrinsically motivated work, these goods are not *necessary* for engaging in that kind of work—one can engage in intrinsically motivated work *without* good fortune. As an additional point, insofar as the integrated extrinsically motivated work that actualizes eudaimonia is situated within the context of larger intrinsically motivated work, material goods are also necessary for engaging in integrated extrinsically motivated work in both of the ways that these goods are necessary for engaging in intrinsically motivated work. Similarly, possessing good fortune facilitates one's ability to engage in integrated extrinsically motivated work but is not *necessary* for engaging in that work.

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