

“Near and Graspable”: Imagining a Binational Future for Israel/Palestine

by

Catherine F. Fisher

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for graduation with Honors in Race and Ethnic Studies.

Whitman College
2018

Certificate of Approval

This is to certify that the accompanying thesis by Catherine Fisher has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in Race and Ethnic Studies.

Zahi Zalloua

Whitman College
May 10, 2018

Table of Contents

Introduction: The Two-State Solution as Lost Cause	1
<i>An Interlude in Introduction</i>	6
The Idea of Utopia	6
<i>An Interlude on Aida Refugee Camp</i>	11
Racialized Utopias	12
Binationalism as the One-State Solution	18
Imagining a Democracy to Come through Aesthetics	21
<i>An Interlude on Incarceration</i>	23
A Roguish Lord: Paul Celan's "Tenebrae"	24
<i>An Interlude on Belfast</i>	28
An Ethics of the Poem: Celan and Butler	29
<i>An Interlude on Memorization and Translation</i>	33
Demanding Autumn: Darwish and Celan in Conversation	33
An Ethics of Would: Darwish's Love and the Conditional	37
<i>An Interlude on New Needs</i>	40
Conclusion	41
Bibliography	43

Introduction: The Two-State Solution as Lost Cause

On December 6 Donald Trump declared Jerusalem the capital of Israel and ordered the U.S. embassy to move their location to the sacred city. In his speech, he articulated, “after more than two decades of waivers, we are no closer to a lasting peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. It would be folly to assume that repeating the exact same formula would now produce a different or better result. Therefore, I have determined that it is time to officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel” (Trump). This move reiterates Trump’s typical tendency to reject complexity in favor of action. Implicit in his rhetoric is the common liberal appeal to the conflict as incredibly complicated¹. By deploying this discourse of extreme difficulty, action becomes impossible. Clearly, this is the discourse he reacts to when saying, “While previous presidents have made this a major campaign promise, they failed to deliver. Today, I am delivering” (Trump). By placing himself as an adversary of previous American leaders, he frees himself from diplomatic densities, instead acting quickly and brashly. It seems that between these two polarities – Trump’s premature action and liberal indecision – there lies a more ethical way to act. I would like to argue that this recent policy shift, although a stance that clearly aligns the United States with Israel and against the Palestinian cause, might force liberals to face what the Left already knows: that the two-state solution is a lost cause, in the most positive sense of the term. And that there is a cause more lost, and more worthy

¹ Of course, the conflict is quite complex. However, this discourse is often coopted in order to maintain the supremacy of Israel in the region. Redirecting the possibility of change towards an insistence on the difficulty of upsetting the status quo works in favor of the powerful.

of revitalizing – binationalism. I would like to think these two lost causes along side one another in order to ask why binationalism was lost, and who is fighting for the renewal of either cause. In these realizations, these causes as lost or worth reinvigorating, lay openness for new ways to think the land's future.

In Edward Said's essay, "On Lost Causes" he argues that for a cause to seem lost "something you support or believe in ... can no longer be believed in except as something without hope of achievement. The time for conviction and belief has passed, the cause no longer seems to contain any validity or promise, although it may once have possessed both" (Said *Reflections* 527). After Trump's declaration, the liberal media quickly named the possibility of the two state solution lost: "[This decision] points toward a future in which peace is less likely, a Palestinian state is less likely and Israel is one day forced to choose between the two core components of its national identity: Jewish and democratic" (Fisher). Here, Max Fisher argues that in light of Trump's policy, the cause of the two-state solution no longer holds any validity. The speed with which news outlets solidified this reaction, just three days after Trump gave the speech, shows that there was already belief in the conflict as a loss cause.

Binationalism, unlike the two-state solution, is a cause so lost that the word does not mean much to those outside of leftist academia². In her piece "Versions of Binationalism in Said and Buber," Judith Butler offers a genealogy of the idea. She

² Even within academia the term has no solid definition. Rather than try to fix this through offering an absolute definition of the term, I would like to define binationalism through the state I imagine, thus leaving what it could be open to interpretation and revision. My starting point for thinking this nation is as a single state with equal citizenship for all.

writes, “traditions of binational thought have been occluded by the changing history of the meaning of Zionism, even though binationalism named an important strain of Zionist thinking throughout a good part of the twentieth century” (Butler “Versions” 185). Today, these ideas surrounding binationalism have “disappeared from the semantic reach of political Zionism as we know, reemerging now as an emblem of anti-Zionism” (Butler “Versions” 187). I want to ask how this idea ended up in the mainstream wastebasket of history. Who put it there and why? As Herbert Marcuse, to whom I will return to later, wrote, “what is denounced as ‘utopian’ is no longer that which has ‘no place’ and cannot have any place in the historical universe, but rather that which is blocked from coming about by the power of the established societies” (Marcuse *Essay* 3-4). One reason why the idea of binationalism was occluded is the creation of the state of Israel itself. This power that Marcuse refers to solidified around the nation-state of Israel after 1948. Once the sedimentation of the state arose, binationalism was left behind. In this way, offering an ontological homeland in the newly formed state of Israel foreclosed the Jewish question for many. Closing the question also stabilizes Jewish identity around the state. I would like to, following Butler, reopen this question and upset the reification of identity by interrogating binationalism.

To return to Said, his essay argues that the cause need not remain lost. Rather, it is lost only under a certain set of circumstances, or even, under a certain understanding or narration of circumstances: “in the future, and given the right circumstances, the time may return, and the cause may revive” (Said *Reflections* 527). The question becomes, then, how one can revive the cause. As Said points out, “there

is no getting round the fact that for a cause to seem or feel lost is the result of judgment” in which “narrative plays a central role” (Said *Reflections* 528). While there is a certain reality and materiality to circumstance, there is also the judgment or discourse around a lost cause where one might intervene to reopen its future possibility. So, by telling the right stories and histories, we might be able to revive the worthy cause of a binationalism that is open to all.

However, in order to understand how to revive the cause, we must understand who deemed lost in the first place and why. Said reminds that,

In the world of political causes a common psychological strategy is for opponents to try to undermine confidence in the cause that opposes them; a battle of will ensues in which one side attempts to pile up one achievement or ‘actual fact’ after another in the hope of discouraging people on the other side, demonstrating to them that they have to hope of winning. (Said *Reflections* 529)

What Said points to here is the ideological deployments of facts. Facts never speak for themselves; rather, those in power offer a naturalized interpretive framework that makes sense of these facts in a particular way. This political structuring of what seems to be simple fact, in turn, brings about certain realities that either reinforce or undermine the very narratives that brought them about. It is these narratives that must be interrogated if one wants to stage an intervention into how the conflict is thought.

Prior to Trump’s announcement there were two main ways in which the conflict was considered a lost cause. The first is a certain understanding of history

furthered by academics and popular historians³. As Ilan Pappé writes in his revisionist history, *A History of Modern Palestine*:

The narrative thus presents a linear history of the modernization of Palestine from a primitive to a modern era. In the Zionist narrative, Zionism is part of that progress, and in the Palestinian one, Palestinian nationalism is the message and outcome of modernity. The conflict is seen almost as the inevitable, but temporary and dispensable, product of these two conflicting consequences of modernization. (Pappé 5)

Here, Pappé shows the way in which the West's colonization of the Middle East brought about the lost cause narrative, the understanding of the conflict as something unavoidable. If it is inevitable, we must simply sit back and watch it happen, nothing can be done, the cause is lost. Through spreading the discourse of modernization, colonization pits Palestinians and Israelis against each other in a race to Westernize. Nationalist historians on both sides of the conflict perpetuate this view of the conflict. In order to undo the lost cause narrative in this case, one must combat colonial ways of thinking and the value of modernization.

This narrative of modernization rests on two reified subjects – that of the Arab Muslim and the Zionist Jew. The myth of the eternal conflict paints these morbid portraits, the Muslim hating Jew, and the anti-Semitic Arab. It argues that these two warring tribes have not gotten along since the time of the Old Testament. Importantly, these two factors converge to offer, in the liberal discourse, the two-state solution. Since Jews and Arabs are ontologically at odds with one another, fixed in an eternal state of conflict from which they are unable to escape, they must each be given their own land.

³ See Thomas Friedman's *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, Bar-On Mordechai's *The Never-Ending Conflict: A Guide to Israel's Military History, My Promised Land* by Ari Shavit and other popular histories of the region.

The West continuously portrays the conflict as predominantly religious. This reification of identity along religious lines creates a climate in which one believes the current conditions change. Religion is conceived of as something stagnant, something one is born into and does not change greatly over time. Thus, the conflict becomes something that had to happen. In order to question the inevitability of the current oppressive reality, I would like to argue that the conflict is largely a struggle for self-determination amongst Arabs, a racialized fight for the end of colonial rule. While religion can obviously not be ignored, prioritizing more overlooked elements of the conflict is fruitful for rethinking the land.

This brings me back to my original observation that came to light after Trump's speech: that the United States recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel renders the two-state solution a lost cause. Perhaps with this liberating failure, we might think newly of these historical unrealities and flawed notions of the reified Jewish and Arab subject. With one cause left behind, we can dedicate ourselves more fully to the revival of the occluded cause, binationalism. While we look for alternatives, one cannot avoid that the present day reality is that the country of Israel is a one-state solution. Thus, the question for the Left is how to make this one-state solution democratic.

