Making it Stick: Navigating the Paradox of Gender Mainstreaming through Frictional
Encounters in South Sudan

by

Sarah Edwards

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for graduation with Honors in Politics.

Whitman College
2017

Table of Contents

Introduction

Sudan has been the site of ongoing civil war since the state became independent in 1956. The most recent civil war spanned from 1983 to 2005, and resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which officially split the country into Sudan and South Sudan in 2011 (Peace Agreements & Related 2005). While the two major political parties – the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) – came to an agreement, the independence process instigated a whole new host of disputes. Still, the referendum in 2011 is an important point in South Sudanese history because it not only formally established an independent state, but recognized the United Nations (UN) as an integral presence in the transition period. However, conflict continues to be a part of daily existence. While the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCRSS) in 2015 sought to bring the two warring factions of the SPLM/A together, instability still prevails (Intergovernmental Authority on Development 2015). At least 50,000 people have died in the civil war since December 2013, and thousands have fled the country (Dearden 2017) – over 500,000 refugees have sought refuge in Uganda since July 2016, and 90% of them are women and children (Quinn 2017). Additionally, a survey recently issued by the UN found that 70% of women in refugee camps have reported being raped since the violence initially erupted in December 2013 ("South Sudan blocks aid" 2017). Violence is a reality for thousands fleeing the conflict, and women in particular are continuing to struggle and negotiate with what the future might entail.

With these dynamics in mind, I turn to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) which was ratified in 2000 and is viewed as a concrete attempt to include women at all levels of peace processes. UNSCR 1325 utilizes the concept of "gender mainstreaming," which calls for a gendered approach in planning initiatives, legislation, projects, etc. and promotes equality in all institutions (Moser &Moser 2005). However, the way in which this resolution is articulated and understood is significantly more complex. A persistent gap exists between the rhetoric of "gender mainstreaming" – as 1325 posits it – and the ways it is implemented in a post-conflict environment. Under the ideological frame of mainstreaming women should be making strides in gender equality, yet those results have failed to translate. A constant feedback loop thus emerges from this problematic which cannot be blamed on the country's instability. While the UN seeks to address the gendered gaps within the country through a liberal peacebuilding framework, there is an inherent problem with the way mainstreaming frames the question of gender in South Sudan.

The underlying question of what it means to take the local into account in peacebuilding efforts is also essential for understanding this problematic. While the UN has sought to bring in more localized aspects, currently "the local and its 'culture' is instrumentally romanticized and the really existing 'local' dismantled in accordance with the predominant thrust of liberal and neoliberal thinking" (Richmond 2009, 159). My analysis complicates this viewpoint and exemplifies the unique way the "local" can renegotiate the position of everyday individuals in relation to their global counterparts. With this goal in mind, I pose the following question: How is gender mainstreaming –

as articulated by UN Resolution 1325 – taken up within South Sudan and in what ways do these dynamics manifest themselves in the overall landscape of peacebuilding?

I argue that gender mainstreaming inhabits a paradoxical state in South Sudan. On the one hand, it is a central policy component and integral part of the ongoing peace process; however, the rhetoric and ideology that mainstreaming purports continues to fragment women's experiences and compartmentalize their practical and strategic interests in society. While regional actors attempt to navigate this problematic, it is on the local level where individuals utilize the friction between universalized notions of mainstreaming and local realities to revise the mainstreaming discourse within a highly sensitive context. Consequently, this friction produces an understanding of women that moves beyond the liberal paradigm to recognize women's full agency and complicate notions of what is necessary in the overall peacebuilding framework. The larger implications of this research go beyond just the study of South Sudan. Gender is often sidelined in peace processes where women are not actively present in the leadership, thus this research not only speaks to the question of what's at stake for women in South Sudan but to the lives of women everywhere in unstable conditions.

To begin, I outline the conceptual frameworks and provide context about the agreements and constitutional components that comprise South Sudan. This section exemplifies how women are conceptualized in a legal sense, and demonstrates how they fit into the overall political framework. Following that, I present and analyze the AU's "Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan" to understand the root causes of violence and ways to move forward beginning from the ground. This report is an integral intervention as it critiques and analyzes the failures of liberal peacebuilding in

the country, as well as sets up my conversation of how gender can fit into broader discussions of peace and reconciliation. Subsequently, I turn to the international level and analyze the UNDP's Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Strategy (GEWES) 2016-2017. This analysis will set up the paradox I am examining, illustrating exactly how the current articulation of mainstreaming is simultaneously an integral and limiting policy in the country. Next, I turn to the regional level to analyze the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW) and their National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, as well as their Strategic Plan for 2013-2018. I find that the MGCSW is operating between two spheres – the government and the lived realities of women in South Sudan. Overall the documents reveal their inability to navigate between these two competing spheres, thus fragmenting women's strategic and practical interests. Lastly, I will bring in an analysis of the local through the South Sudan National Women's Strategy Report and the Juba Conference series on the role of civil society. These documents not only illustrate how local actors can actively reinterpret universal notions, such as gender mainstreaming, to fit their context but also reveal the complex ways women are establishing their agency through both formal and informal settings. These actors negotiate the paradox and utilize everyday practices to reimagine an approach to gender mainstreaming that is by and for women in South Sudan.

Conceptual Frameworks

Defining International Peacebuilding and Gender Mainstreaming

The liberal paradigm of peacebuilding emerged fully towards the end of the twentieth century as the international community propagated concepts of democratization, human rights, and economic liberalization within peace negotiations. Liberal peacebuilding is ultimately a liberal state building project modeled on a particular idea of the "good life." Thus, a liberal peace is built upon the idea that "liberty, competition, human rights, etc. are universally valued as core principles of individual moral freedom" (Tadjhakhsh 2011, 19). Yet it was not until the Agenda for Peace in 1992 that the UN Secretary General explicitly associated peacebuilding with the aim of democratization (Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty 2014, 368). This democratization of liberal peacebuilding rests on the inherent assumption that liberal democracy is superior to other forms of governance, as it provides institutions and leaders that supposedly improve the quality of life (Tadjhakhsh 2011, 20-22). Although, as Oliver Richmond (2011) states, focusing on "liberal institutions…rather than context, culture, or needs and welfare, ignores the experience of post-war reconstruction" (22). Ann Tsing (2005) exemplifies how culture can instead be understood through multiple levels, where the particulars of a culture interact with and overlap the universals put forth by globalizing agents. Tsing (2005) articulates that "cultures are continually co-produced" in these "frictional interactions" which are in turn sites of power and contestation (4). While picking apart the liberal peace order is beyond the scope of my research, it is nonetheless important to evaluate these

dynamics in conversation with my analysis because it provides a fuller picture of the logic of the liberal state.

