

**INTERVENTION IN LIBYA:  
RESISTANCE AND CO-OPTION IN THE EMERGING HEGEMONY**

**by**

**Cory Daniel Rand**

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
graduation with Honors in Politics.**

**Whitman College  
2013**

*Certificate of Approval*

This is to certify that the accompanying thesis by Cory Daniel Rand has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in Politics.

---

Shampa Biswas

Whitman College  
May 7, 2013

## **Table of Contents**

I. Introduction .....	4
II. The Emerging Hegemony of Capital: Growth and Consent .....	7
III. Counter-Hegemonic Resistance .....	15
IV. Hegemonic Co-option of Subordinate Resistance .....	24
V. Intervention and Reconstruction in Libya .....	31
VI. Conclusion .....	40
Bibliography.....	43

## **I. Introduction**

On March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1973, demanding a ceasefire between forces of the Libyan government and rebel fighters, and authorizing the international community to protect Libyan civilians by “any means necessary short of foreign occupation,” (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6498). The subsequent military intervention, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), consisted of a no-fly zone, missile strikes against government forces, bombing sorties, a naval blockade, and the eventual overthrow and death of Muammar Qaddafi. Resolution 1973 marked the first time that the UNSC authorized a “humanitarian intervention” in the domestic affairs of a functioning state without the state’s consent, (Bellamy and Williams 2011: 825). After Qaddafi’s death, the UNSC created the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to assist Libya’s new government in the protection of human rights, state building, and economic development. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, working in partnership with UNSMIL, have recommended neoliberal development policies to encourage the growth of Libya’s private sector, including cutting universal subsidies, lowering wages paid to public employees, streamlining the civil government, and creating a better business environment through improved property rights, rule of law, and access to finance.

It is surprising that the UNSC allowed the NATO intervention and neoliberal reconstruction mission in Libya because both neoliberal economic strategies of development and the practice of humanitarian intervention have come under continuous criticism over the last few decades. International financial institutions (IFIs), including the IMF and the World Bank, have frequently applied neoliberal structural adjustment

policies in Latin America and “shock therapy” techniques in former communist countries to rapidly deregulate and privatize economies. The negative ramifications of these policies, which abruptly open countries to the international economy with no protection for local markets, have motivated frequent and worldwide protests, notable examples being at the 1999 World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle, and at the annual meetings of the World Social Forum. State and non-state actors, including members of the Security Council, accuse the United States and other NATO countries of using humanitarian intervention as a justification to violate the sovereignty of other nations in pursuit of their own interests, for example when NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999. Given the widespread condemnation of neoliberal strategies of development and the international opposition to Western-led humanitarian intervention, why did the UNSC approve the military intervention and neoliberal reconstruction of Libya?

This thesis argues that international approval for the intervention and reconstruction in Libya can be traced to changes made within the global governance structures of an emerging neoliberal capitalist hegemony, a bloc of state and non-state actors led by an elite transnational capitalist class seeking to gain the consent of subordinate actors to expand and consolidate the dominance of capitalism. The bloc has sought to use humanitarianism to overcome resistance and universalize capitalist ideology and practices, but the repercussions of neoliberalism, and past episodes of Western humanitarian intervention, have led to criticisms that threaten to politicize hegemonic interests. To overcome these threats, hegemonic actors have made changes within the bloc’s structure, two of which are the recent internal reforms of the IMF’s governmental model, and the UN ratification of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

initiative of humanitarian intervention.

In this thesis, I argue that both the IMF's internal reforms and R2P's changes to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention have been effective in the short term in gaining subordinate consent for the intervention and reconstruction of Libya, but have ultimately been superficial. NATO's liberal interpretation of resolution 1973 and its marginalization of regional state organizations throughout its leadership of the intervention have led to the same resistance to Western intervention that existed before R2P's formulation. Although the IMF has thus far recommended more moderate reconstruction policies for post-conflict Libya than it has for developing states in the past, I argue that this is attributable to the IMF's efforts to promote political stability in a tumultuous region, rather than to its internal reforms.

In the first section of this paper, I will explain the fundamental connection between capitalism and individual human rights. I will describe the structure of the emerging capitalist hegemony, its expansive nature, and how hegemonic actors constructed a narrow definition of humanitarianism and democracy to garner subordinate consent to hegemonic rule. In the second section, I will outline the ways in which the emerging bloc has marginalized subordinate state and non-state actors, and how these actors have coalesced into a counter-hegemonic force. In the third section, I will show how the IMF internal reforms and the R2P initiative were attempts to co-opt subordinate resistance to the emerging hegemony. Finally, I will explain how these changes, along with the specific context of Libya's revolution, won over international support for intervention and reconstruction, and I will examine how R2P and the IMF reforms affected the emerging bloc's handling of the Libyan crisis.

## **II. The Emerging Hegemony of Capital: Growth and Consent**

Dating back to the first stirrings of nascent commercialization within mercantile society and onwards, economic theorists have debated the “naturalness” of capitalism. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Herbert Spencer all attributed exchange and competition to basic human nature, and labeled competitive capitalism as an extension of these instincts. Kenneth Minogue, a prominent economic theorist, once wrote, “Capitalism is what people do if you leave them alone.” But as intuitive as these theorists claim capitalism to be, the conditions required for a capitalist economy have proven to be not nearly so organic or easily created. Individual rights like free speech and protected private property, access to free markets and free trade, and a strong rule of law maintained by a stable and transparent government committed to a limited scope of economic intervention are just a few of the prerequisites for a truly functional free market economy. As history has shown, these conditions do not naturally develop alongside economic growth. When the industrial revolution boosted production beyond what pre-capitalist 18<sup>th</sup> century English society could sustain, a whole host of social dislocations were artificially triggered by the state to create the conditions necessary for a self-regulating market. The poor laws were repealed, for example, pauperizing millions of people in order to create a mobile labor market for factory owners (Polanyi 2001).