In my paper I will argue for binationalism through poetics. First, I will theorize utopia in order to argue that one must think beyond readily provided ways forward for the land of Israel/Palestine. This requires the demystifying of Israel's understanding of itself as a utopia. I will argue that the state's understanding of itself as a utopia is racialized. This leaves binationalism as the only utopic option, the only

democratic alternative for Israel/Palestine. Finally, I will use the poets Paul Celan and Mahmoud Darwish to understand what this way forward might look like, arguing that an openness to the other, a different way of thinking religiosity, and a certain orientation towards the past is key to bringing into being a utopic, binational state.

An Interlude in Introduction

Eventually, this academic paper will turn to the poetic. If I am a believer in one thing it is that if you read a poem, really open yourself to it, let it get between your toes, down under your fingernails, into the backs of your eyes, it will change how you relate to the world. I don't know that I can explain why this is or even if there would be a point in trying to doing so. All I can say is that I know it to be true.

There is such, such fear of poetry. Maybe this possibility of change is why. It can really upset you, keep you up at night.

Somewhere along the path of writing the rest of this paper, the more conventional parts, I became sick to my stomach. I threw up, really I did! It was rebellion at the idea of writing about something that undoes me, I mean really tears relentlessly at my seams, in such a detached way.

I decided to include these interludes to try and remedy that. It's an experiment. The metaphor falls short because if it were really true to the experience of poetry these interludes could never be contained. Still, I have made a choice about the importance of legibility. I think they are better than nothing. At least, I haven't thrown up again.

The Idea of Utopia

Utopia, first coined by Thomas More in his eponymous book, comes from the ancient Greek words *οὐ* meaning not and *τόπος* meaning place. So, the very etymology of the word connotes a non-place or impossible reality. Built in to the word is paradox, conflicting senses of possibility. This makes the notion of utopia suitable for a study

of the land of Palestine/Israel. Advocating for a radical way forward allows us to move beyond stagnant ideas of the future and instead make a leap into what could be.

In a 1967 lecture entitled “The End of Utopia” Herbert Marcuse resists defining utopia by instead working with what utopia is not or cannot be. He begins the lecture:

Today any form of the concrete world, of human life, any transformation of the technical and natural environment is a possibility, and the locus of this possibility is historical. Today we have the capacity to turn the world into hell, and we are well on the way to doing so. We also have the capacity to turn it into the opposite of hell. This would mean the end of utopia, that is, the refutation of those ideas and theories that use the concept of utopia to denounce certain socio-historical possibilities (Marcuse “End” 249).

This suggests that the end of utopia Marcuse calls for is an end to the idea that utopia is impossible, a revision to Thomas More and others’ definition of the idea as a no-place. Under late capitalism, we don’t have to dream of a better world. Rather, technology now allows us to actually bring into existence a better world. Thus, late Capitalism has opened up new possibilities for living. However, in order for us to see the possibilities of these technologies we must open ourselves to those very ideas that normative try to make unthinkable. He calls for the end of using utopia to condemn certain futures as impossible. The fact that many have derogatorily called binationalism utopic makes Marcuse’s work relatable to my project. Binationalism is not a utopian idea if by utopia one means the term in the more conventional sense of dreaming a better world as an escapist reality. A Marcuse informed utopian binationalism would be something we can achieve in the here and now. In fact, I would argue that there is an ethical imperative to do so.

For Marcuse “it is precisely the continuity of the needs developed and satisfied in a repressive society that reproduces this repressive society over and over again within the individuals themselves” (Marcuse “End” 251). Here, the internalization of capitalist needs reproduces the social formation. So, utopian possibility becomes a rewriting of needs, needs that are, contrary to those in dominant society, “liberating and gratifying” (Marcuse “End” 252). Luckily, “all human needs...are historically determined and historically mutable” (Marcuse “End” 251). Therefore, these needs are in no way naturally occurring or intrinsic and thus can be changed. The change begins by ending the current exploitative and naturalized understanding of needs: “the new needs, which are really the determinate negation of existing needs, first make their appearance as the negation of the needs that sustain the present system of domination and the negation of the values on which they are based: for example, the negation of the need for the struggle for existence” (Marcuse “End” 252). For Marcuse, these old needs are the idea that one must struggle to exist under capitalism. This idea of the perpetual struggle of the individual under capitalism echoes that of the eternal struggle between the Arab and the Jew. This foreshadows ways in which political economy impacts the conflict to which I will return later.

Once these old needs are understood as false and oppressive, a horizon can be made for the institution of new needs. I want to ask, what restructuring of needs that attends to the historical specificity of the conflict might bring about a binational utopia in Palestine? This restructuring of the present would necessitate both looking

backward, towards the particular histories of the land, and looking forward to new potentialities.

One way in which the needs of Israelis and Palestinians might be restructured is through conceiving of a need or desire for the Other that is always already within us. The reified conception of the Jew centers on an understanding of the identity as closed. Whether Judaism is conceived as a race, ethnicity, or religion, the coherent factor is its inaccessible status. The Jews are understood as History's Victim, a hermetic group. However, in a 2003 publication, *Freud and the Non-European*, Said radically deconstructs the Jewish subject. He writes, "Freud profound[ly] exemplifi[es] the insight that even for the most definable, the most identifiable, the most stubborn communal identity – for him, this was the Jewish identity – there are inherent limits that prevent it from being fully incorporated into one, and only one, Identity" (Said *Freud* 54). Here, in a way that applies to both the mythically constructed singular identity of the Arab and the Jew, Said, through Freud, argues that there is no group to which a singular identity can be attributed. All identities are constructed in relations to the Other and therefore cannot be understood as pure or completely insular. Freud articulates this idea through the figure of Moses:

The founder of Jewish identity was himself a non-European Egyptian. In other words, identity cannot be thought or worked through itself alone; it cannot constitute or even imagine itself without that radical originary break or flaw which will not be repressed, because Moses was Egyptian and therefore always outside the identity inside which so many have stood." (Said *Freud* 54)

So, not only can no identity be insular, but Judaism itself is founded on the non-Jew, on the proximity with the Arab. Or, as Judith Butler understands it in her work *Parting Ways*, "Jew and Arab are not finally separable categories" (Butler *Parting*

28). This radically deconstructs the figure of the reified Jew deployed by Zionists and Western liberals. If one understands the Jewish subject in this way, the two-state solution begins to disintegrate. This need for the other is also a need for a mutable and open identity.

This understanding of identity must also be rooted in material conditions. While the Arab is implicated in this both ancient and newly theorized closeness, the contemporary figure of the Muslim can be interrogated further with recourse to an understanding of liberal Islamophobia⁴. In *Polemics* philosopher Alain Badiou points to the change in anti-Semitism. He argues that, in much of Europe, the anti-Semitism attributed to many Arab and Muslim people is not traditional anti-Semitism, rather it has a class and historical component. There is not anger against the Jews as such, but rather the disenfranchisement of Palestinians and the poor opportunities available to low socio-economic classes. This analysis points to factors beyond the ontological that might cause distrust between Arabs and Jews. The impact of this understanding is that one can change if their hatred is not tied to their identity, but rather their circumstances. A historical and class-conscious reading of various terrorist acts undermines this liberal vision of Islamophobia where the Arab harbors an eternal hatred for the Jew.

Thus, the two-state solution requires a fixed and closed understanding of identity: the Jews must live separately from the Arabs and this points to a belief in their ability to be understood without one another in the first place. Further, it does

⁴ It is apt to note that Microsoft Word which acts as a canonizing force for acceptable language does not recognize the word “Islamophobia”. This shows one instance of the failure to see Muslim lives as worthy of protecting from racialized hatred.

not show a commitment to the possibility of change. By arguing that the Jews and the Arabs never have been able to live in peace and thus should be separated, it does not allow room for growth. This stale solution deals in dangerous ideas of identity.

By revealing the historically contingent underpinnings of these two reified figures, I have tried to create room for the reunification of the two through an understanding of their overlap. The Jews have long been thought of as the victims of history, always living in exile and diaspora. In 1948 the Israeli army forced over 800,000⁵ Palestinians from their homes in an event called The Nakba, the Arabic word for catastrophe. These families were forced into exile, and some endured still more horrors such as the Lebanese Civil War. While, as Rosemary Sayigh notes in her article “On the Exclusion of the Palestinian Nakba from the ‘Trauma Genre,’” this has not been considered as an international catastrophe on par with others, I would argue that the trauma of the Nakba is a point of similarity between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Further, the reality of exile for both groups connects them. In “Reflections on Exile,” Said notes,

While it perhaps seems peculiar to speak of the pleasures of exile, there are some positive things to be said for a few of its conditions. Seeing ‘the entire world as a foreign land’ makes possible originality of vision. Most people are principally aware of one culture, one setting, one home; exiles are aware of at least two, and this plurality of vision gives rise to an awareness of simultaneous dimensions, an awareness that – to borrow a phrase from music – is *contrapuntal* (Said “Reflections” 186).

I think this passage becomes incredibly important because of the future possibility of pleasure. A conception of exile as pleasurable might be another way in which to

⁵ The attempt to quantify suffering in numbers always ends in the realm of failure and misrepresentation. Yet, numbers and statistics have made their way into neoliberal discourse and, as such, become useful in eliciting sympathy.

understand Marcuse's restructuring of needs. The need for exile, for upsetting or unending the self, might find root in a binational utopia.