Furthermore, one of the mechanisms of liberal peacebuilding is the aforementioned "gender mainstreaming." The term first became popular in 1995 during the Beijing Platform for Action conference, and from there expanded to many different facets of the UN. It was entrenched through the passing of UNSCR 1325, which calls for the "equal participation and full involvement [of women] in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security" (Moser and Moser 2005, 12). UNSCR 1325 was a major hallmark for UN peace operations because it set a precedent that was previously unacknowledged within the popular discourse of the international community. However, gender mainstreaming is a highly contested term within the fields of international relations and gender studies. Mainstreaming is embedded into the context of the "good life" that liberal peacebuilding propagates for it promotes a universal ideal that, once achieved, will supposedly allow equality to flourish. In Torunn Tryggestad's (2010) article analyzing UN gender norms, she argues that UNSCR 1325 is significant because it actively constructs new norms within the institution. Nonetheless, she also acknowledges that the integration of this norm into post-conflict situations is still highly dependent on other actors (159-171). Expanding Tryggestad's analysis to investigate who these actors are, as well what that means for South Sudan, is an important point of divergence I take in my research.

Critiquing the Liberal Peacebuilding Framework

While there are many different critiques that are lobbied against this framework, Dominik Zaum (2012) articulates two that stand out within the field: one

surrounding the ineffectiveness of the outcomes of liberal policies in a post-conflict state, and another which problematizes the universalization of liberalism itself (121-132). While Zaum advocates for an abandonment of the notion of liberal peacebuilding itself because it obscures "informal actors," prominent scholars in the field such as Ronald Paris argue that these hyper-critical stances are not well founded (Zaum 2012, 130; Paris 2011). Instead, Paris (2011) argues that there needs to be a simultaneous dissection of "the paradoxes and pathologies of peacebuilding" while still "ensuring that this critical enterprise is well-founded and justified" (33). He seeks to mitigate the critiques on ideological grounds, while still evaluating the apparent ineffectiveness of the outcomes – an important point that I also take in my analysis. Yet a focus on outcomes can also lead to "local cultures, institutions, actors, and practices [being] perceived [as] the liberal peace's other" (Richmond 2011, 6). Therefore, I evaluate everyday dynamics in conversation with the outcomes of liberal policies and how the former can inform the latter. Understanding how liberal peacebuilding "others" different local and everyday dynamics is essential for understanding its defining qualities.

Since gender mainstreaming fits within this dominant paradigm of liberal peacebuilding, the language of UNSCR 1325 has provoked the critique of feminist scholars who argue that its limited conception of gender both constrains women's agency and the resulting dialogue that ought to emerge (Barrow 2010, 222). This argument moves away from a liberal feminist approach to mainstreaming, which draws on the liberal peacebuilding framework outlined above, and provides a fuller understanding of the way its language is taken up by various actors. Ultimately, the

discussions surrounding UNSCR 1325 illustrate the "intellectual fault lines...between radical feminist research and empirical research focused on conflict resolution" (Olsson and Gizelis 2015, 3). Operating between these fault lines is key to furthering the understanding of mainstreaming within its local and regional context. Thus, in my analysis I will bring together these two perspectives in order to illustrate how constructions of gender at an international level affect both the ideological and logistical framing of women's realities on the on the ground.

Women and the State

Throughout my research, I explore different levels of discourse within South Sudan to understand how women fit into both the theory and practice of mainstreaming. The UN is still very present within South Sudan, and resolutions such as UNSCR 1325 require them to "promote, facilitate, support, and monitor the incorporation of a gender perspective in its peacekeeping operations" (True 2009, 43). This statement therefore requires that mainstreaming is taken up by the state in question, which is a process that I seek to uncover. Historically, the role of women in Sudanese politics and society is substantial. Sudan had one of the earliest and most vigorous women's movements in the Arab and African worlds, but since the achievement of these basic rights in the 1960's and 70's there has been little chance to extend those demands (Khugali 2001, 75). While women make up between 55-60% of the population in South Sudan, Muna Khugali (2001) argues that "the policies adopted by both the government and the liberation movement in addressing societal problems exclude gender policies in addressing national issues" (102). Women exist within a patriarchal society and that oppressive power is also reflected in "the functioning of

basic social institutions including schools, health services, employment, and the family" (Khugali 2001, 74). The socio-cultural and political aspect to gender discrimination thus reflects itself through different avenues, practices, and institutions. Debates surrounding these issues range in their approach, yet as Lona Lowilla (2001) articulates, "the pursuit of peace is a fundamental element in the human rights struggle of Southern Sudanese women" (102).

Moving forward, it is also necessary to analyze the universalizing discourse of gender. Some scholars argue that the universalization of liberal peace masks the material inequalities of women through positing a certain political subjectivity, thus limiting the scope of analysis. By positing women as the "victims" of warfare, scholars simultaneously deprive women of the ability to form their own subjectivity as political figures and ignore the complex societal dynamics that constitute them as such (Kim and Kim-Puri 2005, 151). This descriptor further essentializes women who are expected to assume the role of peace makers (El-Bushra, 2007). Yet J. Ann Tickner theorized that acquiring a gendered lens illustrates a more dialectical process through which the lived experiences of women are exemplified. Tickner's intervention is important because she grounds her theories in the lived realities of how gender is experienced and aims to construct knowledge based on the actual material conditions of women's existence (as cited in Narain 2014, 185). Scholars such as Kim and Kim-Puri (2005) operate similarly within this line of inquiry, and utilize a transnational feminist lens to reject dualisms such as tradition and modernity. They move away from a homogenized understanding of Third World women as objects of a Western feminist discourse, and therefore reject mainstreaming as it is a symbol of liberal

9

feminism (142). They utilize a post-colonial feminist discourse, which I will also do in my research to prioritize the perspectives of women living in South Sudan who are navigating oppressive structures and situations.

Furthermore, many scholars have sought to tackle the complexities of women in relation to the state and ask how feminist discourse can productively interact with different notions of statehood. The discourse of "Third World" women and the nation reveals that "the state – especially the post-colonial state – is regarded as of critical importance in women's lives, both public and private" (Rai 1996, 11). Consequently, women within post-colonial states are operating under different circumstances and power arrangements which are essential for understanding the way in which they navigate opportunities. Among many other lasting divisions, "the colonial powers refashioned gender relations within colonized countries through the exercise of not only material but discursive power" (Rai 1996, 8). This combination of material (lived) and discursive (rhetorical) power is reproduced within state institutions, so that they "embody complex gendered relations that work against women" (8). Nonetheless, the complexity of relations means that the state can also "provide resources for negotiation and struggle" (Rai 1996, 14). Thus, women are operating on various levels to advocate for what Maxine Molyneux (1998) terms as "practical" and "strategic" gender interests (231). Practical interests are those relating to everyday needs, whereas strategic interests are those "involving claims to transform social relations" for women in society (232). The combination of practical and strategic interests in a post-colonial lens reveals a complex negotiation based on "discursive elements" and other cultural and historical variations (Molyneux 1998, 233).

Transforming Conflict Through Local Processes

The pursuit of peace manifests itself within the rhetoric of conflict transformation. This not only entails the transformation of institutions, but a shift in attitudes and perceptions about the conflict as well. Lambourne (2009) explains that "this holistic and comprehensive approach to peace building implies" promoting a "culture of peace in place of a culture of violence" (34). It is here where civil society and other non-governmental actors can operate to deconstruct misconceptions and promote alternative narratives to the hegemonic discourse. In addition, Lederach (2007) argues that conflict is "driven by deep real-life experiences...that render rational and mechanical processes and solutions aimed at conflict transformation not only ineffective but also in many settings irrelevant or offensive" (24). Mainstreaming and other peacebuilding operations utilize this "rational" liberal approach to peacebuilding. However, reconstruction across and between peoples is much more complex, and thus embodies more of a "social space" which allows individuals to engage with local and historical contexts (Lederach 2007, 26).