In addition to the base conditions that a capitalist society requires, the economy must also have room to expand. Competition, which drives individuals in a free market economy, requires that an investor’s profit surpluses be continually reinvested in expansion and innovation; otherwise newcomers to the game may undercut the original investor. As an economy grows, however, and more profits are made, it becomes harder

and harder for capitalists, the economic elite in a capitalist society, to find new investment opportunities. To solve this capital surplus absorption problem, a capitalist society must constantly expand to open new markets and investment opportunities to flows of capital. Beginning in the 1970's, capitalism's inherent need for expansion, capitalists' pursuit of profit, and the breakdown of Keynesian liberalism motivated a global wave of privatization and deregulation to create the specific conditions for free market capitalism beyond the Western world. This movement defines the contemporary neoliberal era, (Harvey 2011: 29).

Neoliberalism has existed as a term since the 1930's, but it did not begin to develop into the free market utopian theory and political project it represents today until after World War II, in response to the rise of Keynes's socially embedded state liberalism. In the three decades following World War II, while Keynesian economics presided over an unprecedented global increase in wages and standards of living, fringe economists like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman developed a theory built upon classical liberalism, advocating individualistic economic freedom unhampered by state intervention (Friedman 2002). In the early 1970's, Keynesian liberalism seemed to fail the US economy, and neoliberalism took its place as the dominant economic theory. Foreign manufacturing in Japan and Germany began to undercut American factories, leading to nationwide corporate austerity measures like wage cuts. The American economic elite needed to find more profitable avenues of investment and gain back the corporate autonomy and privilege that post-war welfare capitalism had rolled back (Harvey 2005).

This political project to restore class power found popular domestic support in its portrayal of neoclassical economic theory as a cure-all for the failing economy and a means of advancing individual freedoms. Its ideological influences circulated through corporations, the media, and civil society organizations. Corporate-funded top-tier educational institutions like Harvard and Stanford became centers of neoliberal orthodoxy, and their graduates went on to work in the federal government, the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN (Harvey 2005: 51). By the late 1970's, the US economy had stopped growing, but was still experiencing inflation. The Federal Reserve chose to combat the inflation through neoliberal domestic austerity measures and an increase in interest rates, which dramatically affected the variable-rate loans US banks had lent to Latin American countries. These countries found their interest rates rise from 9 to 19%, and by 1982, both Brazil and Mexico had defaulted on their loans (Charlip and Burns 2011: 274).

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in to buy Latin American debt and bail out US banks. The IMF, dominated by Western states and neoclassical economists, gave Latin American countries new loans but with attached conditionalities designed to create self regulating markets via extreme fiscal austerity, economic reorientation from internal state-driven industrialization to deregulation and exportation, and extreme privatization. Latin America became a testing ground for this new formula of economic development, which became known as the Washington Consensus (Steger and Roy 2010). With ideological fervor, neoliberals like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan promoted the global creation of free markets and unregulated competitive

capitalism as the only option for economic progress, and the fall of the Soviet Union appeared to prove their claims.

With the end of the Cold War, large areas of the globe previously hidden behind the iron curtain opened up to capital flows, and neoliberal “shock therapy,” (traumatically rapid deregulation and privatization), became the model for development in the former Soviet Union. Loan conditionalities were an important tool for neoliberals seeking to expand capitalism’s reach, but neoliberal structural adjustments were a hard pill for developing countries to swallow. Often, acquiescing to Western demands required governments to enact policies that were wildly unpopular with their constituents, for example ending subsidies and cutting government jobs. In addition, neoliberal economic development often led to high rates of poverty and inequality (Harvey 2005). The global governance structures driving neoliberalism (IFIs and the governments of Western states), could not force poor countries to create and maintain the conditions required for capitalism without violating sovereignty and breaking international law. To maintain international goodwill, Neoliberals needed a tool to gain the cooperation of developing states without relying on coercion.

Antonio Gramsci, an Italian political theorist who developed his theory of hegemonic rule while languishing in a Fascist prison, wrote that a ruling class achieves hegemony by harmonizing its interests with the interests of subordinate classes. He saw societies as complex, multi-layered formations in which relations of force and contradicting interests are in constant tension. A ruling class relies on elements of civil society, for example schools, cultural organizations, and family practices, to depoliticize elite interests into a universal ideology that appears to be “common sense,” so that lower

classes believe subordination is to their benefit (Hall 1986). This ideology must not appear to be modeled after the interests of the leading class, it must satisfy the interests of subordinate classes, and it cannot undermine the leadership of the hegemonic class by contradicting the state's economic model (Cox 1993). Because of the importance that civil society plays in the establishment of hegemony, a ruling class can only achieve hegemonic position when it unites with its state's civil society to form a larger structure. Gramsci labeled this structure a historic bloc. The historic bloc, however, is not synonymous with the ruling class. A hegemonic bloc may have leading elements, but it also incorporates the dominated classes, thus while a bloc's governmental structure is the point from which hegemony is exercised through policy, the state structure cannot be regarded as a single actor. Instead, the state functions as more of an arena; a space where a variety of different and often contradictory relations and practices are coalesced into a definite system of rule which lends itself to the continual development of a bloc's economic model (Hall 1986). If Gramsci's theory is applied beyond the state level to international relations, a global historic bloc can be said to achieve hegemony when the consent of subordinate states, which are themselves a conglomeration of national and transnational social forces and competing interests, has been won through the global universalization of the interests of a dominant state or elite transnational class.

What we see today is the emerging hegemony of transnational capitalism, struggling to globalize its economic model and perpetually recreate the societal conditions of capitalism to find new avenues of capital surplus absorption. The leading elements of the emerging bloc, the transnational capitalist class, seek to achieve this through neoliberal privatization, deregulation, and the rollback of state apparatuses.