An Interlude about Aida Refugee Camp

Beneath my fingers I feel the pockmarked side of the school building. The man who lives here tells us that the wounds are from IDF shooting at children. Later, when we get back to our hotel room, my father insists that during the Intifada insurgents hid in the school, that was the only explanation for the bullet holes. My head spins, I am unmoored.

It is Christmastime. My family and I are in Israel. Just a few miles from Bethlehem, we visit a woman my brother knows who teaches English at Aida Refugee Camp. The wall around the camp is so tall the entirety is in darkness all day long. Along it, soldiers in green uniforms stroll slowly, menacingly. Since 1948, the houses have been built up and up and up, a visual representation of the fact that no one meant to live here for long. As more generations were born, the only place to go was up.

We stop at a map that has the Arabic names of the villages and towns. Our guide shows us where his family is from. He has never been there because he was born in the camps and does not have the papers to travel to see his place of origin though it is only 34 miles away.

Throughout the camp, people stop us to take photos or practice their English. They do not see many white people. On our way out, my brother stops to kick a soccer ball with a seven-year old. We hear explosions. Amused by our fear, the boy ensures us they are just fireworks. Proudly, he tells us he can hear the difference between gunshots, explosives, fireworks and just about anything else that goes boom.

As we leave the camp it begins to rain. Everyone comes into the streets to watch the water fall.

Racialized Utopias

Now that I have outlined the way in which I would like to use the term utopia, I have to contend with the more popular ways it circulates when discussing the land of Israel/Palestine. In order to resignify the term, it is imperative to wrest control from the ways in which the Israeli state tries to position itself. In debunking the myth of a Zionist utopia, the term can be alternatively deployed. Of course, arguing against the way Israel attempts to use the term does not erase these uses. Rather, by using the same term to denote an entirely different notion of the future points to an irony that undergirds my analysis, thus dissolving singular meanings and opening the idea of utopia to multiplicity. This multiplicity would encompass a future, a utopia, in which the state is truly open to all instead of open only to some based on race.

Zionist positioning of Israel as utopic is always racist⁶ because decisions of inclusion or exclusion are based on racial identity. One root of the Zionist fear of binationalism lays in the eventual outnumbering of Jews by Palestinians. If Palestinians were recognized as citizens, Zionists argue, they would bring about an end to the only Jewish state in the world. It is important, therefore, to turn to the work of scholars who have theorized Israel as a racialized state. In the introduction to her edited volume *Thinking Palestine*, Ronit Lentin argues,

Zionism was articulated as the imperative to protect the nebulous body dubbed ‘the Jewish nation’ from anti-Semitic persecutions... [thus] it is inevitable [to] theorize the State of Israel, from its very inception, as a racial state. Indeed, the prominent Israeli genetics professor Rafael

⁶ I use the term racist throughout to designate the way in which Israelis and Westerners reduce the Palestinian to a figure of intolerance and backwardness, a failure of modernity. Importantly, in the case of Israel/Palestine there is a corporeal aspect added to this dynamic which renders it racist as opposed to simply bigoted.

Falk reads the entire history of Zionism as a eugenicist project, aiming to save the Jewish genetic pool from the degeneration forced upon the Jews by diaspora existence (Lentin 8).

Since its very inception, even before the racialization of Palestinians, Israel was a state predicated on race insofar as it was conceived to protect and propagate a single ethnic group that some consider a race, the Jews. As early as the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Israel was constructed as “a national home for the Jewish people,” as opposed to simply a majority Jewish state in which non-Jews could have equal rights (Balfour). This understanding shows that the continuation of Israel as it exists today, as a state that affords citizenship⁷ on the basis of race, will always be a racial project to defend Jews at the expense of the indigenous Palestinian other. From this conceptualization, each time the Israeli government portrays itself as a utopia, there is a multivalent racism in this positioning. It is a racial project in and of itself to continue the current Israeli state since it is at its base built to perpetuate the Jewish race.⁸ Additionally, it perpetuates itself by juxtaposition with the Arab Other, thus reifying each identity. This becomes clear in two key iterations of false or racialized utopias: first, Israel as democratic, and second the state as accepting of queer people. Both positionings try to establish Israel’s singular modernity in the region.

⁷ In Israeli law there is no Israeli nationality. Rather, one can be a Jewish national of the state of Israel, an Arab national of the state of Israel etc. Commenting on this, the Israeli supreme court wrote that having an Israeli nationality would divide Jews from their preexisting belonging to the Jewish nation (Supreme).

⁸ While I spend much of the paper discussing the theoretical and rhetorical aspects of this violence there are also very material effects. These effects play out in two main ways: first, the bodily violence enacted disproportionately upon Palestinian civilians and secondly, the bureaucratic violence that “is the incessant slow work of taking the land from the Palestinians on the West Bank, supported by a Kafkaesque network of legal regulations” (8 Žižek “Anti-Semitism”).

Israeli politicians positioning the state as a utopic democratic space reduces and excludes both Jewish and non-Jewish peoples. This valorization of Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East allows the state to tie itself to the West and achieve the support of, chiefly, American politicians and citizens. In a speech given by previous Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on the occasion of the 53rd anniversary of the Knesset he began:

It is no coincidence that we are celebrating 53 years since the Knesset - the heart and soul of Israeli democracy - was established, on Tu B'Shvat. More than anything, the planting holiday symbolizes our renewed connection with the soil of the land and the Jewish people's full historic rights over the Land of Israel. (Sharon)

Here, Sharon strongly ties the false utopia that is Israel's alleged democracy to religiosity and exclusion. There is no attempt to evade the fact that Israeli democracy is only open to Jews. By offering the image of planting, Sharon dismisses an entire trope of the Jewish people as rootless and diasporic. Common throughout Israeli rhetoric, this move to root the Jews in the material land of Israel through evoking soil reduces the Jew to the Zionist. While Palestinians are clearly the most disadvantaged by a Zionist view that understands the land as distinctly Jewish, there is also an anti-Semitic reduction of all Jews to those who feel or literally are, rooted in or supportive of Israel.⁹

Sharon goes on to make a qualification of the land that shows how it is not the land itself, but the Jewish people who are laudable which undermines his earlier claim to the mere geography and highlights instead his supremacist tendencies. He says,

⁹ Recognizing the power at work in attempting to define all Jews as Zionists is important because the category of Palestinian is in part defined by a certain understanding of Jewishness. If one upsets one of these categories the other, too, becomes destabilized.

“Thus, 53 years ago, in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, we planted the Knesset of Israel in the hard soil of the terraces and their environs, which was, on the whole, hostile to the fragile Israeli democracy” (Sharon). His discussion of hostility remains oddly without actors. Any resistance by individuals, Palestinian or otherwise, is reduced to the opposition of the desert itself. This total dismissal characterizes his understanding of resistance as simply environmental and without actual importance, thus dehumanizing any who object to the state. By understanding resistance in this way, the link between positioning Israel as a democracy and racism becomes clear. There is no room within the so-called democracy for anyone but one race: the Jews. He goes on to say,

This is the day of Israel's victory as a fighting democracy characterized by a steadfast stand and struggle to realize the Jewish people's historic rights in its country on the one hand, and the fight to realize civil rights and equality of opportunity as the Middle East's only genuine democracy, on the other. (Sharon)

Here, Sharon contrasts the Jew's right to Israel with the state as a “genuine democracy”. Oddly, this recognition does not in any way qualify the Jewish¹⁰ right to create the nation-state at the continued expense of the Palestinians. His designation of Israel “as the Middle East's only genuine democracy” has Orientalist and supremacist underpinnings. As he recounted earlier, the land itself is understood as contrary to democracy itself. Thus, in his logic, the Jewish people are better than the Arabs who lived there before and failed to instate this ideal form of government. This, too, shows the racist thought inherent in naming Israel the only democracy in the Middle East. Still, Sharon's use of the oppositional “on one hand... on the other” points towards the

¹⁰ Here, I use the word Jewish because it is what Sharon would argue, but I think the word Zionist is more applicable.

fact that he himself is running up against the very impossibility of a theocratic democracy.

As Said asserts in his 1999 essay, “The One-State Solution,” that the allotment of citizenship based on “ethnic and religious criteria...make Israel in effect an undemocratic state for 20 percent of its population” (Said “One” 5). The fact of discrimination and inequality between citizens renders Israel a failed democracy. By positing themselves as a democracy, Israel and complicity the West, feed a racist discourse about the barbaric totalitarian states in the Middle East to which Israel stands in opposition. Further, the very existence of a theocratic state prevents democracy because it is only open to those with the same religious beliefs¹¹.

This utopic positioning of Israel as democratic grows into other racist ways of valorizing the state such as their seeming acceptance of queer people. A US based public relations company called Blue Star, responsible for “humanizing Israel,” makes videos about gay life in Israel (“About”). In their video “Israel: Gay Oasis,” they offer a visual argument that places Israelis on the international moral high ground¹² because of their open minded approach to LGBT issues. The video carries on a similar rhetorical approach as Sharon in beginning the visuals with images of barren desert and the narrator valorizing the Israeli ability to make a society in such

¹¹ This religious division becomes more complicated in the case of Israel/Palestine when Jews, which are both considered a race of peoples and white in the eyes of the West, profile Arabs without regard for their religious beliefs. For a fantastic account of the racialization of Muslims read “The Story of Islamophobia” by Junaid Rana.