While many scholars have recently sought to prioritize the "local" within peacebuilding, it is also necessary to not romanticize this realm to the extent that it is beyond critique. Randazzo (2016) addresses this concern and notes that positing the local or the "everyday" in opposition to the liberal peace can result in binary language and ignore the positive aspects of the peacebuilding structure (1362). Costa and Karslrud (2012) note this problematic and further argue that "power operates relationally and is managed by individuals to their own advantage rather than simply being imposed," thus revealing a more dialectical relationship between the different

11

levels of society (55). The local is always constituted through these multiple levels of interaction and is a dynamic and fluid process. I acknowledge this dynamism when I use the local level in my analysis, and as Randazzo (2016) iterates, also utilize it as a tool "to actively resist and oppose the liberal paradigm, as well as to renegotiate it and alter it" (1360). It is also within this paradigm that I engage with Anna Tsing's (2005) theory of friction most prominently. Tsing's globalization theory utilizes the metaphor of friction as way to understand how "heterogeneous and unequal encounters" between global and local actors "can lead to new arrangements of culture and power" (5). By using friction, she also illustrates how "universals become practically effective" and "inspire expansion – for both the powerful and the powerless" (Tsing 2005, 9). In my analysis of various actors in South Sudan, I utilize this notion of frictional interactions to understand how the liberal peacebuilding paradigm is negotiated – a process that is bound up in complex interactions and seemingly contradictory results.

Contextualizing South Sudan

Frameworks of Inclusion and Exclusion

In 1956 Sudan officially gained independence from the British, yet issues of secularism and regional autonomy eventually culminated in the first civil war. The war ended in 1972 with the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement, which granted limited regional autonomy to Southern Sudan. However, civil war erupted once again in 1983 when President Jaafar Nimeiri imposed Sharia Law in both the North and South. This conflict was long and devastating for the region, lasing twenty-one years until the signing of the CPA in 2005. The CPA foregrounded issues of power sharing between the two major parties, in addition to establishing a referendum for the independence of Southern Sudan in 2011. Notably, during this second period of conflict the SPLM began to recruit some women into the armed forces, prompting the creation of the position of Director of Women's Affairs in 1989. This position slowly transitioned to the Commission for Women, took on its current role as the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare after the CPA (MGCSW 2015). Nevertheless, the actual representation of women in the process of drafting the CPA was far from equitable. Given that the CPA also largely focused on issues of power sharing and wealth, it omitted critical concerns relating to health care, education, and human security – all of which women strongly advocated for in the process. The interim period was characterized by recurring instances of violence within and between communities, as well as the presence of UNMISS as a mediating force. Mahmood Mamdani (2014) argues that "it is wrong to think of South Sudan as a failed state – for the simple reason that South Sudan never was a state" (31). Therefore, while the CPA helped legitimate

those in power, it fell short in creating a state that adequately addressed the needs of its populace.

After the referendum for independence in 2011, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) put forth the National Transitional Constitution which enshrined various rights for women. Among them was a 25% quota for women in all levels of government and the official establishment of the MGCSW (Hoth Mai 2015). South Sudan's commitment to gender equality is laid out in Article 16 of the Constitution, which states that "women shall be accorded full and equal dignity of the person of men," have the "right of equal pay," and to "participate equally with men in public life" (GOSS 2011). Additionally, Article 14 states that "all persons are equal before the law" without fear of discrimination. However, when intensive fighting broke out in 2013 its implementation was halted substantially. In 2015 peace was once again negotiated with the help of international actors, leading to the ARCRSS. This agreement outlined the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) that was to implement the agreement, and once again guaranteed the 25% quota for women. The conflicting parties attempted to bring some women to the peace table, yet it was a minuscule number compared to the already established quota, and the inclusion of civil society was also not an accurate representation (SSuDEMOP 2016).

After the ARCRSS was signed, twenty-eight governors were appointed to each state - all of whom were men. Although women's participation both within the drafting and framework of these peace agreements has increased in recent years, they often continue to be conceptualized largely within the 25% quota. Women currently represent about 28.5% of seats in the National Legislative Assembly, yet this quota

does not extend to all branches of government and does not translate to lower levels of governance. There is only one women out of twelve members appointed to the Transitional Security Monitoring team, and only one on the Strategic Defense and Security Review committee responsible for formulating the direction of the country's security sector. The humanitarian assistance and reconstruction pillar also has 0% representation allocated for women. This leaves the healing and reconciliation sector as one of the only ones which meet the 25% provision, with three out of the seven participants being women (Hoth Mai 2015, 6-8).

Violence intertwines notions of gender and security even when constitutional components are sidelined due to unstable relations. The UN refugee camps currently house more than 30,000 people, and women live in constant fear of violence – community leaders told reporters that more than 120 women were raped over the course of a few days, a number consistent with UN reports (Folyton 2016). Aid workers and CSOs are greatly affected as well. In July NGO workers living in a compound in Juba were attacked and beaten, and in five instances raped (Grant 2016). Violence and instability is therefore a constant factor in the lives of South Sudanese women, as well as those attempting to respond to the situation. However, as various actors attempt to navigate these realities on the ground, a gendered lens is often missing in conversations about the country's security. Therefore, a dialogue about gender mainstreaming and how it conceptualizes women's role in peacebuilding can help illuminate these dimensions.

Providing a Template: The AU Commission of Inquiry

In 2014, the AU issued a report titled the "Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan," which was compiled by Mahmood Mamdani and specifically sought feedback from individuals and groups affected by the conflict. This was the first in depth investigation in the country, and provided a nuanced perspective for the international community. On January 30, 2016, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon noted the Commission was a "significant step" towards women's empowerment and urged all parties to take their analysis into account ("In Addis Ababa…" 2016). However, as I illustrate in my subsequent section on the UNDP, the UN does not reflect these recommendations in their actual mandates. While gender mainstreaming is not an official term referred to throughout the Commission's report, it is an important template for understanding the current violence and providing a more explicit critique of peacebuilding processes. This in turn sets up the conversation about the paradoxical state of gender within South Sudan, as well as providing a more nuanced understanding of how to move forward.

The report is laid out in four main sections, starting with the violence in 2013-2014 and then transitioning into current issues and recommendations for a way forward. Mamdani (2014) articulates two ongoing debates when it comes to the recurring violence: one about the role of responsibility and one about the role of culture. Representatives from the UNDP and from UN Women who were interviewed expressed the belief that part of the reason for the ongoing violence, especially against women and girls, is because the "gendered practices that are considered a part of 'culture' are heavily weighted against a female child" (23). As the report indicates

however, this recurring violence often acts as a target for international media to claim that African culture itself is the problem. Yet women interviewed in refugee camps articulated that culture could not account for the extreme violence because during the civil war in the North "the fighting was only on the frontlines, it did not involve women and children" (23). Thus, a gap in understanding begins to emerge when evaluating these two perspectives. While one side locates the blame within socio-cultural practices, the other prefers to look towards the larger political framework as the source of strife. Mamdani's analysis is consistent with this latter point, and states that those involved in the conflict look for explanations in the present rather than traditions of the past. He argues that "for this group, culture was historical and changing in a dialectical relationship with a rapidly changing reality" (24). It is this "rapidly changing reality" that the UN cannot adequately respond to given the strictly linear logic of peacebuilding efforts.