Unfortunately for this emerging hegemony, however, its economic model of free market capitalism is prone to crisis. Capitalism is constantly creating barriers to its expansion, and must constantly overcome them. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, for example, American manufacturers were forced to cut labor costs in response to competition from foreign countries. To overcome the labor problem, companies outsourced manufacturing to areas of the world where labor was cheap and plentiful. This solved the labor problem, but created a new problem of effectual demand: unemployment and wage depression in America resulted in less capital for consumers to spend, and less profits for capitalists. To solve the demand problem, new markets had to be created, opened, and cultivated abroad, (Harvey 2011).

As I will explain in detail later on, the newest barrier that transnational capitalism faces is resistance to capitalism itself. Capitalism's association with Western imperialism and global economic inequality motivates vehement resistance to the emerging hegemony's growth. This paper argues that the growing international focus on humanitarianism offers hegemonic actors a method for overcoming this resistance and gaining subordinate consent to hegemonic assimilation. The development of a global human rights regime (HRR) began after World War II with the founding of the UN and the codification of human rights in a series of international treaty systems. Humanitarian treaties and watchdog NGOs mostly focus on a narrow definition of human rights: negative political and civil individual rights like free speech, freedom from persecution, and right to private property. Humanitarians support transparent states and a strong rule of law to ensure these rights, but criticize oppressive or overly interventionist governments for violating individual human rights. The criteria of a humanitarian state

perfectly matches the conditions required for neoliberal capitalism: individual rights and rule of law with limited government interference. Humanitarianism is a moral and internationally lauded discourse that may be used to support capitalism without carrying any of the negative connotations of free market imposition. Neoliberals encourage the association of capitalism and human rights through the claim that free markets are synonymous with democracy. Freedom of exchange in the marketplace is equated with individual freedom, and flows of capital are claimed to encourage state governments to remain transparent and free of corruption to encourage private investment. This connection between free markets and democracy not only ties capitalism closer to humanitarianism, it also allows hegemonic actors to characterize alternative economic models to capitalism as anti-democratic. As Manfred Steger notes, however, “these arguments hinge on a conception of democracy that emphasizes formal procedures such as voting at the expense of the direct participation of broad majorities in political and economic decision-making,” (Steger 2003: 111).

Humanitarianism, as defined by the global HRR and its emphasis on individual rights, has become universalized to the point that the protection of human rights is not only internationally supported but mandatory as well. States feel normative pressure from the international community to ratify humanitarian treaties, despite the limits these treaties place on national sovereignty, because protection of human rights is essential for a state’s international legitimacy (Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008). By extension, this means that capitalism’s prerequisites are now integrated into the international standards of a modern and just state. Although the conditions of capitalism are historically attached to

Western states, the HRR has depoliticized and naturalized these concepts, and thereby universalized hegemonic interests into a global ideology (Manokha 2008: 22).

In this study, I focus on a specific facet of contemporary humanitarianism: state intervention in the sovereignty of another state to protect human rights. Humanitarian intervention contributes to humanitarianism's role as the emerging hegemonic bloc's mechanism of consent in three ways.

1. The moral rhetoric that accompanies humanitarian interventions, including the condemnation of human rights violations and the reaffirmation of victims' negative civil and political rights, contributes to the global universalization of transnational capitalism's foundational conditions (Manokha 2008). It is important to note that even states that do not participate in humanitarian intervention are still exposed to the accompanying rhetoric, or issue statements condemning crimes against humanity.
2. Humanitarian interventions deter states from committing human rights violations. The threat of intervention ensures that states are held accountable to the legal parameters of the HRR and protect the individual rights necessary for the growth of capitalism.
3. Humanitarian intervention is a morally, and sometimes legally, legitimate method for the direct propagation of neoliberal interest. Under the guise of humanitarianism, states or organizations of states may intervene in countries to prevent the growth of alternative economic models to capitalism, which are characterized as coercive and undemocratic, and then reconstruct post-conflict countries more according to neoliberal norms. For example, the post-conflict

reconstructions following humanitarian interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq limited centralized power and encouraged competitive capitalism, (Manokha 2008: 213).

Past episodes of humanitarian intervention, however, have provoked accusations of Western imperialism and violations of sovereignty. In the next section, I describe the global resistance to capitalist expansion, and how the controversies surrounding intervention threaten to destroy the viability of humanitarianism as a hegemonic tool in overcoming this resistance.

### **III. Counter-Hegemonic Resistance**

As I've shown in the previous section, leading elements of the emerging hegemony utilize neoliberal economic policies to continually create new outlets for capital surplus absorption, and humanitarianism to gain subordinate consent through the universalization of capitalism's conditions of existence. The exercise of these two strategies, however, has led to counter-hegemonic resistance from both state and non-state actors.

The first paragraph of the WTO agreement, which David Harvey labels the "quintessential neoliberal document", states the organization's goals as "raising standards of living, full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demands, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development..." In reality, the neoliberal imposition of international free markets has failed to fulfill these promises. Aggregate global economic growth rates stood at 3.5 percent in the 1960's, but fell to 1.4 percent and 1.1 percent in

the 1980s and 1990s in response to neoliberal strategies of development. After the fall of communism, neoliberal shock therapy policies designed to open Russia to freer flows of capital resulted in a 3.5 percent annual decline in per capita income, dramatic increases in poverty, and decreases in life expectancy. In Latin America, neoliberalization produced economic stagnation, or spurts of growth followed by collapse (Harvey 2005: 154). The structural growth of transnational capital has led to the marginalization and impoverishment of millions of individuals, primarily in the global south. In its wake, the emerging hegemony leaves ecological and social catastrophes, and failed states or kleptocracies (Stiglitz 2002).