¹² They do this directly by expressing surprise at the United State’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and reiterating that queer people are allowed to serve in the Israeli Defense Force. In this way they call attention to their own acceptance of queer people that not only exceeds the stereotypically low bar of the homophobic Muslim but also the seemingly progressive United States.

harsh conditions. This valorization already posits the Jews as superior to Palestinians in that they deserve recognition for their society, suggesting that it is more successful. Thus, the understanding of Israel as a gay utopia also perpetuates racist arguments.

Sarah Schulman theorizes the relationship between queerness and the state in her book *Homonationalism*. She defines the term as

a contemporary phenomenon...where white gays, lesbians and bisexuals (and in some cases transsexuals) have won a full range of legal rights. Through marriage, parenthood, and family, they become accepted and realigned with patriotic or nationalist ideologies of their countries...this new integration under the most normative of terms is held up as a symbol of that country's commitment to progress and modernity. Some then identify with the racial and religious hegemony of their countries and join movements opposing immigration or racial and cultural difference (Schulman 103-4).

Here, it is important to note the role whiteness plays in homonationalism. It is not all queer people who are folded back into the dominant society, and in the case of Israel it is only white Jews who act as beacons of the state's falsely progressive attitudes. This phenomenon offers Israel moral superiority in the West. They are seen as the only state in the Middle East accepting of non-straight people and women. However, their continued mistreatment of Palestinians, regardless of sexual identity, shows their investment in white lives as opposed to acceptance of any sexuality.

The Blue Star video does occasionally address non-Jewish queers, but offers racist arguments about Arab views of sexuality. In the rare moment when they show a queer Arab individual, it is to show just how accepting Israel is. In this way, the acceptance of non-Jewish queer people becomes a way to argue that Israel does not mistreat brown people. Following Gayatri Spivak's famous phrase about colonialism in "Can the Subaltern Speak," "white men saving brown women from brown men", I

might propose: “Jewish queers saving Palestinian queers from non-queer Palestinians”. This formulation evidences the colonial and condescending logic at play in this way of approaching queer rights. The assumption that Palestinians are inherently violent towards gay people is, needless to say, racist.

One way we see the accidental success of Israel’s racist rhetoric is through the figure of the Zionist anti-Semite. In his article “Whither Zionism,” theorist Slavoj Žižek points out this counterintuitive phenomenon. He discusses Anders Breivik, Norwegian white supremacist and mass murderer, writing: “he was anti-Semitic, but pro-Israel, since he saw the State of Israel as the first defence line against Muslim expansion” (Žižek). For many white supremacists, Israel solves two problems in one state: it contains Jews away from other white people and divides its society along racial lines by discriminating against Palestinians and other Arabs. The apartheid nature of the Israeli state stands as a model for many white supremacists¹³. The racist rhetoric and quotidian reality of the Israeli state is recognized and valorized by the Zionist anti-Semite.

These distorting and repressive utopias coincide to reinforce the division between Jews and Palestinians. Pulling on heavily racist and racialized rhetoric, Israel and the West align white Judaism with modernity and in so doing demonize the Arabs as backwards, close-minded, and ungreivable. I hope to have shown that Israel is in fact neither democratic nor truly accepting of queer people, but rather position themselves in these ways in order to gain moral superiority. By showing the ways in

¹³ Richard Spencer, self-proclaimed white supremacist and alt-right leader, has called himself a “white Zionist” (“Richard”).

which these utopias do not exist, I hope to make room for a subversively utopian future for the land of Israel/Palestine.

Binationalism as the One-State Solution

If one disrupts the binary between the Jew and the Arab as I have tried to do, binationalism becomes not only a utopia, but also an eventuality¹⁴. Understanding the two groups as existing without strict boundaries between them means that the state could no longer afford certain privileges to any individual on the basis of their designation as Jew or Arab. This disruption of identity has the possibility of ending the unequal distribution of citizenship in the current state of Israel.

I would like to return to a key idea in Marcuse's theorizations in order to think binationalism: that of happiness. This might seem out of place, but I would argue that this very instinct to render happiness less important than more conventional political science discourse such as an interest in constitutional rights or the instatement of courts, proves Marcuse's own point. In *Eros and Civilization* he offers the conventional view of happiness within civilization: "Happiness must be subordinated to the discipline of work as full-time occupation, to the discipline of monogamic reproduction, to the established system of law and order" (Marcuse *Eros* 3). This compulsion to enjoy only that which society predetermines enjoyable renders true happiness a revolutionary force. In *Negations* he writes:

¹⁴ This inevitability argument also gains support from the fact that many Palestinians and Jews are already living side by side in Israel within the current one-state solution. The only difference is that now the Palestinians are severely mistreated.

In a society that reproduces itself through economic competition, the mere demand for a happier social existence constitutes rebellion. For if men value the enjoyment of worldly happiness, then they certainly cannot value acquisitive activity, profit, and the authority of the economic powers that preserve the existence of this society. The claim to happiness has a dangerous ring in an order that for the majority means need, privation, and toil. (Marcuse *Negations* 99-100)

Here, he points to the way in which happiness can assert pressure upon capitalist society. As of now, happiness is not a need, and this is both what makes it dangerous, and why needs must be rewritten. In his later piece, “End of Utopia,” he speaks of “‘undeserved’ happiness” as one amongst other newly structured needs which would be “not simply ... [an] individual need but ... a social productive force, ... [a] social need that can be activated through the direction and disposition of productive forces” (Marcuse “End” 253). Marcuse wants to consider happiness something everyone should have regardless of merit. Undeserved happiness is enjoyment we have a right to irrespective of our actions.

In thinking Israel/Palestine I would like to imagine this idea of ‘undeserving’-ness alongside that of citizenship. If, currently, Israeli citizenship is racialized because it is most easily afforded to white Jews, the idea of undeserving citizenship would radically undo this understanding of belonging. Interestingly, potentially even productively, Israel already has a unique conception of citizenship. They afford citizenship to anyone who can prove their Jewish lineage. While radical in its forgoing of normative conceptions of citizenship such as where one was born, or where one’s parents were born, it is incredibly conservative and racist in that this radical view of citizenship is only allotted on the basis of race. How might one

transvalue this view of citizenship, which is radical only for a few, in order to make it open for all?

One way to revolutionize the idea of democracy is through tying Marcuse's idea of undeserved happiness to that of citizenship. This notion would mean that citizenship could never rely on belonging to any particular group. It could become, in a sense, unstrippable, a basic right to participation in the state. If one never deserved citizenship in the first place, one could do nothing to lose that sense of deservingness.

Importantly, this undeserved citizenship would take away the state's ability to declare a state of emergency thus rendering the racialized state an impossibility.

Through Foucault, Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, Lentin weaves together an argument for the state of emergency giving rise to the racialized state. Within these theorizations, the sovereign, or the state, determines the state of exception or emergency. This political determination always defends the existence of the state at the expense of some of its inhabitants (Lentin 4). Agamben argues that the perpetual state of exception which "has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states" renders the state able "to turn the lives of those under state rule into what he calls *homo sacer* or 'bare life'" (Lentin 5). Foucault turns this state of exception into the racial state by arguing "that the duty to defend society against itself (and by extension defend 'the nation' from its indigenous and immigrant others) means that the state can scarcely function without racism, which Foucault sees as 'the break between what must live and what must die'" (Lentin 6). Therefore, the state of exception, the revoking of certain citizens' rights on the basis of the perpetuation of the state is always racialized. If, however, we were to understand the right to

citizenship as one that is “undeserved” and therefore unstrippable, the ability of the state to perpetuate racism on the basis of the state of exception is radically reduced.

In order for this to be possible, one would need to imagine a state that is not absolutely immune, one that recognizes the possibility of damage. In *Rogues* Jacques Derrida theorizes the democracy to come. This idea is another sort of utopia that is useful for my thinking. In the introduction he writes, “through certain experience that lets itself be affected by what or who comes, by what happens or by who happens by, by *the other to come*, a certain unconditional renunciation of sovereignty is required a priori” (Derrida xiv). Thus, in order to think the state along the lines of an undeserved citizenship, one must give up the idea of absolute sovereignty. This sovereignty is what allows for the racist state because it has the ability to revoke rights of citizens, an idea to which I will return. Of course this opens the nation state to vulnerability, but the alternative to that vulnerability, what Derrida calls auto-immunity is more destructive than openness to the other. Further theorizing the weak sovereign, he writes,

such a distribution or sharing also presupposes that we think at once the unforeseeability of an event that is necessarily without horizon, the singular coming of the other, and, as a result, a *weak force*. This vulnerable force, this force without power, opens up unconditionally to what or who *comes* and comes to affect it. The coming of this event exceeds the condition of mastery and the conventionally accepted authority or what is called the ‘performative.’ (Derrida xiv)

Derrida’s democracy to come radically alters any conception of the state as closed. Absolute sovereignty, for him, only enacts the state’s eventual death. Thus, his vision of the state rewrites relations to alterity. For my thinking, this horizon opens or reveals itself in the realm of the aesthetic. Art is what exceeds the condition of

mastery, which questions the current conditions. It is the site at which our relation to the other can be rewritten.

Imagining a Democracy to Come through Aesthetics

In imagining a utopian future for Israel/Palestine, I would like to privilege art because it has promising ways of denaturalizing the status quo and upsetting societal structures. Marcuse writes,

This ‘voluntary’ servitude (voluntary inasmuch as it is introjected into the individuals), which justifies the benevolent masters, can be broken only through a political practice which reaches the roots of containment and contentment in the infrastructure of man, a political practice of methodical disengagement from and refusal of the Establishment, aiming at a radical transvaluation of values. Such a practice involves a break with the familiar, the routine ways of seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding things so that the organism may become receptive to the potential forms of a nonaggressive, nonexploitative world (Marcuse *Essay 6*).