Furthermore, the section on justice and reconciliation is an integral part of the report as it sets up the framework for future peace processes. An important tenet of customary law in Sudanese culture is reconciliation and, as many expressed, popular reconciliation takes place out of necessity and often includes the active participation of women and youth (43). Mamdani draws a distinction between what is pragmatic and principled reconciliation, stating that "popular reconciliation has been pragmatic; necessary but not sufficient" (50). The reason it is not sufficient is because political justice cannot be achieved through this approach. As the Commission states, this failure to address issues of justice lies directly "on the shoulders of those who designed and steered the six-year transition ushered in by the CPA" (50). The Commission

17

uncovers the roots of the conflict by identifying the failure to address political justice and consequently reveals how the current crisis was produced. Additionally, the report indicates that context was largely overlooked in lieu of a state building agenda. This is where the failure of liberal peacebuilding is fully realized. By prescribing these "best practices" based on western paradigms, in reality it destabilizes state functions (Paris 1997). The Commission makes it clear that the state of South Sudan was never a fully formed entity. Nevertheless, the CPA and interim period attempted to build state capacities despite an apparent lack of structures to absorb them.

When the CPA was formed, reconciliation was articulated more as "coming together to drink from a common well" than developing a common policy for the future (Mamdani 2014, 27). Women's groups were also excluded from the peace process itself, and UNSCR 1325 was not considered given the restrictions at the time (Eltahir-Eltiom 2011, 144). This exclusion compounded the failure of the CPA as a peacebuilding initiative. In their conclusions, the Commission states that:

> "The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was responsible for setting up an unchallenged armed power in South Sudan, and thereby legitimizing both anyone holding a gun and the rule of the gun. Without the CPA that politically marginalized the civil population of South Sudan and ushered in an unaccountable political class, the SPLA would not have held unchallenged power. Continued support from the international community, in particular the Troika, kept this setup in place and reinforced the illusion of the political class that all it needed was international support to ensure its continued hold on power. That this political class should seem incapable of reform on its own should not come as a surprise" (56)

Consequently, the Commission calls for an "Africa Oriented Solution" that moves away from international dependency and a one-size fits all framework. This report exemplifies a nuanced understanding of the violence and offers a way forward outside traditional peacebuilding frameworks. As Mamdani articulates, "context is not the

opposite of the universal value or standard" but an "understanding that any concrete situation is an outcome of multiple causes: historical, political, moral, and economic" (54). Given this assertion, I turn to the UNDP for an entry point into understanding the problematic ways the UN understands and applies mainstreaming within the current context.

International Actors

UNDP GEWES 2016-2017

UNSCR 1325 was constructed by UN institutions and thus is subject to the norms and definitions which proliferate within that community. Additionally, while the UN operates in conjunction with regional partners, they also have their own agenda which sets the tone for future policies and processes. Given the ongoing instability, they still have a large presence and sway within the country. It is thus with this background that I analyze the UNDP's report on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Strategy (GEWES) for 2016-2017.

In January 2016, the UNDP issued the GEWES to reflect on the current state of women in South Sudan and outline future strategies. Their eight-point agenda for practical outcomes exhibit a wide range of issues ranging from women's security to gender-responsive recovery and developing capacities for social change (McDonald 2016, 6-8). As the report states, "the achievement of this eight-point agenda will require supporting full implementation of UNSCR 1325" (8). Therefore, the GEWES recognizes multiple levels of insecurity in South Sudan while also acknowledging mainstreaming as the catalyst for change in these sectors. However, this agenda is highly dependent on coordinating the actions of other agencies such as UN Women, UNMISS, and the GOSS to implement programs. The report is a "roadmap" for the Country Office (CO) in South Sudan, yet the CO is still viewed as a "vessel of the global UNDP system" (11). Consequently, this close-knit relationship to the UNDP continues to characterize how gender is understood in the country.

Furthermore, the report's gendered strategies should "empower women and girls" while simultaneously offering a "re-examination of gender roles and traditional practices as a primary focus" (15). Thus, the UNDP wants to "empower" women by "reexamining" roles, yet there is little reference to the current context and how it is affecting women's roles. Examining gender roles outside of this context therefore ignores the complexities of gender itself. Instead, the UNDP offers a two-pronged approach to tackling inequality through a gender mainstreaming framework. They seek to support empowerment through "gender specific interventions," as well as "address gender concerns in developing, planning, implementing, and evaluating all policies" (16). These two prongs aim to provide a holistic approach and build more "resilient communities" (10). Yet despite the holistic rhetoric that surrounds these discussions of mainstreaming, the local interventions that it lays out in the objectives section are articulated as just that – interventions (25). Gizelis and Krause (2015) argue that gender mainstreaming can only have a positive relationship with development if there are already "existing economic and social institutions" (172). The absence of the latter affects the former, yet the UNDP's interventions do not fully comprehend latter context they are operating in.

At times the UNDP tries to address this issue through the Do No Harm framework (DNH). This principle acknowledges the fact that foreign institutions have the power and means to affect conflict in a number of ways. However, it occupies a very brief portion of the report and only vaguely mentions the ways intervention should not cause "inadvertent harm"[1] and must be "evidence based" (McDonald 2016, 19).

---

[1] It is also notable that the UNDP does not provide a definition of "harm" in this approach, but merely assumes the concept to be broadly applicable.

Thus while recognizing their position, they do nothing to alter or address those power dynamics. As Richmond (2009) states, "these actors profess to 'do no harm' and often turn to local cultural practices in order to assimilate them into the top-down construction of the liberal peace" (163). Yet assimilating these everyday practices takes away women's implicit agency. Despite good intent, this allows international actors to subsume women's subjectivities before understanding the potential of their diverse positions.

The report also states that customary law "is an area where the CO must be very cognizant of the DNH approach and the preservation of human rights for women and girls" (McDonald 2016, 19). However, the UNDP does not articulate what aspects of these laws are problematic, but cautions that mainstreaming must be implemented "to ensure the future does not reflect the gender inequalities and harmful traditions of the past" (21). Firstly, the notion of "harmful traditions" connotes an anachronistic society that is unable to move forward into a modern framework of rights and policies. Secondly, this statement posits culture as one of the main obstacles to gender equality and thus represents the "generic 'other'" which peacebuilders seek to incorporate into "institutional and discursive forms of the liberal peace" (Richmond 2009, 151). The GEWES is therefore where the paradox explicitly comes to the forefront. Unlike the Commission of Inquiry, South Sudan's "past" and "culture" are viewed here as concrete entities rather than fluid realities. While gender mainstreaming is a part of this peacebuilding framework, there is a strict notion of what exactly constitutes it and women are consequently hindered by a "past" that deems them inherently unequal.