In some countries, the deregulation of markets has spurred overall economic growth, but still created inequality. Over the past two decades, China's economy has enjoyed an average annual GDP growth rate of 9.7% due to the cautious decentralization and privatization of economic power, and since 2003, India has recorded an annual average GDP growth rate of 8.8% as a result of state deregulation. These reforms, however, have dramatically widened the wealth distribution gap between the rich and the poor. The privatization of housing in India has placed homeownership out of reach for the majority of Indian citizens, and China's economic transition has benefitted powerful elites at the expense of its laborers (Steger and Roy 2010).

All over the world, neoliberal policies have benefitted the leading elements of the emerging bloc, the transnational capitalist class, to the detriment of ordinary citizens. The 1997 edition of UN Development Program's *Human Development Report* stated that the wealthiest 20% of the global population received 74 times as much income as the poorest 20%, up from a ratio of 60 to 1 in 1990, and 30 to 1 in 1960 (UNDP 1997). In

2006, The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research released a report stating that 1% of the world's population owned 40% of global wealth (UNU-WIDER 2006). Neoliberalization, which began as a political project to restore the power of economic elites, has achieved this goal but with grave consequences for the rest of the world. The negative repercussions of neoliberal economics have prompted numerous critiques from scholars (Chomsky 1999, Harvey 2005, 2011, Schwartz 2011), as well as former neoliberal economists (Krugman 2012, Sachs 2012, Stiglitz 2002).

The disastrous effects of neoliberal policies in Latin American countries have helped prompt a political “left turn” for the region. Over the past few decades, mass mobilizations of people marginalized by the neoliberal agenda have elected “candidates who promised a more radical platform, from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998... to Mauricio Funes in El Salvador in 2009,” (Charlip and Burns 2011). Since 1998, leftist leaders resistant to neoliberalism have been popularly elected in Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Panama, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and El Salvador (Ibid). In 2005, a BBC poll stated that of the 350 million people living in South America, three out of four lived in left-leaning countries.

Resistance to neoliberalism has also grown beyond state borders. The Global Justice Movement (GJM) is one such example. The GJM is a loose but globalized association of civil society organizations and social movements ideologically united in their goals to transform the process of market globalization and encourage participatory democracy, restorative and redistributive justice, income equality, and socioeconomic and environmental sustainability, (Steger and Wilson 2012). The GJM meets annually at the

World Social Forum (WSF), as a counter to the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum, and is built around the slogan “another world is possible.”<sup>1</sup>

Social movements resistant to neoliberal economics represent a potent threat to the emerging hegemony precisely because they show that another world is possible. They challenge the assertion that transnational capitalism is the *only* system through which human progress and protection of human rights can be achieved. La Via Campesina, a worldwide organization fighting for the rights of farmers, challenges the role of the market as the ultimate arbiter in the production and distribution of food with its call for social control of markets via “food sovereignty,” (Patel 2009: 122). Experiments with direct participatory democracy, like Brazil’s participatory budgeting processes and the Zapatistas’ *Preguntando caminamos*, offer an alternative to the Western democratic model and are more effective in protecting human rights from market forces and elite decision-making (Ibid). These movements undermine the naturalization of free markets, and the alleged connection between capitalism and humanitarianism, the bases upon which universalized hegemonic ideology relies.

As I explained in the previous section, humanitarianism offers the emerging hegemony a way to overcome resistance to neoliberalism, but past Western humanitarian interventions have led to criticisms that threaten humanitarianism’s universalization of hegemonic interests. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States became the world’s first unchecked superpower, and the West found itself in a position where it could enforce its foreign agenda all over the world. Humanitarianism drew attention as

---

<sup>1</sup> The GJM does suffer from internal incoherence and contradiction, for example some constituent organizations advocate locally specific solutions to marketization, such as food sovereignty, while others seek to promote global agendas. In addition, constituent organizations may have contradictory platforms, for example workers’ rights organizations and environmental NGOs, (Steger and Wilson: 2012).

the “international community” became more willing to intervene in the domestic affairs of states. The brutal civil wars between the republics of Yugoslavia gave the Western-led international community an opportunity to respond to human rights violations in the post-Cold War world, and highlighted the controversies inherent in humanitarian interventions.

Within the UN, Western states that favored intervention in Yugoslavia were opposed by states concerned with preserving traditional notions of state sovereignty: the concept that nations enjoy a fundamental right to self-determination free from intervention by other states. Respect for sovereignty has been the cornerstone of international relations since the end of World War II. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter forbids the use of force in international politics, except in a state’s self defense (Article 51), or with the authorization of the UNSC (Chapter VII), and commits member states to a mutual respect for sovereignty by prohibiting the UN from interfering “in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states” in Article 2(7). In 1960, the UN General Assembly issued its Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, proclaiming that “all peoples have the right to self determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status...” This self-determination could not be realized if powerful states intervened in the affairs of the weak, and in 1970, The General Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations affirmed, “No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state,” (Forsythe 1993). Once the bipolar balance of power ended in the 1990s and the United States became an unchallenged superpower, these pronouncements were more important

than ever.

The sanctity of traditional sovereignty, held dear by developing states and represented on the UNSC by Russia and China, limited international intervention throughout the Balkan Wars. In 1998, however, the Yugoslav army moved south into Kosovo, killing and displacing thousands of ethnic Albanians. NATO acted without UN authorization, carrying out a ten-week bombing campaign against targets throughout Serbia and Kosovo in response to “appalling violations of human rights and the indiscriminate use of force by the Yugoslav government” (NATO 1999). The NATO bombing signaled a willingness of the West to violate the sovereignty of other nations without the approval of the UN, as long as the violation could be justified with human rights protection. President Bill Clinton codified this agenda into his administration’s foreign policy,

"We can say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it's within our power to stop it, we will stop it," (White House 1999).