His rhetoric here participates in a larger project evoked in my earlier section on utopia, the “transvaluation of values” or the reconceptualization of needs. This shift in ways of thinking can be brought about by changes in individual ways of perceiving the world. Art offers these new “ways of seeing, hearing [and] feeling” (Marcuse *Essay 6*). Further, the work of art is not subject to the reality principle and as such is radically imaginative:

Art reflects [the failure of any utopia to liberate Eros from Thanatos] in its insistence on its own truth, which has its ground in social reality and is yet its ‘other’. Art breaks open a dimension inaccessible to other experience, a dimension in which human beings, nature, and things no longer stand under the law of the established reality principle (Marcuse *Aesthetic 72*)

Here, art manages, unlike any other act, to stand outside of Freud’s understanding of

the reality principle. The reality principle, for Freud, is that which keeps a check on the pleasure principle. It urges delayed gratification and moderates pleasure, encouraging the ego to act rationally. Defending the ego from disproportionate pleasure, it maintains a balance between what is possible and what is pleasurable. Art, as free from this limit, encourages excess and urges absolute imagination. It upends the dictum to act within the preconditioned desires of society, pointing instead towards new ways of experiencing pleasure. When one is not compelled to act with regard to the reality principle, innovative ways of opening the world appear. Marcuse writes,

Subjects and objects encounter the appearance of that autonomy which is denied them in their society. The encounter with the truth of art happens in the estranging language and images which make perceptible, visible and audible that which is no longer, or not yet, perceived, said and heard in everyday life (Marcuse *Aesthetic* 72)

Art's autonomy is precisely that freedom from the reality principle that every individual lacks. This confrontation with actual autonomy allows lost causes or new causes to enter or reenter the world through language and visuals. The two poets I engage, Paul Celan and Mahmoud Darwish, practice this through poetic language. I will construct an ethics of utopia from their poetics in order to imagine the land of Palestine/Israel.

An Interlude on Incarceration

The first time I ever encountered Paul Celan I was sixteen. I was on the youth board of the Hugo House, a writing center in Seattle. I think I was in love with the woman who ran the group. Her name was Sarah. I will always remember the way she talked

about the desert. How real heat brings everyone together into pure survival.

Back in Arizona, she was a youth social worker. Many of the kids she helped ended up in prison. She used to send Celan's poems to the lifers, said he was the only poet she could imagine including in her letters. A unique mix of hopelessness and beauty. She gave it to us, too, though we were a bunch of kids from mostly bourgeois families, insulated from incarceration. We read "Death Fugue". Elliptic and infuriating, I threw it away.

Years later, when my grandfather died I wanted to follow him for a while. It was winter and I'd never been so low. Sarah sent me "Death Fugue". I was tired of hating it. When I couldn't sleep, I'd take the poem on a walk. Ambling along together, I felt accompanied for the first time in a long time. Celan gave me permission to descend in order to go on, not to turn away from the black milk, but to drink it.

Both Celan and Darwish spent their own time in prison. Celan was sent to a work camp during World War II and came home to find his parents dead. Darwish went to prison numerous times and was frequently under house arrest.

People are surprised when I tell them I'm using Celan to think the Palestinian question. They never have the same reaction to Darwish since his content and biography include the struggle. I do not feel like justifying my choice. I feel his poetry does so itself. Still, we often must do what we do not feel like doing.

Incarceration might be a justification.

A Roguish Lord: Celan's "Tenebrae"

Paul Celan was born to a Jewish family in Ukraine on November 23, 1920. A tragic time for millions of European Jews, Celan's story is unsurprisingly heart wrenching. He left home one weekend in June of 1942 and when he returned, his parents had been taken away. After this, both parents both died in concentration camps. Celan himself was interned in a work camp for two years. These traumatic experiences greatly impacted his poetry. While it is reductionist to consider his work

solely in terms of his autobiography, his work speaks interestingly to the conflict because of his eternal wrestling with identity, trauma and exile in a way that is not Israeli, but is distinctly Jewish.

Originally published in a collection entitled *Sprachgitter* or Speech-Grille in 1959, “Tenebrae” reverses the conventional role of the worshipper and the worshipped. The name is Latin for shadows and connotes a Catholic service held to commemorate Jesus’s crucifixion before his followers knew he would be resurrected. While on the surface this seems to evoke Christian imagery, the darkness points also to the concentration camps. This reading of the poem as in dialogue with the Shoah continues when one reads the first lines as an exclamation to an absent God: “Near are we, Lord, / near and graspable” (Celan 1-2). The use of the pronoun ‘we’ shows that the speaker represents a collective. The repetition of ‘near’ in the two short lines draws attention to itself. By placing the speaker’s collective close to the divine alongside an understanding of the poem as referring to the Holocaust, there is an implication that the characters are close to death. Conventionally, in Judeo-Christian thinking, we approach God in our death, becoming nearer and nearer. Therefore, through our own vulnerability, our own proximity to death, we approach the divine. This reduces the distinction, important in monotheistic religions, between worshippers and the worshipped.

In Celan’s use of the adjective ‘graspable,’ there is a further breakdown between the divine and the human. Bodily materiality is one way in which mortals are distinguished from the godly. By pointing to the collective’s ability to be grasped,

there is an implicit request to be touched by the hand of God. This hope, however, is dashed when we learn that the time for God to grasp the collective has passed:

Grasped already, Lord,
clawed into each other, as if
each of our bodies were
your body, Lord. (Celan 3-7)

Abandoned by the divine, the collective finds something nearly transcendent in the arms of the Other. Despite the violence denoted by the word ‘clawed,’ there is power in this collectivity, in this shared bodily humanity. Authority becomes even more evident in the next stanza when the speaker demands, “Pray, Lord, / pray to us, / we are near” (Celan 7-9). This irreverent request further dissolves the boundary between the human and the godly. By asking God to pray to them, the collective claim power in the relationship and undermine both their own identity as potential worshippers, and the Lord’s identity as the one who is supposed to be worshipped.

Through this analysis, a way forward might be read by understanding identity and collectivity. The group of humans, articulated for by the speaker, gains power over the divine, reimagining the hierarchy of godly and human through a sacred religious act – the call to prayer. “Tenebrae’s” repetitive, meditative quality enacts a demand or request; it is itself a prayer. In this way, the group of people is not simply reversing the hierarchy of the mortal and the immortal by asking God to pray to them. Rather, their prayer is a request for the return of prayer. This reciprocal prayer dissolves the borders between the human and the divine. And yet, the divine does not grasp them, so while the hierarchy is no longer, the difference remains. Here, the poem offers a way forward for Israel/Palestine. It invents new ways of dissolving the hierarchies between identities by an understanding of the power of the collective.

This power is not benign, rather it “claw[s],” and yet it produces a utilitarian conception of the whole that can forward demands.

The poem continues the disruption of the divine as untouchable: “It was blood, it was / what you shed, Lord. / It shined.” (Celan 14-16). Here, the vulnerability of the Lord shows. This, too, puts him¹⁵ alongside as opposed to above the human collective. Celan places “It shined.” in its own stanza. It is the only single line stanza in the entire poem. This formal choice brings additional attention to the sheer materiality of the Lord’s blood. The poem continues:

It cast your image into our eyes, Lord.
Eyes and mouth stand so open and void, Lord.
We have drunk, Lord.
The blood and the image that was in the blood, Lord.
(Celan 17-20)

Here, Celan returns to Catholic imagery by invoking the drinking of Christ’s blood. Interestingly, the blood is given agency; it is what “casts” the image. This articulates the power the blood has over the collective. This excess of power upsets the earlier understanding that the boundaries between the Lord and collective dissolved. While calling the Lord to pray to them, the speaker characters also consume part of the godly. Before this consumption, their “eyes and mouth [stood] so empty and void” (Celan 18). Without the materiality of the Lord, who is now no more than the Other, the collective is empty, without power. Drinking the blood and the image in the blood gives them the strength to call out again, finishing the poem, “Pray, Lord. / We are

¹⁵ Gendering the monotheistic God male perpetuates images of men as made in God’s image while women were a mere afterthought and a slew of other misogynistic discourses. However, I will use the masculine pronoun for the Lord because it seems at least part of Celan’s project in this poem is to wrest power from the almighty and this argument is all the more subversive if the image of the divine he deconstructs is normative.

near.” (Celan 21-2). The call to prayer is even harsher and more commanding as represented by Celan’s use of two blunt end stops, periods.

This ending, too, offers a way to think the future of Israel/Palestine. The Lord, who at the beginning of the poem stood outside the collective, seems to share in it more and more as the work culminates. The materiality of his blood is consumed by the people, thus turning into part of their body, their graspable collective. The Lord, whose identity seems utterly beyond that of the human, is brought into this mortal collective. This suggests the ability of that which seemed outside the realm of the possible to come to pass.

Interestingly, we never hear from the Lord in the poem. Perhaps all this calling out was in vain. Alternatively, we could understand Celan as foregrounding the voices of the dispossessed. This shows an understanding that, while the boundaries between the identities of the human and the divine might be dissolving, there is historical power at play here. We have heard much from the Lord. Now he must hear our prayers and return them. This becomes, then, another political gesture: the imperative to allow the marginalized to speak as opposed to those who have characteristically been in power.