Juxtaposing the UNDP report with the AU Commission of Inquiry reveals important differences about how international actors conceptualize South Sudan. The GEWES utilizes the discourse of mainstreaming to drive its objectives and planning initiatives, but while the overall rhetoric reflects a general understanding of the context and its inherently interventionist role, the UNDP does little to remedy that in its strategic planning. Thus, gender mainstreaming assumes its paradoxical state while continuing to ignore the multiplicity of relations that constitute women's experiences. There is also a noticeable lack of avenues that would allow diverse groups to dialogue with these issues. On the contrary, in the Commission Mamdani thoroughly examines both the material and discursive realities of individuals on the ground and utilizes a discussion of everyday practices to further understand the situation. Comparing this approach to the UNDP's more top-down method to mainstreaming exemplifies how gender is not fully understood. The UNDP is operating from the paradigm of liberal peacebuilding and advocates for change through the lens of mainstreaming. The AU attempts to analyze the underlying causes of recurring violence through a critical lens in South Sudan, consequently producing an understanding that can more easily dialogue with complex gender relations in the country.

Regional Actors

MGCSW National Action Plan 2015

When South Sudan gained independence in 2011, the MGCSW initiated an investigative process that sought ways to strengthen the implementation of mainstreaming through UNSCR 1325. Thus, the NAP was created in 2015 to produce a shared understanding among government ministries, civil society organizations, and UN representatives. The NAP's overall goal is "to strengthen the participation of women in peace and security efforts and facilitate the creation of an enabling environment for their leadership and political participation" (MGCSW 2014, 11). These objectives focus on increasing participation through identifying key stakeholders with the clout to ensure these changes, in addition to finding ways to make the political climate more conducive to women's involvement. The MGCSW states that flexibility is inherently built into their objectives so that stakeholders can "rapidly respond" to these "changing environments" (12). And yet, the NAP makes no mention of how the on and off violence since 2013 has informed their view of gender mainstreaming. All they note is that sectors such as health and security have seen no substantial change in women's participation, while governmental sectors have exhibited an increase – largely thanks to the 25% quota. Thus, on the one hand, more women parliamentarians have been elected, but this representation has not been operationalized into other sectors that are equally important in a country where change on the political level may not necessarily translate to the local context (22).

A limited view of gender mainstreaming emerges from this analysis. Yet as Molyneux (1998) argues, women's strategic and practical interests should come

together in an "interest paradigm" and not be conceived in this sort of binary (235). The increase in women parliamentarians is a strategic interest for women, as it inserts them within the overall structure, but practical interests fail to be addressed. For example, government employees are mandated to come to work from 8 am – 5 pm in South Sudan, but women also hold significant familial responsibilities given the socio-cultural context. The initiative to include more women in government is thus not supplemented by practical strategies such as childcare and other support networks. Consequently, the NAP is fragmenting women's strategic and practical interests. While the political link between the two interests can only "emerge through dialogue, praxis, and discussion," UNSCR 1325 – and by default the NAP – does not provide these avenues (Molyneux 1998, 236).

Additionally, the NAP's strategic goals largely focus on trainings and gender sensitization programs to make their policies universally understood. They "identify and recommend competent women" for decision-making positions, as well as empower women on the local level to advocate for their communities through state institutions (MGCSW 2014, 34-36). Yet, despite the broad rhetoric of inclusion and empowerment, the NAP fails to advocate for the transformation of local communities beyond what it would add to their national objectives. The role of the everyday is only addressed in the justice section, and even then, it is only to advocate for "thorough research conducted on cultural and religious policies that are harmful to women and girls" so as to align with "international human rights standards" (68). While this is an attempt to address the societal context, it nonetheless acknowledges the universal discourse of human right standards as a binding obligation. In an attempt to counteract this

25

universalization, the NAP proposes a group called the "Male Champions" which would head awareness campaigns targeting men and boys on the local level (79). Yet while using this program to note how South Sudan's patriarchal society is problematic, it does not articulate how the "Male Champions" will bolster both the strategic and practical needs of women in the community.2 Therefore, the NAP is striving to prioritize a "rhetoric of inclusion" before fully addressing the experiences of women in South Sudan (Lee 2013, 380).

On the regional level, the MGCSW exemplifies exactly how difficult it is to negotiate this paradox that characterizes South Sudan. The MGCSW acknowledges mainstreaming as a central component of the peace process, as well as their personal mandate, yet its limitations do not allow the MGCSW to realize how women's subjectivities are constituted through both formal and informal spheres. Yet a discourse that sidelines this material, lived aspect also creates a view of the state as a monolithic social structure incapable of change (Kim and Kim-Puri 2005, 144). Consequently, feedback loops are produced that constantly ignore the practical interests of women throughout the country. While the NAP makes gains in addressing some inequalities experienced in the public sphere, the private sphere and its structural issues are not considered. Therefore, an incomplete picture of women in South Sudan is created in an attempt – however substantial it is – to fit women into the existing frameworks.

---

2 The term "Male Champions" is also extremely problematic in itself, as it contains paternalistic connotations which posit women as helpless actors in need of saving. This terminology further perpetuates gender roles and diminishes the agency that women inherently possess in their own lives.

MGCSW Strategic Plan 2013-2018

The MGCSW's Strategic Plan 2013-2018 offers more detail about what it will take for broader gender equality to be achieved in South Sudan. The Ministry cites the need "to develop a plan that is aligned to both the changes in the dynamic operating environment and the strategic thinking of the Government" (Kawje Lasuba 2013, 13). Therefore, this Plan is the Ministry's attempt to once again find commonalities between governmental strategies and the actual situation on the ground. It identifies gender as a cross-cutting issue that overlaps with the South Sudan Development Plan, but as a result ties gendered mainstreaming to the success of the state (13). This association helps to further isolate women. Since mainstreaming is the ideology utilized to understand gendered progress within the state, any progress outside these state structures is not taken into account. What the Plan essentially produces is a gendered strategy dependent on the existence of liberal state and peacebuilding mechanisms – a dependence that comes to limit how they dialogue with gender as a whole.

Nonetheless, unlike the NAP, the Strategic Plan makes more effort to acknowledge the public/private divide and outline that most women are employed in the informal sector (20). They illustrate that the higher one goes in government the less women are present, especially in areas such as Finance, Judiciary, and Executive (21). This indicates a commonly held perception that women in government are suited for more social-oriented services, revealing a gap in the mandated quota and actual perception of women's abilities (Edward 2014, 32). Yet while revealing this gap, the Plan does not offer any concrete solutions to address the realities of the patriarchal

norms that women are subject to and thus does not fully articulate women's strategic interests (Kawje Lasuba 2013, 24). Furthermore, the stakeholders analysis is a central part of the report as it identifies how different actors relate to the Ministry. The UNDP, UN Women, and Joint Donor Team are all expected to provide technical support and funding to the Ministry's efforts. Other international organizations and donors are expected to do the same, so while they might allocate the funds it is the Ministry who takes care of the overall planning. National and International NGO's are expected to collaborate with the Ministry and vice versa, while the Ministry of Justice and Finance are expected to have "timely releases" of draft budgets and bills. Local actors are not addressed in this matrix (28-30). While the financial components of these programs are extremely important, this sort of compartmentalization is more interventionist than supportive. It limits the chance for dialogue and does not acknowledge the work that everyday practices might be doing to address these problems.