The NATO bombing was perceived by many states as a challenge to traditional notions of sovereignty, and therefore a threat to the territorial integrity and political self-determination of weaker states. Within the UNSC, Russia, China, and Namibia proposed a resolution accusing NATO of violating international law. When the rest of the council vetoed the resolution, several UN states outside the Security Council saw the move as acquiescence to Western imperialism, (UNSC 1999: S/PV.3989). The Group of 77, a

loose coalition of developing countries within the United Nations, responded to the bombing by condemning the “so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention,” (G77 2000). The intervention also prompted radical intellectual critiques. Many scholars accused NATO of knowingly exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, and merely using human rights protection as justification for the projection of Western hegemony, (Chomsky 1999, Wood 1999, Ali 1999). Such critiques also highlighted the selectivity of NATO’s protection of civilians. If Albanians in Kosovo were to be protected, why not Palestinians in Israel, or Kurds in Turkey? (Chomsky 1999: 7).

Despite these reactions, the successful NATO intervention set the grounds for future acts of Western intervention without UN authorization, namely the American invasion of Iraq. The United States initially invoked Article 51 of the UN charter, claiming that Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and his connection with terrorist organizations posed a threat to American national security. Once it became clear that Saddam Hussein possessed no weapons of mass destruction, The United States justified its war on humanitarian grounds. The goal of the occupation became liberating the Iraqi people and protecting their human rights. The US Department of State emphasized Saddam Hussien’s poor human rights record, labeling him “one of the worst tyrants of the past 50 years,” and releasing pictures of mass graves as proof of his atrocities (US Department of State 2003). Despite these efforts, the invasion and occupation earned widespread and vehement condemnation. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared the occupation illegal, and fifty-four countries officially condemned the war. On February 15 2003, millions of people in more than 600 cities worldwide collectively protested the imminent U.S. invasion, making it the largest

protest movement in history, and prompting the *New York Times* to label global civil society the world's "second superpower," (Tyler 2003).

The debates and controversies surrounding neoliberal economics and doctrines of humanitarian intervention pose a threat to the emerging hegemony. By definition, a hegemonic historical bloc possesses a strong civil society united with the state in the pursuit of harmonized interests. Gramsci compares hegemonic civil society to trench warfare systems that offer an unassailable line of defense against enemy invasion (Gramsci 1988: 227). Even if the governmental apparatuses of a hegemonic state were to be seized by an attempted revolution, elements of the hegemonic civil society would resist transformation and reintroduce new state structures compatible with the hegemony's underlying ideology and economic model. According to Gramsci, to overthrow a state's hegemonic rule, its civil society must be targeted through a "war of position," (Cox 1993:53). Within the historic bloc, the social foundations of a new society must be slowly built up according to a long-range revolutionary strategy. Stephen Gill applies Gramsci's work in a global context, and writes that counter-hegemonies may be formed across state borders rather than solely within them. He believes that the negative repercussions of neoliberalism have contributed to a "global organic crisis that links diverse forces across and within nations, specifically to oppose the ideas, institutions and material power of disciplinary neoliberalism," (Gill 2008: 242). David Harvey complicates the definition of civil society by identifying seven spaces of activity in which capitalism evolves, including social relations, reproduction of daily life and of the species, and mental conceptions of the world. He writes that movements to change capitalism must take root in all seven spaces to achieve lasting change, and thus diverse

social movements focused on different activity spaces must collaborate to achieve change. (Harvey 2011).

I have shown how diverse resistance movements to neoliberal economic policies have in the past few decades transcended borders and even gained control over the state structures of several Latin American countries. In addition, the emerging bloc's attempts to universalize its economic model through humanitarianism have been opposed through resistance to humanitarian intervention. Massive global protests against the Iraq War, Latin America's "left turn," and the transnational Global Justice Movement indicate that counter-hegemonic forces have established themselves in a "war of position" within global civil society. The two threads of resistance to neoliberalization and humanitarian intervention have found a semblance of commonality in the identification of Western hegemony, either through state power or through the influence of IFIs and a transnational capitalist class, as the primary target for opposition.<sup>2</sup> By highlighting the flaws of neoliberal economics and humanitarian intervention, and offering alternative economic and political models to transnational capitalism, resistance movements weaken the state-society union of the historic bloc, and challenge the mechanisms through which the bloc's leading elements seek to universalize their economic, political, and ideological practices into "common sense." The fracturing of this "common sense" opens space for a shift in the unstable balance of the hegemony's numerous constituents, and a possible realignment of the relations of force between the hegemonic elite and subordinate actors. The puzzle this paper seeks to solve is why, despite these counter-hegemonic forces, The

---

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that resistance to the globalizing effects of neoliberalization also exists on the far right of the political spectrum in Western states. Such resistance makes appearances in nationalist and libertarian ideologies that oppose either the subordination of the native state to the control of global economic governance or the danger international governmental structures pose to individual freedoms and economic security (Rupert 2000: 96-99).

UNSC (including historically anti-Western states like Russia, China, and Brazil) allowed the NATO bombing in Libya and the post-conflict neoliberal reconstruction. How have elements of the emerging transnational hegemony overcome or subverted resistance to its expansion?

#### **IV. Hegemonic Co-option of Subordinate Resistance**

In the last section, I traced the evolution of both transnational and state-centered counter-hegemonic forces within the emerging hegemony of capital. As I discussed in the first section, hegemonic actors consolidate control over subordinate actors through neoliberal economic policies and the use of humanitarianism to universalize capitalist ideals. The challenge for counter-hegemonic forces within global civil society is to resist the universalized ideology of the emerging historic bloc, and avoid subordinating themselves to hegemonic rule in return for small concessions or incremental gains within the established order. This is difficult because counter-hegemonic forces still must operate within the dominant hegemony's globalized framework of governance in order to avoid political and economic marginalization (Cox 1993). The participation of states in international economic forums like the IMF is one example, and states' adherence to the global HRR to maintain legitimacy is another. In this section, I describe two ways in which the emerging bloc has co-opted subordinate resistance without actually altering its economic model. The IMF executive board has granted representational concessions to subordinate states through the reform of its governance structure, and hegemonic actors have recently revised humanitarian intervention doctrine to accommodate subordinate concerns over sovereignty. This co-option of counter-hegemonic resistance ultimately

helped secure international approval for the Libya intervention and its neoliberal reconstruction.