Both the Lord and the collective in this poem enact Derrida’s notion of weak force. While I argued earlier that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more about colonialism than religion, we must also maintain that narratives have power. Each time the West asserts the religiosity of the conflict, it does become more about religion. So, while the religious assignation of the conflict is in one way misleading, the importance of the Lord for the land of Israel/Palestine cannot be avoided. In this

work, Celan shows the permeability both the Lord and the collective. They are each defined by one another but not in a way that subordinates one group to the other. Rather, they continuously cross unclear barriers between each term, the human collective becoming more divine, and the almighty becoming more mortal. The permeability here acts as a model for understanding religiosity insofar as it shows the possibility of existing at frontiers while maintaining difference. Both the Lord and the collective have enough sovereignty to forward claims, but not so much that they exist at odds with one another.

An Interlude about Belfast

Living in cosmopolitan areas of the United States makes it rare to encounter anti-Semitism in the wild. There was the time, growing up in Atlanta, the school secretary told my mom as she picked me up from school for Yom Kippur services, that it was a shame such a nice family was going to hell. Still, by all accounts, I've had an easy go of it.

I am doing all I can to focus on the thousands of bubbles cascading towards the bottom of the glass in waves that turn my dark Guinness a creamy color. Its mid-March and I am in Belfast, Northern Ireland/the six occupied counties. I knew so little about the struggle before coming here, never learned about it in school. Twenty years have passed since the peace accords and still the gate between the Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods closes every night.

Across from me sits a fifty-year-old man who offered to buy my friend and I drinks. He's ex-IRA. Did eighteen years for planning bombings. He tells me he feels guilty about the deaths he caused, that he called and called telling them to evacuate the buildings and no one would listen. Two people died.

I ask him if he thinks the IRA should be a communist party. He tells me if the Jews would just share their money no one would need communism. I am doing all I can to focus on the thousands of bubbles cascading towards the bottom of the glass in waves that turn my dark Guinness a creamy color. I tell him I'm Jewish. Quickly, he assures me this is no problem, that he would marry me if I were 20 years older. I feel sick to my stomach. I've had this experience before.

When my friend goes to the bathroom I tell him again I think the IRA should be a communist party. At least Socialist, I insist. He takes my hand, kisses it, reeks. I pull away and he tells me if I want to talk about real revolution we will have to go away on holiday and have really great sex. When she comes back I say we have to leave. Women can never talk about just the revolution. It is dangerous to forget this. I step out into the street. I am so angry I begin to cry.

I remember him telling me the war (“Don’t call it a conflict, that was what the British did to keep us from getting refugee status”) was never about the Catholics and the Protestants. It was always an anti-colonial struggle repackaged in the language of religious essentialism.

Outside the bar I realize I already smoked my last cigarette. I ask a man leaning against the building for one. He tells me he has no more but I can finish the one he’s having, takes a long drag while maintaining eye contact and hands me a soggy mostly butt. When I get back to my room I scribble: Israel/Palestine might not really be about religion at all.

The Ethics of the Poem: Celan and Butler

If one problem that must be interrogated in order to rethink the land of Israel/Palestine is that of religiosity, another is the ways in which one listens to the other, and how to commemorate traumatic histories. The process of reconciliation is far from simple and if binationalism stands a chance the inhabitants of the land would have to interact differently. At the end of “Can the Subaltern Speak” Spivak quotes Derrida calling for “a rewriting of the utopian structural impulse as ‘rendering delirious that interior voice that is the voice of the other in us’” (Spivak 283). Thus, the other’s voice is within us just as the other is. Our burden is to make it not make sense, to render it delirious, to avoid reducing the other’s voice to our own. It is for these reasons I return again and again to Celan. In his unrelenting difficulty, he renders the other’s voice delirious. As Derrida wrote:

A call might thus be taken up and take hold: the call for thinking of the event *to come*, of the democracy *to come*, of the reason *to come*. This call bears every hope, to be sure, although it remains, in itself, without hope. Not hopeless, in despair, but foreign to the teleology, the hopefulness, and the *salut* of salvation. Not foreign to the *salut* as the greeting or salutation of the other, not foreign to the *adieu* ('come' or 'go' in peace), not foreign to justice, but nonetheless, heterogeneous and rebellious, irreducible, to law, to power, and to the economy of redemption. (Derrida xv)

Thus, this listening, this reconciliation, this reading, exists as a hope without hope, a utopia without redemption.

Celan's poetry enacts an encounter between reader and text in which excess which undoes meaning, leaving in its place the raw materiality of language:

No sandart anymore, no sandbook, no masters.

Nothing in the dice. How
many mutes?
Seventen.

Your question – your answer.
Your chant, what does it know?

Deepinsnow,
Eepinno,
I – i – o. (24)

In this poem, the language quite clearly breaks down into the raw materiality of letters and their corresponding sounds. These letters quite obviously refer to nothing but marks on a page, sounds in one's ear. By truncating the tradition of reference within literature, Celan is radically straightforward. These letters refer only to themselves and in so doing they enact vulnerability and straightforwardness. Yet, even in this poem, which almost entirely eschews conventional attempts at meaning, the 'you' remains persistent, almost accusatory in its repetition. Even without saying it, this poem makes a claim over its reader. In this way, the poem is able to evacuate

any meaning from suffering and still compel its audience to listen. This non-redemptive understanding of trauma is important for the future of Palestine/Israel. By regarding the traumatic history of Palestinians and Jews as meaningless in the sense that there is nothing positive to have come from this suffering, the binational future could avoid a hierarchy of traumatic experience. This would open a space in which everyone must bear witness to one another's trauma without judging it.

In her essay "Precarious Life," Butler considers ethical representation, or the representation and concludes that it must involve a staged failure:

the human is indirectly affirmed in that very disjunction that makes representation impossible, and this disjunction is conveyed in the impossible representation. For representation to convey the human, then, representation must not only fail, but it must *show* its failure. There is something unrepresentable that we nevertheless seek to represent, and that paradox must be retained in the representation we give. (Butler "Precarious" 144)

So, trauma must attempt representation with the knowledge that it will fail. Celan stages this failure of representation and draws attention to it through form in the end of the poem addressed earlier:

Deepinsnow,
Eepinno,
I – i – o. (24)

Scholar Anne Carson comments on the poem, saying: "suspended within the act of whitening is a terribly quiet pun. For one cannot help but think, watching "Deepinsnow" melt away, that if this poem were translated into Hebrew, a language in which vowels are not usually printed, it would vanish before its appointed end. As did many a Hebrew" (Carson 116). So in addition to the earlier analysis, the poem can be read, like most of Celan's work, as a reaction to the

Shoah. By pulling apart the letters, Celan points to, even dramatizes the failure of representation. Rather than attempt a conventional type of mourning through naming or narrative, Celan renegotiates language as representational practice. Through this act of renegotiation, the deceased occupy the letters of the poem. They exist in each letter not in their singularity but in their collective and thus are “not ‘effaced’ in this failure of representation, but...constituted in that very responsibility” (Butler 144). The fact that no individual is specifically mourned in this poem makes it open to all. It is through the failure of mourning any one person in particular that the poem becomes commemorative in a greater sense. This type of recognizing the failure of representation must be considered when constructing a binational utopia. One must remain aware that no one can never fully represent their trauma, and yet must still try in order to live alongside one another.

Through reading the poem not only as Celan’s personal trauma, but also as a representation of *other* traumas, one can see that the poem participates in its own ethical burden. These poems are deeply commemorative. They bear the weight of the Shoah and that unknowable, unrepresentable violence. This context allows yet another way of engaging with the work’s mystifying hermetic quality and almost aggressive repetition of ‘you’. Butler writes, “if we are to understand ourselves as interpellated anywhere in these images, it is precisely as the unrepresented viewer, the one who looks on, the one who is captured by no image at all” (143). In Celan’s poetry, too, we are brought in as bystander, but in his work we get the sense that we are watching something we should not be watching. Yet this claim on the reader, the

'you,' does not permit turning away. Through these formal elements, Celan reminds us that this horrific event, the Shoah, should never have been permissible and as such we are all implicated in its occurrence. This reading of his poetry as remembrance of lives lost offers us our ethical obligation: to witness through critical reading. It is this witnessing through the act of attentive reading that Celan's poetry demands, and it is this that we must give it. This notion can be expanded to include representations of the Nakba as well. Art that teaches how to interact with the trauma of others is necessary in the working through that must take place in a possible binational utopia.

Beyond its own demands, Celan's poetry allows its readers how to interact with the other's trauma in alternate situations and representations. Butler writes, "the reality is not conveyed by what is represented within the image, but through the challenge to representation that reality delivers" (Butler 146). Celan's poetry resides outside of what is represented in the words on the page by implicating a historically specific event. In this way, these mediums redirect the reader outwards and beyond. This redirection teaches the reader how to interact with trauma in other scenarios, brings them into the knowledge it is never what remains on the surface but rather that which rests behind it. By reading Celan's work alongside Butler, an ethics of listening emerges which would prove essential to the reconciliation necessary for a binational state. If trauma is one of the points at which the Jewish and Palestinian experience overlap, it is essential to understand this phenomenon for a binational future. Through Celan and Butler, we come to a working through that does not evade failure, but lives within it.

An Interlude on Memorization and Translation

I've never been one to pack with any foresight. I need the stress of a deadline to do just about anything. Pulling books out of my bag to begin writing this paper I realize I forgot to pack the Michael Hamburger translation of Celan's poems.