Lastly, the Directorate of Gender within the Ministry has the primary task of promoting "an inclusive society" to "strengthen gender mainstreaming in all government institutions" (41). However, promoting "an inclusive society" necessitates highly inclusive policies. This sort of inclusivity is not possible without realizing the implications of women's strategic and practical interests, as well as their work in the informal sectors. All of the Ministry's programs also rely on numerical indicators as essential markers of success (39). While this may be necessary in some areas, quantifying gender equality through these means isolates women at the local level whose experiences fall largely outside this realm. Focusing on numerical indicators may also tokenize women and their experiences (Edward 2014, 30). Similar to El-

Bushra's (2007) critique, this can lead to an essentialized notion of women where their rights are solely instrumentalized for peace/state building ends instead of actual transformation of their position in society. The way the Plan is currently laid out reflects the internal struggles of the Ministry to operate decisively in a way that acknowledges the ideological framework of mainstreaming while still realizing its material consequences. Yet despite its extensive work, it continues to conceptualize gender mainstreaming in a way that fragments women's experience in the attempt to level broad, sweeping changes.

Overall, the regional level exemplifies the complex way gender is currently understood in South Sudan. Although the MGCSW produced both the NAP and the Strategic Plan, the two reveal slightly different approaches. The NAP advocates for policies that increase participation through structural programs and evaluations, and brings more context to the universalizing discourse. Yet the NAP still does not fully engage with the material and informal aspects of South Sudanese society. The Strategic Plan is more of an analysis of other stakeholders, yet its discourse once again reveals how the Ministry oscillates between international regulations and more regional realities without fully citing the violence that women face. As a result, women tend to be classified by either subsuming them into this mainstreaming discourse or not addressing them at all. This is where the second part of the paradox is established: women's strategic and practical interests are fragmented and overall experiences compartmentalized within the larger discourse, subsequently preventing its policies from having any real effect. In the next section, I will address how exactly this paradox is being negotiated on the local level and in what ways the fragmentation can be

remedied by a dialectical process of formation "which assumes instrumental agency"

for the women involved (Molyneux 1998, 236).

Local Actors

SSuDEMOP's South Sudan National Women's Strategy

There are many different analyses of peacebuilding which identify the gap between local and international agendas, but I argue for a more nuanced approach to illustrate how that gap is constituted. In September 2016, the South Sudan Democratic Engagement, Monitoring and Observation Programme (SSuDEMOP) was launched to develop the South Sudan National Women's Strategy. SSuDEMOP is a consortium of CSOs from faith-based organizations, NGOs, CBOs, and youth groups. They consulted 89 South Sudanese women and 27 men from all positions in society, and produced a document "committed to mainstream gender and provide gender equality in different sectors of society" (SSuDEMOP 2016, 6). Additionally, their overall objective is to "ensure that women's participation and contribution at a national level is seen beyond the limitation of the 25% threshold of gender quota" enumerated in the Constitution, in addition to "full recognition" of the meaningful work that they do within all different sectors of society (6). Thus, the National Women's Strategy takes on the 25% quota as its main impediment, outlining ways to push against and beyond it. SSuDEMOP is utilizing the voices of women to directly engage with the national agenda, and advocating to be treated as more than an afterthought (14). This move echoes Tickner's theory of knowledge construction, as it utilizes the lived experiences of women to inform their understanding of the policies at hand (El-Bushra, 2007). SSuDEMOP assumes a rights based approach, yet brings the discourse down to the local level to reimagine how mainstreaming engages with women. Ultimately, they reject some

articulations of the quota to create a new framework that pushes beyond the confines of the paradox.

The report also moves to develop immediate, mid-term, and long term strategies to improve relationships of support among women. This matrix allows both practical and strategic interests to come into the conversation, as it recognizes different timelines for its strategies. It does not hierarchize, and instead realizes the transformative potential of multiple approaches (Molyneux 1998). SSuDEMOP articulates that it is ultimately the "primary responsibility of the women in that sector to initiate processes designed to help them realize their aspirations…once this is achieved, then it will trickle down to the lower levels of the sector" (SSuDEMOP 2016, 26). Thus, this approach focuses on how women's progress affects others in a similar situation and does not rely on outside actors as heavily. The document lays out strategy tables for Women Parliamentarians, Entrepreneurs, Organized Forces, Academia, CSOs, Media, the Legal Sector, as well as Unemployed Women. It is notable that mainstreaming objectives in these Tables focus on women implementing them first and foremost, and while other actors are needed, women are the ones who dominate the discourse. For example, the main thrust in the strategy for women parliamentarians is for greater advocacy and data collection headed by the Women's Caucus and CSOs (29). In the CSO section, it advocates for a form of coalition building among women and utilization of entry points to perpetuate the hold women have in key posts (37). It is through this initial breakthrough that women's interests will be prioritized and seen beyond just a spot to fill. The document concludes with a table for the "Involvement of Women Employed at Different Levels in all Sectors,"

which focuses on the ability of women throughout society, regardless of position, to articulate their rights fully (44). Thus, they understand the ideological concerns and material realities of women, as well as the ability of some women to engage more fully and directly than others. This is a crucial point given the sheer number of women who are currently unable to participate in the public sphere due to the precarity of their situation.

Overall, the National Women's Strategy articulates mainstreaming in a way that prioritizes women's agency and encourages them to take the lead within their own sectors. It also pushes women to disseminate information about their rights with one another outside the context of mainstreaming (44). These recommendations combine the multiple forms of agency that women possess, and solidify their goals through dialogue between different sectors. Gender mainstreaming in South Sudan inhabits a paradoxical space, yet these strategies articulate the discourse in a way that recognizes women's experiences in full. It is this process which also embodies Tsing's (2005) theory of friction – actors from different levels interact around and within the universal ideology of gender mainstreaming, producing a frictional encounter that transforms global processes and utilizes a liberal peacebuilding approach to "form bridges, roads, and channels of circulation" (7). Transformation of any kind will begin with these encounters, as it establishes a dialogue and precedent moving forward that includes the voices of those most affected by violence. In the end, this rhetoric reflects the goals and hopes of a collective group of localized actors that see women as necessary for the future of South Sudan and deserving of say in what that future might entail.

Instruments in Both Peace and War: South Sudanese Discuss Civil Society

Actors

In 2016, the Rift Valley Institute issued a report titled "Instruments in Both

Peace and War: South Sudanese Discuss Civil Society Actors and their Role," which is

a compilation from the discussions at the Juba Conference series. Since 2010, the Rift

Valley Institute has organized an annual series of public discussions to promote

extensive debate about political and cultural issues emerging in South Sudan. The

participants came from church organizations, women's groups, the media, and

customary authorities, and is thus an excellent resource for examining different

advocates at the local level. Civil society in South Sudan has undergone many

iterations over the years given the instability. For one, CSOs receive substantial outside

funding and international support, yet organizations also find a way around issues of

funding as indicated by the large base of informal volunteers that women CSOs retain

(SSWEN and UNDEF 2014, 11). Thus, while civil society operates between the

citizens and the state, in the case of South Sudan those public and private lines are

much more blurred. This conference series makes strides in articulating what exactly

those lines look like, and therefore completes the discussion of how a combination of

gendered and local processes can act as transformative agents.