Over the past two decades, the IMF has engaged in two waves of reforms in response to global resistance and crises of legitimacy. The first began in the mid 1990's, when it became clear that the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and the IMF had failed to alleviate the Latin American debt crisis, and civil society movements like the "50 years is Enough" campaign and the Jubilee 2000 Coalition called for the dissolution of the IFIs and cancellation of third world debt. The first wave of reforms was essentially a publicity campaign to advertise the predicted benefits of neoliberal economics: "poverty reduction, good governance, and loans for projects that respected the environment" (Toussaint 2008). Structural Adjustment Programs were renamed Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs, but in reality the names were the only things that changed. The macroeconomic fundamentals of privatization and liberalization remained the same, and the IMF actually attached more severe conditions to its loans in conjunction with the newly drafted WTO (Toussaint 2008: 186).

The World Bank also introduced a "participatory review" system of World Bank and IMF policies designed to include feedback from representatives of countries borrowing from the IFIs. IFI officials, however, marginalized local representatives in the review process, and although the reviews found major problems in the IFI developmental strategies, the World Bank reneged on its promise to publish review findings and did not reform the lending frameworks (Ibid). The tactics were clear; when faced with opposition, the IFIs announced the formation of new participatory mechanisms, studies and reports, but refused to go deeper than surface level with their changes.

The second wave of IMF reforms began in 2008, in response to the growth of alter-globalization movements and the damning toll the global financial crisis exacted on IMF legitimacy. The internal reforms targeted the IMF's governance structure. The IMF is composed of a Board of Governors in which every member country has a seat, but each country has voting power in proportion to its contribution quotas to the IMF's funding. The Board of Governors elects or appoints members of an Executive Board, which makes most of the day-to-day decisions within the IMF. In 2008, the Executive Board recommended a more transparent formula to the allotment of quotas, and a shift in quota distribution to enhance the representation of emerging market countries. In addition, the number of basic votes for each member country would be tripled, increasing the collective voting power of blocs of developing states (IMF 2008). In 2009, the Executive Board overhauled the IMF's lending framework, declaring the Fund would specifically tailor loan conditions to the circumstances of individual countries and monitor adherence to these conditionalities through a less draconian observation process (IMF 2009).

In 2010, the Executive Board followed up on its 2008 reforms, approving a more significant realignment of quota shares, which would result in a net shift of representation of nine percentage points to emerging market countries. IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn labeled the agreement "the most fundamental governance overhaul in the Fund's 65-year history and the biggest shift of influence in favor of emerging and developing countries to recognize their growing role in the global economy," (IMF 2010). The reforms had to be approved by 85% of IMF member countries, and the Executive Board set the deadline for approval at January 2013. The IMF *failed* to meet this deadline, in large part because the US, which holds 17% of the

IMF's voting shares, has not approved the reforms. Once again, the pattern is clear. Faced with growing opposition and a problem of legitimacy spurred by the financial crisis, the IMF announced reforms, but failed to follow through. In this case, however, the failure was structural. The missed reform deadline shows that intentionality on the part of the IMF is not necessary for superficial hegemonic co-option. The efforts to reform unequal representation within the IMF have been thwarted by the same structural flaw that the reforms sought to fix.

Former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz identified another structural problem in the Fund's governmental model. The representatives of each country that sit on the IMF's Board of Governors are appointed to the position by the respective country's government, and are usually the Minister of Finance or President of the Central Bank: individuals of the transnational capitalist class who do not represent their countries as a whole, but rather represent the interests of the hegemonic ruling class. The result is that working classes all over the world will remain marginalized from the IMF decision-making process regardless of governance reforms that redistribute voting power (Stiglitz 2002: 224).

Mirroring concessions granted to overcome resistance to neoliberal economics, hegemonic actors have revised the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. In 2001, the Canadian government sponsored the creation of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS was formed to address criticisms about humanitarian intervention, and to craft a workable doctrine that protected national sovereignty but also allowed for intervention in cases of serious human rights violations. The report issued by the ICISS, titled "Responsibility to Protect," shifted the terms of the

debate about humanitarian intervention by focusing on the victim's perspective, rather than that of the perpetrator or intervener. The report described national sovereignty as *conditional*, not absolute, and contingent upon a state's fulfillment of its responsibility to protect the individual rights of its citizens. According to the report, when a state failed to protect its citizens, or refused to do so, it was the international community's responsibility to intervene, utilizing military force only as a last resort (Bellamy 2009).

At the 2005 UN World Summit, Secretary General Kofi Annan presented R2P to world leaders for discussion and ratification. Resistance to R2P, exacerbated by the American invasion of Iraq, centered on its allowance, although limited, of military intervention. A relatively small number of countries such as Venezuela, Algeria, Belarus, Pakistan, Cuba, and India were adamantly opposed to R2P on the grounds that it would invite abuse by Western states. A majority of states, however, including most members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G77, supported R2P's emphasis on a nation's responsibility to its citizens. After several months of negotiations, the international community reached a consensus on the doctrine, and unanimously adopted a new version of R2P. The revisions left out explicit reference to military intervention, eliminated codes of conduct for permanent members of the UNSC limiting when they could veto methods of human rights enforcement, and granted sovereign states a wider rhetorical margin before the responsibility to protect citizens shifted from the host state to the international community: from a state "unwilling and unable" to protect citizens, to a state "manifestly failing" to protect citizens (Bellamy 2009: 95).