I am in my parents' basement on Spring Break. They have Golda Meir's biography on the living room table. Last night, we got in a fight when I told them she once said Palestinians didn't exist. I walk this fine line at home between complete detachment and blow out arguments. I can put myself away for the weekend, seal off the parts of myself that care or we can scream. I scare myself with how good I have gotten at this closing off.

Now, looking out over the lake, I recite "Corona" to myself. I realize I will have to use it for my paper because I don't have Celan's other poems with me. I love it so much it feels almost like sacrilege to write about it academically.

I memorized it years ago. It appears with me at the slightest provocation. I can see the punctuation on the page when I close my eyes. For me, memorization is an exercise in living with, an internalization of another's way of thinking, experiencing and expressing the world. Memorization is also completely useless. We live in an age where everything is at our fingertips. It seems like rebellion to memorize, an utter waste of time. Who has time to waste is a very political question.

Demanding Autumn: Darwish and Celan in Conversation

Mahmoud Darwish is the most celebrated Palestinian poet. Born in the village of al-Birwa in Western Galilee on March 13, 1941, Darwish lived a life of exile. He and his family fled Palestine in June of 1948 as the Israeli army razed their village, and took up refuge in Lebanon. Subsequently, he spent his life between countries and was banned from Israel for large swatches of time due to his involvement in the Palestinian Liberation Organization. He never met Paul Celan, and while he might

have read his work, he never mentions him in interviews, memoirs or poems. Still, I would like to posit that their poems “Corona” and “We Have the Right to Love Autumn” exist in dialogue with one another. Importantly, this dialogue is not closed. Rather, each is haunted by a particular past and a different way of imagining the future. Their works exemplify what Derrida understood of the address: “two addresses, here coupled together, leave, as if abandoned, an open correspondence. A correspondence to come and left hanging, open, unsettled and unsettling” (Derrida xii).

Celan’s “Corona,” while never explicitly mentioning the Holocaust, remains haunted by its vicious memory. As translator and Celan scholar Pierre Joris points out in “It is Time: A Discussion of Paul Celan’s ‘Corona,’” autumn is repeatedly evoked throughout Celan’s oeuvre and is the season in which he lost both of his parents to genocide. This poem was written while he lived in Austria from December 1947 to June 1948 meaning he wrote the work out of season, further suggesting that autumn here refers more to his memory of loss than to the actual season (Filreis). Yet, there is an effort to reconcile his present with the painful past in the first line: “Autumn eats its leaf out of my hand: we are friends.” (Celan “Corona” 1). By calling autumn “friend,” Celan claims the memory as something close to him. However, this is an odd version of friendship, one in which the friend, autumn, is subservient to the speaker since the season eats from the speaker’s hand. Further, in the original German Celan uses the word “frißt,” a form of fressen, which the translator, Michael Hamburger, chooses to convey as “eats”. German has two words for eat: essen and fressen. The former has essentially the same meaning as the English “to eat,” while

the latter is generally used for the way animals eat. Thus, the friend, autumn, is dehumanized, and the line takes on an eerie connotation, one in which the hunger of the friend is wild in that it is animal, yet controlled because it eats from the speaker's hand. This tension sets the tone for the poem that terrifies in its opaque insistence while at the same time describing a potentially hopeful scene of two lovers. This attempt to reconcile past and present offers an ethics of transvaluation. It shows the importance of returning to memories and trying to add new values to them. However, this attempt is only partially successful. Thus, failure is accepted early in the poem.

Darwish's poem is similarly haunted by another horrible tragedy, the Nakba. He begins, "And we, too, have the right to love the last days of autumn" (Darwish 1). As readers, we enter the poem on a conjunction that gives the sense that this speaker is in the midst of listing many things that a certain collective is unable to take part in. The "too" suggests that there are some who have this right, the right to enjoy autumn, and the collective that the speaker articulates for is left out of this right. In opposition to Celan's poem, autumn is quite benign. This adds to the injustice of a certain group of people being unable to experience the season. Yet, he goes on to ask: "Is there room in the field for a new autumn, so we may lie down like coals?" (Darwish 2). Here, a threatening aspect enters the poem because coals lying in fields would likely light the fields on fire. In asking this question, the speaker encourages those who the powerful have deemed unable of loving autumn to agitate. Agitation is another way in which to change the value of a memory or emotion. This compulsive return is the mark of a traumatized individual as Freud points out in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. However, for these two poets, the failure to absolutely change the memory

is accepted and the poem is still written. The importance of failure is key to a vision of binational Israel/Palestine as I will return to later.

Celan has a similar agitating tone towards the end of the poem. The penultimate stanza conveys an insistence on the importance of something which remains unnamed:

We stand by the window embracing, and people
look up from the street:
it is time they knew!
It is time the stone made an effort to flower,
time unrest had a broken heart.
It is time it were time.
(Celan 13-18)

Celan conveys the speaker's excitement, not necessarily in the positive sense, through the only use of an exclamation mark in the entire poem. The need for the people to know is no less insistent because the subject matter is opaque. Rather, it holds the reader's attention through its ambiguity. Failure seems essential, because though a stone can never flower, it is time it made an effort. This suggests the centrality of struggle when one is trying to change the minds of people, or show them something. This notion of attempt despite the eventuality of failure is central to the making of utopia. As José Muñoz explores in the introduction to *Cruising Utopia*, "hope can be disappointed. But, such disappointment needs to be risked if certain impasses are to be resisted. A certain affective reanimation needs to transpire if a disabling political pessimism is to be displaced" (Muñoz *Cruising* 9). This constant struggle towards utopia with the promise of many failures is an important structuring concept for a binational state. One cannot imagine the state as permanently successful, rather there will always be problems to work through. This is not a teleological utopia which,

when realized, remains static. Rather, it is one that will be in a constant state of becoming, or renegotiation.

Celan's shows one way of forwarding a demand despite the eventuality of failure through his use of tense in the final line of the stanza. He writes, "It is time it were time" (Celan "Corona 18). This restructures any understanding of needs in the present moment. It is time that it were already time. What we are struggling for, in the case of Palestine/Israel a binational state with undeserving citizenship, should always already have been accessible. And yet, because the poem needed to be written it is not the case. Only this acknowledgement, that the past was not how it should have been, allows the speaker to move forward to the present moment, the final line: "It is time" (Celan "Corona" 19). Through repetition of this call, Celan shows that failure must be moved through in order to enact something new. By denaturalizing the past through unconventional tense use, Celan demands something radically new of the present.

Similarly, Darwish's demand, the right to love autumn, is radical because it implicitly asks to make Agamben's *homo sacer* grievable again. In Tom Langley's article "EXCEPTIONAL STATES: The (Bio)politics of Love in Darwish's A State of Siege," he defines Agamben's concepts of *bios* and *zoë*: "the Ancient Greeks had two words to designate 'life': *bios*, which is a kind of qualified life (a 'political life', or a 'life of pleasure'); and *zoë*, which stands for the simple fact of living" (Langley 71). For Agamben, the person who only experiences *zoë* is deemed *homo sacer*. In Darwish's poem the speaker is not satisfied with their collective's designation as *homo sacer*. He writes, "If only we were leaves on a fig tree, or even neglected meadow plants / that we may observe the seasons change!" (Darwish "We" 4-5).

Here, the dehumanization of being a non-sentient plant would be better than the collective's designation as bare life. Furious with an existence that recognizes them as less than even the non-human, the speaker demands a right to pleasure, to "warm the nights of beautiful women" and "smell autumn's fragrances and ask the night for a dream" (Darwish "We" 8, 10). By asserting the right to desire, Darwish does not settle for the right to bare life, but rather demands the right to a pleasurable life, thus making *homo sacer* grievable again.

By putting these unconventional interlocutors into conversation with one another, they have offered us an aesthetics of the demand that denaturalizes the present and asks something radical of the future. In terms of Israel/Palestine, Darwish lays out the right to a pleasurable life, not just the right to keep living as the biopolitical state regulates. This is an ethics of failure, of valuing change and of the past living on.

An Ethics of Would: Darwish's Love and the Conditional

Mahmoud Darwish wrote his memoir *Memory for Forgetfulness* during the bombings of Beirut in August 1982. In it, he describes a scene in which he talks to his Jewish lover in the middle of the night before he has to turn himself back into the Israeli police:

- What do you usually dream about?
- I usually don't dream. And you? What do you dream about?
- That I stop loving you.
- Do you love me?

- No. I don't love you. Did you know that your mother, Sarah, drove my mother, Hagar, into the desert?
- Am I to blame then? Is it for that you don't love me?
- No. You're not to blame; and because of that I don't love you. Or, I love you (Darwish *Memory* 125).