One of the first questions asked at the conference was: "what is unique about

the position of the chiefs and churches and civil society representatives in relation to

their communities?" (Juba Lecture Series 2016, 11). All of the participants involved

expressed one overarching answer – that these individuals were a part of the

community in a way that no outside organization could recognize. They garner both

trust and respect, and hold a stake in a thriving community. Bishop Enock Tombe

expressed that they can also "provide early warning on crises, much better than NGOs"

(11). This statement is particularly relevant for the current context, since unstable

relations characterize everyday life. Others such as Reverend John Chol and Madam

Modi articulated that chiefs and church leaders are available "among the people" who

can "speak for the voiceless" (12-13). They also expressed that there is a stark divide

between formal and informal actors. While the formal side signifies NGOs and

churches, the informal side is comprised of support groups and women's organizations

that operate from a more traditional context (15). Thus, defining civil society within a

strict context is troubling for these representatives because it is often on the informal

side where women participate to a greater degree. As the society continues to fragment

due to violence, so do the women themselves. Under the auspices of gender

mainstreaming, the informal is illegitimate and everyday practices are sidelined to

make room for the larger peacebuilding paradigm to take effect. While gender

mainstreaming is not explicitly mentioned, it is the hope of those involved that these

informal sectors – and thus more women – will be more empowered in formal

discourse. Consequently, what these representatives are advocating for is an approach

that legitimizes local initiatives – both formal and informal – and recognizes their

ability to generate solidarity.

Additionally, there is no common forum for traditional leaders to have a voice

beyond the local level (23). Especially in this moment, utilizing the local formal and

informal networks is essential in the absence of greater security. Bishop Enock Tombe

sums up the concern poignantly when he quotes Lederach (2007):

"Those who are familiar with John Lederach's pyramid: the civil society, the traditional leaders, the church leaders, they are all in the middle; and you have at the top, the political leaders and the military leaders; and at the bottom, you have the people. What is required is for us to work horizontally together and then vertically upwards and vertically downwards, so there are three approaches. Horizontal is first agreeing how and on what to work together, and also to deal with the issues related to those at the top and do the same for those people at the bottom" (41)

Currently the UN and their associates are not providing the space to conceptualize this kind of relationship because it would necessitate a different framing of gender mainstreaming. But it is this combination of vertical and horizontal processes, as well as negotiating the formal and informal in both political and everyday institutions, that characterizes the local level and daily experiences of women in South Sudan. Tsing (2005) states that ultimately universals are "limited by the practical necessity of mobilizing adherents" in a society (8). Therefore, these local actors embody this highly mobile and changing landscape of "adherents" that are actively reformulating liberal peacebuilding paradigms to articulate universals from the ground up. All that is needed is a platform and those that will listen.

Reflecting on this report, as well as the National Women's Strategy, exemplifies the vast array of individuals that are seeking to better women's position in society. Whereas international actors such as the UN are constrained by the linear logic of peacebuilding, these individuals can imagine a process that draws from multiple sources and experiences. Women do not exist in a binary reality and no universal – mainstreaming included – is going to fix that. While gender mainstreaming is supposed to elevate the position of women, that cannot happen if the realities of their strategic and practical interests are not addressed. Mainstreaming is a central policy component

and any future negotiations are going to include its principles. Nonetheless, analyzing these localized encounters reveals how it can fragment and compartmentalize women to the detriment of greater gender equality. Yet those involved in everyday practices navigate these frictional encounters, moving beyond the confines of liberal peacebuilding to realize the enormous potential of utilizing women's agency and local networks to affect real change in South Sudan.

Conclusions

South Sudan continues to be subject to violence on broad and minor scales, affecting the overall stability of state structures and local communities alike. Its brief history as an independent country began with international intervention during the process of the CPA, but it failed to address the tensions within South Sudan is exemplified by the violence that continues to permeate the countryside. While the country has signed the ARCRSS and is required to adhere to UN mandates, enforcing those mandates – let alone simple protections – is and will continue to be extremely challenging. Gender mainstreaming is a poignant example of this dilemma; equality within communities and institutions first requires security for the thousands of women who experience violence from day to day. Yet mainstreaming and security do not need to be mutually exclusive. The AU Commission of Inquiry reflects on this violence and provides an entry point for understanding a way forward that prioritizes a holistic approach to peace and reconciliation. Throughout this analysis, I have extrapolated on that structure to provide an essential component missing from the overall framework: an understanding of how gender fits into it all.

Ultimately, what I have provided throughout this analysis is a conceptual framework to help work through the paradox of gender within South Sudan. Mainstreaming is an increasingly integral discourse within the country, yet its impact is limited by its own liberal structure which fragments women's experiences through alienating strategic interests from their practical counterparts. Yet, viewing gender mainstreaming through a more fluid lens illustrates how identifying universals can also work to "identify knowledge that moves." (Tsing 2005, 7). This knowledge has the

potential to move across and between levels, affecting the way gender is understood in current and future contexts. Given the number of countries the UN currently operates in, this research reveals the larger implications of what it might mean to truly take gender into account in peacebuilding efforts. Women should not be viewed as additive, but make up an integral part of the framework from the beginning. While the situation in South Sudan is complex and arduous, this research has exemplified the countless ways individuals advocate for gendered interests regardless of positionality. Despite a strict mandate, everyday practices on the local level both by and for women are finding avenues to make their voice heard. Yet only when liberal peacebuilding mechanisms, and those that propagate them, acknowledge the dialectical process of formation that constitutes women's experiences in South Sudan will gender mainstreaming become a realizable and tangible reality.

Appendix

ARCRSS .... Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
AU .... African Union
CO .... Country Office
CPA .... Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO .... Civil Society Organization
DNH .... Do No Harm
GEWES .... Gender Equality and Women Empowerment Strategy
GOSS .... Government of South Sudan
MGCSW .... Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare
NAP .... National Action Plan
NGO .... Non-Governmental Organization
SPLM/A .... Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army
SSuDEMOP .... South Sudan
Democratic Engagement, Monitoring and Observation Program
TGoNU .... Transitional Government of National Unity
UN .... United Nations
UNDP .... United Nations Development Program
UNMISS .... United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSCR 1325 .... United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 2015. *Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCRSS)*. 17 August. https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final_proposed_compromise_agreement_for_south_sudan_conflict.pdf.

Peace Agreements & Related. 2005. *Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)*. 9 January. hhtp://refworld.org/docid/4c0377872.html.

Government of South Sudan. 2011. *The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan*. http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/The_Draft_Transitional_Constitution_of_the_ROSS2-2.pdf.

Juba Lecture Series. 2016. *Instruments in Both Peace and War: South Sudanese Discuss Civil Society Actors and their Role*. Juba: Rift Valley Institute.

Kawje Lasuba, Hon Agnes. 2013. *Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare Strategic Plan 2013-2018*. Juba: Government of South Sudan. http://mgcswss.org/wp-content/uploads/MGCSW-Strategic-Plan-2013-2018.pdf.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2014. *AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan*. Addis Ababa: AU Commission. http://www.au.int/en/auciss.

McDonald, Erin. 2016. *South Sudan: Gender Equality and Empowerment Strategy 2016-2017*. Juba: United Nations Development Programme. http://www.ss.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/library/Fact%20Sheets/GEWES.pdf.

Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare. 2015. *South Sudan National Action Plan 2015-2020 on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions*. Juba: Government of South Sudan. http://www.ss.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/library/Reports/southsudanotherdocuments/SS%20NAP%201325.pdf.

South Sudan Democratic Engagement, Monitoring, and Observation Programme. 2016. *South Sudan National Women's Strategy*. Juba: SSuDEMOP. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_46318-1522-2-30.pdf?160909102210.

Secondary Sources

"UN: South Sudan blocks desperately needed aid." 2017. *Al Jazeera,* March 6. Accessed April 5, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/south-sudan-blocks-desperately-needed-aid-170306193711077.html.

Barrow, Amy. 2010. "UN Security Resolutions 1325 and 1820: constructing gender in armed conflict and international humanitarian law." *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, 877: 221-234.

Costa, Diana Felix and John Karlsrud. 2012. "Contextualizing Liberal Peacebuilding for Local Circumstances: Unmiss and Local Peacebuilding in South Sudan." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7, 2: 53-66.

Dearden, Lizzie. 2017. "Women and children being raped and slaughtered in South Sudan conflict worsens famine threatening millions." *The Independent*, March

15. Accessed April 6, 2017.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/south-sudan-famine-dec-emergency-appeal-women-children-rape-murder-war-crimes-refugees-uganda-a7630201.html.

Edward, Jane Kani. 2014. *Special Report: A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*. Juba: The SUDD Institute. https://www.suddinstitute.org/publications/show/a-strategy-for-achieving-gender-equality-in-south-sudan.

El-Bushra, Judy. 2007. "Feminism, Gender, and Women's Peace Activism." *Development and Change* 38, 1: 131-147.

Eltahir-Eltom, Gihan. 2011. "The impact of UNSCR 1325 and peacekeeping operations in Sudan." In *Women, Peace and Security*, edited by 'Funmi Olonisakin, Karen Barnes and Eka Ikpe, 138-149. London: Routledge.

Foltyon, Simona. 2016. "'I begged them to kill me instead': women in South Sudan raped under nose of UN." *The Guardian*, July 29. Accessed April 5, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jul/29/women-south-sudan-raped-un-compound-juba-kill-me-instead.

Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene and Jana Krause. 2015. "Exploring gender mainstreaming in security and development." In *Gender, Peace and Security,* edited by Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Lousie Olsson, 165-184. New York: Routledge.

Grant, Harriet. 2016. "Attack on aid workers in South Sudan: 'There was incredible naivety'." *The Guardian*, October 17. Accessed April 3, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/oct/17/attack-on-aid-workers-in-south-sudan-there-was-incredible-naivety.

"In Addis Ababa, Ban urges leaders to build on progress in human rights and women's empowerment." 2016. *UN News Centre*, January 30. Accessed April 11, 2017. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53129#.WOw_9lMrLOS.

Hoth Mai, Nyathon James. 2015. *The Role of Women in Peacebuilding in South Sudan*. Juba: The SUDD Institute. https://www.suddinstitute.org/publications/show/the-role-of-women-in-peace-building-in-south-sudan.

Khugali, Muna Awad. 2001. "Women's Rights: The Challenge of the Transition." In *The Phoenix State: Civil Society and the Future of Sudan*, edited by A.H. Abdel Salam and Alex de Waal, 73-99. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press Inc.

Kim, Hyun Sook, Jyoti Puri and H. J. Kim-Puri. 2005. "Conceptualizing Gender-Sexuality-State-Nation: An Introduction." *Gender and Society* 19, 2: 137-159.

Lambourne, W. 2009. "Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 3, 1: 28-48.

Lederach, J. P. 2007. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, D.C: United States Institute for Peace.

Lee, Seryon. 2013. "Legal Feminism and the UN's Gender Mainstreaming Policy: Still Searching for the Blind Spot?." *Journal of East Asia and International Law* 6, 2: 368-384.

Lowilla, Lona. 2001. "The Human Rights Situation of Southern Sudanese Women." In *The Phoenix State: Civil Society and the Future of Sudan*, edited by. A.H.

Abdel Salam and Alex de Waal, 101-112. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press Inc.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2008. "Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace." *Cooperation and Conflict* 43, 2: 139-163.

Joshi, Madhav, Sung Yong Lee and Roger Mac Ginty. 2014. "Just How Liberal is the Liberal Peace?." *International Peacekeeping* 21, 3: 364-389.

Molyneux, Moly. 1998. "Analyzing Women's Movements." *Development and Social Change* 29: 219-245.

Moser, Caroline and Annalise Moser. 2005. "Gender Mainstreaming since Beijing: A Review of Success and Limitations in International Institutions." *Gender and Development* 13, 2: 11-22.

Narain, Seema. 2014. "Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives of J. Ann Tickner." *Indian Journal of Gender Studies* 21, 2: 179-197.

Olsson, Louise and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis. 2015. "An introduction to Resolution 1325." In *Gender, Peace and Security,* edited by Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Lousie Olsson, 1-13. New York: Routledge.

Paris, Ronald. 1997. "Peacebuilding and The Limits of Liberal Internationalism." *International Security* 22, 2: 54-89.

Paris, Ronald. 2011. "Critiques of Liberal Peace." In *A Liberal Peace?* edited by Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, Meera Sabaratnam, 31-51. London: Zed Books.

Quinn, Ben. 2017. "Makeshift justice the only recourse for ill-protected women at South Sudan camp." *The Guardian*, January 16. Accessed April 4, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jan/16/makeshift-justice-ill-protected-women-south-sudan-un-camp-malakal-protection-of-civilians-sexual-violence.

Rai, Shirin M. 1996. "Women and the State in the Third World: Some Issues for Debate." In *Women and the State: International Perspectives*, edited by Shirin M. Rai and Geraldine Lievesley, 5-22. London: Taylor & Francis.

Randazzo, Elisa. 2016. "The paradoxes of the 'everyday': scrutinizing the local turn in peace building." *Third World Quarterly* 37, 8: 1351-1370.

Richmond, Oliver. 2009. "The Romanticization of the Local: Welfare, Culture, and Peacebuilding*." The International Spectator* 44, 1: 149-169.

Richmond, Oliver. 2011. *A Post-Liberal Peace*. London and New York: Routledge.

Roberts, David. 2013. "Surveying South Sudan: The Liberal, the Local, and the Legitimate." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 7, 1: 65-86.

SSWEN and UNDEF. 2014. *Mapping Exercise of Women CSO's in South Sudan Report*. Juba: South Sudan Women Empowerment Network.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. 2011. "Open societies, open markets: assumptions and illusions." In *Rethinking the liberal peace: external models and local alternatives*, edited by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, 19-36. London and New York: Routledge.

True, Jacqui. 2009. "The Unfulfilled Mandate: Gender Mainstreaming and UN Peace Operations." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 10, 2: 41-50.

Tryggestad, Torunn L. 2010. "The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Gender: A Case of Norm Reinforcement." *International Peacekeeping* 17, 2: 159-171.

Tsing, Anna Lowenhaup. 2005. *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. New
    Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Zaum, Dominik. 2012. "Beyond the 'Liberal Peace.'" *Global Governance* 18: 121-132.