By distancing R2P from humanitarian intervention, the World Summit transformed the doctrine from a commission proposal to an internationally recognized

principle, endorsed by every member state of the UN. In addition to the revisions to R2P I discuss in this section, Western states secured the acceptance of Russia, China, and several G77 and NAM states by granting development concessions in the final Outcome Document of the 2005 Summit. These concessions included tangible commitments by Western donor nations to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, and the cancellation of debt of heavily indebted poor countries (Bellamy 2009, UN 2005 World Summit Outcome). Opposition to R2P still existed, but the doctrine gradually became more influential in collective policy decisions. Leading up to the intervention in Libya, the UNSC reaffirmed R2P in 2006, and in 2009 the UN General Assembly did as well. In 2008, the R2P doctrine motivated the UN diplomatic intervention in Kenya to end ethnic violence after elections (Ferris 169).

Although the UN version of R2P allows P5 members greater latitude to veto humanitarian interventions, outlines less obligation for the international community to protect citizens, and never mentions military intervention, the initiative still affirms the international importance of the protection of human rights. The revisions to R2P are concessions granted to accommodate the interests of subordinate states, including permanent members of the Security Council. Both Russia and China saw their veto power as an important barrier against western interventionism, thus the removal of the veto ban from the final draft of the World Summit Outcome Document allayed fears that R2P could be used as a tool to justify a Western foreign policy agenda (Bellamy 2009: 83).

The final ratification of R2P still strengthened the universalization of capitalism's conditions of existence. R2P is a legal affirmation that the protection of human rights

takes precedent over traditional norms of sovereignty. The concept that a state's sovereignty is conditional upon its protection of citizens provides a strong incentive for countries to protect human rights and the conditions necessary for the growth of free markets. By ratifying R2P, countries willingly acknowledged that if they fail to protect human rights, their national sovereignty is compromised. If a government no longer has sovereign control over its territory, it may be subjected to legal intervention by other states. In addition, the vagueness of R2P in defining the grounds for intervention allows intervening states the room to intervene only when the human rights violations are inimical to capitalism. The original ICISS report had included specific criteria of humanitarian crises mandating intervention, including genocide and ethnic cleansing. Opposition to these criteria was strongest among Western states that wished to limit their *actual* responsibility to intervene in humanitarian crises (Bellamy 2009). The elimination of the criteria allows intervention to remain as selective as it had been in the 1990s. The UN now has a legal basis upon which it can enforce human rights, but at the same time, its member states are not legally obligated to intervene when the growth of capitalism is not at stake.

In the next section, I examine how the above reforms in humanitarian doctrine and the IMF led to the utilization of both during the Libyan Civil War. I attempt to discern whether the changes were only superficial concessions granted to subordinate states, or if R2P and the internal IFM reforms evoke a deeper change in capital's emerging hegemony.

## **V. Intervention and Reconstruction in Libya**

The UN authorized military intervention in Libya to protect civilians in the civil war between government and rebel forces. Several factors contributed to the Security Council's ultimate decision to intervene: Libya's diplomatic isolation, the deteriorating situation on the ground, and the support of regional organizations of states.<sup>3</sup> Leading up to the UNSC's decision to intervene, R2P was key in framing the legality of the intervention, garnering the support of regional organizations of states, and preventing reluctant members of the UNSC from vetoing the resolution.

Colonel Muammar Qaddafi rose to power in a bloodless coup in 1969. A bizarre and often unpredictable ruler, his foreign policy led to the regional and international marginalization of Libya. Despite his repeated calls for pan-Arab unification, his abrasive leadership led to skirmishes, both diplomatic and military, with fellow Arab states throughout his decades-long rule. His fervent support of global anti-imperialist and Islamic movements, his connection with terrorist attacks, and his state's aborted WMD program earned Libya the status of an international pariah state (Pargeter 2012). Qaddafi's diplomatic isolation in the region played an important part in the ultimate decision of the Security Council to intervene. As the humanitarian crisis deteriorated, Qaddafi's lack of support from Middle Eastern and African states allowed member nations of the UN to act collectively without the fear of angering states friendly with Libya (Bellamy and Williams 2011).

---

<sup>3</sup> Another contextual factor that I do not explore in this paper is the size of Libya's oil reserves. Libya possesses the largest oil reserve in Africa, making it an important exporter for the global oil market. The civil war dramatically reduced oil production, providing a strong incentive for the international community to find a resolution.

On February 26, 2011, the UNSC moved a step closer to intervention by unanimously adopting Resolution 1970, which imposed an international arms embargo, a travel ban, and an assets freeze on the Libyan state and its top officials. Supported by the League of Arab States (LAS), the African Union (AU), and the Islamic Conference (OIC), the resolution condemned the Libyan state's use of force against civilians, and demanded an end to the violence, stating that "Libyan authorities [had a] responsibility to protect [the] population," (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6491). But the resolution also reaffirmed the UN's commitment to the sovereignty of the Libyan state. In statements on the resolution, Russia and Lebanon both explicitly emphasized the sovereignty of Libya, and China urged peaceful dialogue with Qaddafi's administration (Ibid). Resolution 1970 was a swift response to the escalating crisis, but the cautious language of the resolution indicated the reluctance of the Council to intervene militarily. Nevertheless, this was the first time that R2P had been specifically referenced in a UNSC resolution. The willingness of Russia, China, and Lebanon to include R2P in the resolution, despite its implicit association with intervention, showed the doctrine's ability to provide a space for the international protection of human rights amid concerns of sovereignty.