Here, Darwish, who finishes the excerpted conversation, contradicts himself, illustrating a conflicted subject. Butler addresses this very excerpt in *Parting Ways*, writing that this love is

both proximity and aversion; it is unsettled; it is not of one mind. It might be said to be the affect, the emotional tenor of an impossible and necessary union, the strange logic by which one wishes to go and insists upon staying. Surely binationalism is not love, but there is, we might say, a necessary and impossible attachment that makes a mockery of identity, an ambivalence that emerges from the decentering of the nationalist ethos and that forms the basis of a permanent ethical demand. (Butler *Parting* 53)

Clearly this is one important reading of the passage that I don't want to disagree with. The relationship with the other upsets both Darwish's identity and that of his lover. This is not some abstract idea of the Other, but a real person who is very different from the self and with whom the self has an intimate relation. This seems in line with my earlier arguments about dissolving the boundaries between self and other while trying to maintain difference in order to achieve a binational utopia. However, Butler does not address the repetition of a phrase that occurs in the same scene. The first instance comes before the passage quoted above. Darwish's lover begins:

- What's gotten into you?
 - Has it all come to an end?
 - What's the matter?
 - I can't get back to myself.
- (*Each would kill the other outside the window.*) (Darwish "Memory" 125)

The suggestion of death, or even murder, permeates this space of love. This shows the great effect of Darwish's claim that he "can't get back to" himself (Darwish "Memory" 125). I would like to foreground this difficulty that comes along with the disruption of the ego. Importantly, there is recognition of the possibility of violence in the beloved as well. Darwish knows that a similar feeling exists within her, that she would kill him too. Insisting, against stereotypes of the lover and the feminine, that this woman could inflict the ultimate violence is an ethical realization insofar as it allots for an equally complex subject hood in the other as in the self. This way of thinking the other is crucial for the binational state. Further, the evocation of the window reminds the reader of the inside/outside barrier, or the division between the public and the private. While the two lovers can exist within the private realm, they "would" kill one another in public. However, the conditional tense is important here. They are not doomed to kill one another. Darwish does not write they *will* kill the other outside the window. The conditional calls attention to just what the name of the tense suggests: that under the current set of conditions the two lovers *would* kill each other in the public realm. Since it does not have to be that way, Darwish draws attention to the possibility of changing the current reality or set of conditions. Further, since they do not kill one another inside, this creates a model by which we might avoid the killing outside.

The second repetition of this line closes the scene. It differs slightly from the earlier iteration. Darwish writes, "And each is killing the other by the window" (Darwish "Memory" 126). Here, Darwish is more deterministic about the killing. It *is* happening. Further, it is no longer evoking the public realm in the same way since the

killing is now taking place “by” the window. The immediate question becomes why is the killing taking place. Earlier, we established Darwish’s understanding of how the other disrupts the self, not in a prescriptive sense as in we should interact with others such that they disrupt our ego, but rather in a merely descriptive sense: the dialogue between Darwish and his lover show that each had their own sense of self upset by the other. Thus, the killing cannot be taking place on account of some essential or eternal notion of the Arab and the Jew as fundamentally opposed. Rather, it must be something more historically situated that causes this killing. Returning to Marcuse, “utopia in the great art is never the simple negation of the reality principle but its transcending preservation in which past and present cast their shadow in fulfillment. The authentic utopia is grounded in recollection” (Marcuse *Aesthetic* 73). Thus, Darwish’s utopia becomes all the more authentic in that he does not imagine a space in which all historical strife fades away. Rather, this utopia is attentive to the historical reality of the conditions between Jews and Arabs. This is essential for any binational utopia. History cannot be erased, however it must be worked through and engaged with.

An Interlude on New Needs

Originally I wanted to use Celan and Darwish to construct a new state. While I tried to understand their ethics alongside that of Israel/Palestine, I found that poetry might not lend itself cleanly to the institution of rights or laws. What did come about, though, were many new needs that might, instead of actually instituting a new state, allow for the possibility of one. I would like to list them here, in an almost manifesto:

the need for the other who is always already inside us
the need for a transvaluation of pasts
the need for an acknowledgement of trauma
the need for an expression of meaninglessness

the need for failure
the need for collectives which can forward demands
the need for a permeable Lord
the need for non-hierarchical difference
the need for undeserved pleasure
the need for a unsettled identity
the need for the impossible to come to pass

This essay is about Israel/Palestine. But it is maybe even more about how poetry can restructure our world and allow for something more open, more just, maybe just something more, to come to pass. While I have been interested in the particular history and voices that speak to and from it, these poetics apply far beyond this conflict.

Conclusion

One of the struggles I have had throughout writing this thesis is my own ethical conundrum inherent in suggesting that Palestinians should live alongside those who have relegated them to second-class citizenship and blatant mistreatment. Often in anti-colonial movements even the most sympathetic Western thinkers have, in a rather tone-deaf manner, decried nationalism while those in the struggle have returned again and again to its importance¹⁶. On the other hand, the assumption that these movements need nationalism restages the belief that all liberation movements must move through the same stages of development as the West. I hope that I have not to

¹⁶ Frantz Fanon calls for nationalism as an important stage in the emancipatory process in *Wretched of the Earth* and Salim Tamari levels an important critique of binationalism on similar grounds in his essay “The Dubious Lure of Binationalism” to name just a few such thinkers.

fallen into this trap and yet worry that I have. At the end of his essay “Permission to Narrate” Said addresses this very problem. In a respectful critique of Noam Chomsky’s work he writes:

in a situation like that of the Palestinians and Israelis, hardly anyone can be expected to drop the quest for national identity and go straight to a history-transcending universal rationalism. Each of the two communities, misled though both may be, is interested in its origins, its history of suffering, its need to survive. To recognize these imperatives, as components of national identity, and try to reconcile them, rather than dismiss them as so much non-factual ideology, strikes me as the task at hand. (Said “Permission” 47)

One way to reconcile this difficulty is through the idea of utopia as I have tried to invoke it, as demanding the impossible. However, I hesitate to do away so simply with this problem. Rather, I hope that through the use of poetry to think this problem I have given space to working through which is necessary to living together.

I harbor no illusions that this space I have imagined would solve all problems. Animosity based on class, gender, sexuality, and other characteristics would likely still persist. However, this argument that anything short of perfection, utopia in the undesirable sense, is not worth fighting for echoes the beginning of my paper in which liberals deem a cause too complex to address. The continuation of certain antagonisms is no reason to stop advocating for change, maybe even for the impossible.

Bibliography

“About BlueStar .” *BlueStar*, 12 Mar. 2018. Web.

Badiou, Alain. *Polemics*. Verso, 2012.

Balfour, Arthur James. Received by Lord Rothschild, 2 Nov. 1917.

- Butler, Judith. *Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism*. Columbia University Press, 2012.
- Butler, Judith. "Precarious Life." *Precarious Life: The Powers of Violence and Mourning*. New York: Verso, 2004. 128-51. Print.
- Butler, Judith. "Versions of Binationalism in Said and Buber." *Conflicting Humanities*, edited by Rosi Braidotti and Paul Gilroy, Bloomsbury, 2016, pp. 185–210.
- Carson, Anne. *Economy of the Unlost: Reading Simonides of Keos with Paul Celan*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999. Print.
- Celan, Paul. *Breathturn Into Timestead: The Collected Later Poetry*. Trans. Pierre Joris. New York: Farrar Straus Girroux, 2003. Print.
- Celan, Paul. *Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan*. Trans. John Felstiner. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001. Print.
- Celan, Paul. *Poems of Paul Celan*. Translated by Michael Hamburger, Persea Books, 1980.
- Darwish, Mahmoud. *Memory of Forgetfulness*. Translated by Ibrahim Muhawi, University of California Press, 1995.
- Derrida, Jacques, and Joshua Wilner. "Shibboleth: For Paul Celan." *Word Traces*, edited by Aris Fioretos, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 3–72.
- Filreis, Al, and Ariel Resnikoff, Anna Strong, and Pierre Joris. "It Is Time: A discussion of Paul Celan's 'Corona'". Audio blog post. Poem Talk. Poetry Foundation, 6 Dec. 2016. Web. 10 Mar. 2018.
- Fisher, Max. "The Jerusalem Issue, Explained." *New York Times*, 9 Dec. 2017.

- Langley, Tom. "EXCEPTIONAL STATES The (Bio)Politics of Love in Darwish's A State of Siege." *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, vol. 14, no. 1, 24 Apr. 2012, pp. 69–82.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics*. Beacon Press, 1978.
- Marcuse, Herbert. "The End of Utopia." *Herbert Marcuse: Marxism, Revolution and Utopia*, edited by Douglas Kellner and Clayton Pierce, vol. 6, Routledge, 2014, pp. 249–263. Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *Eros and Civilization: A Critical Inquiry into Freud*. Random House, 1962.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *An Essay on Liberation*. Beacon Press, 1969.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *Negations*. Translated by Jeremy Shapiro, Beacon Press, 1968.
- Pappe, Ilan. *A History of Modern Palestine*. 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- "Richard Spencer Tells Israelis They 'Should Respect' Him: 'I'm a White Zionist'." *Haaretz*, 16 Aug. 2017.
- Said, Edward. *Freud and the Non-European*. Verso, 2003.
- Said, Edward. *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*. Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Sayigh, Rosemary. "On the Exclusion of the Palestinian Nakba from the 'Trauma Genre.'" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 43, no. 1, 2013, pp. 51–60. JSTOR, JSTOR.
- Sharon, Ariel. "Knesset Speech." Jerusalem.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Can the Subaltern Speak." *Can the Subaltern Speak?: Reflections on the History of an Idea*. Ed. Rosalind C. Morris. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

Supreme Court Sitting as the Court for Civil Appeals. *Georges Raphael Tamarin v. The State of Israel*. 20 Jan. 1972.

Trump, Donald J. "Trump's Speech Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel." New York Times. 12 Dec. 2017, Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House.

"Anti-Semitism and Its Transformations." *Deconstructing Zionism: A Critique of Political Metaphysics*, by Slavoj Žižek, Bloomsbury, 2013.

Žižek, Slavoj. "Whither Zionism." *In These Times*, 2 Mar. 2015.