Qaddafi's regime did not comply with the Council's demands. The situation in Libya deteriorated: the rebel-held city of Benghazi seemed about to fall to government forces, and international observers feared Qaddafi's soldiers would commit a massacre upon its occupation. Qaddafi refused to allow humanitarian aid convoys to reach besieged towns, and UN officials began to believe that diplomacy alone would not bring about a ceasefire (Bellamy and Williams 2011). The factor that finally won over countries on the Security Council opposing intervention was the support of regional state

organizations. In early March, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the OIC, and the LAS all called on the UN to actively intervene in Libya through the imposition of a no-fly zone (Ibid: 844).

On March 17, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973, approving a no-fly zone over Libya and authorizing “all necessary measures” to protect civilians short of foreign occupation. The resolution established that Libya had failed in its responsibility to protect its population, and emphasized the support of the LAS, AU, and OIC for the Council’s decision to intervene. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Germany all abstained from the vote on the resolution due to concerns about how its measures would be enforced. China, however, specifically stated that it had not vetoed the resolution due to the support of the LAS and AU (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6498). The resolution marked the first time that the UNSC had authorized a humanitarian intervention into the territory of a functioning government without the consent of the host state, a clear indication that R2P had co-opted subordinate resistance to intervention. The doctrine allowed the UN a space for legal intervention in Libya after the state’s sovereignty was compromised by human rights abuses. In addition, R2P secured the support of member states of the LAS, AU, GCC, and OIC, which in turn ensured the approval of the UNSC, through its shaping of the regional organizations’ perceptions of humanitarian intervention. Although the regional organizations did not specifically reference R2P in their calls for a no-fly zone, they advocated intervention despite its imposition on Libyan sovereignty. R2P co-opted subordinate states’ concerns by reconceptualizing intervention from a superficial justifier of Western imperialism in Kosovo and Iraq to a multilateral tool to be used in the *legal and mandatory* fulfillment of the international community’s responsibility to protect

civilians according to a universalized standard of humanitarianism. R2P promised a more responsible and limited form of humanitarian intervention than that which characterized the wars of the 1990s and early 21<sup>st</sup> century: an intervention legally mandated by the UN and driven solely by the need to protect human rights. The actual intervention in Libya, however, did not live up to this promise.

On March 24, NATO assumed command of enforcing the no-fly zone. Over the next seven months, NATO forces flew 26,500 sorties, including 9,700 strike missions to “protect the people of Libya from attack or threat of attack,” (NATO 2011). Resolution 1973 authorized NATO to take “all necessary measures... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack,” short of physically occupying Libyan territory (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6498). Although the resolution did not set any other concrete limits to the intervention, it also did not call for regime change or the specific targeting of Qaddafi. The BRIC countries, plus Germany, abstained because of the vague wording of this resolution, and for good reason. Over the course of intervention, the goal of NATO’s air sorties changed from directly protecting civilians to deposing Qaddafi, despite growing international resistance.

Just one month into NATO’s leadership of the intervention, NATO jets bombed Qaddafi’s compound, killing several of his family members (Pannel 2011), and a week later the National Transitional Council (NTC), which claimed representation of rebel forces, told the UN that it would not consider a ceasefire with government forces unless such an agreement was directly linked to Qaddafi’s departure from power (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6527). This ultimatum contradicted the AU’s plan to reach peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the fighting. The NTC’s call for Qaddafi’s departure from power, and its

institutional growth into a government-in-waiting, allowed the UN to consider regime change as a legitimate option. It is important to note, however, that the NTC gained international legitimacy thanks to the support of the “Friends of Libya,” an international contact group led by Western nations that formally recognized the NTC as “the legitimate governing authority in Libya,” (Leyne 2011). Of the countries that abstained from Resolution 1973 and expressed concern about the scope of the intervention, only Germany participated in the contact group meetings that established a governmental alternative to Qaddafi.

The issue of regime change polarized the international community. On May 4, the day after the NTC issued its ultimatum demanding Qaddafi’s removal from power, both Russia and China protested civilian casualties linked to NATO action and NATO’s use of force “beyond the Council’s mandate,” (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6528). In the same Security Council Meeting, the United States echoed the NTC’s call for Qaddafi’s departure (Ibid). On May 25, the extraordinary Summit of the African Union expressed “surprise and disappointment” at the shift in the intervention’s direction and the AU’s marginalization from managing the conflict. The AU noted that NATO had lost the international support which had originally secured the approval of Resolution 1973, and that a continuation of the intervention under UN authority violated Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which mandated cooperation with regional organizations (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6555). Eleven days later, the AU called for an immediate end to the NATO bombing because the operations prevented humanitarian aid from reaching the Libyan people, and thus detracted from the protection of civilians (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6566). The bombing continued, however, and the civil war on the ground intensified.

In late July, South Africa's representative to the Security Council accused NATO of exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Libya. The original aim of Resolution 1973, he emphasized, "had not been regime change," (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6595). Nevertheless, subsequent UNSC meetings on the situation in Libya aimed to increase collaboration with the National Transitional Council with the ultimate goal of replacing Qaddafi's regime (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6606). On September 16, the UN General Assembly voted to seat the NTC as Libya's representative to the United Nations. Although the vote went in the NTC's favor, twenty-two countries voted against the measure, including Angola, Bolivia, Cuba, South Africa, and Venezuela, on the grounds that the NTC did not represent a unified Libyan government. Cuba and Venezuela claimed that Western support of the NTC was NATO's attempt to make Libya a protectorate of the organization, (UN General Assembly 2011: GA/11137). On October 31, following the establishment of the NTC as Libya's legitimate government and the new regime's consolidation of power within the turbulent state, the UNSC unanimously voted to end NATO's mandate (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6640).

R2P was instrumental in securing UNSC approval for the intervention in Libya, but the doctrine was unable to prevent NATO from angering and marginalizing subordinate states throughout the intervention process. Western states granted legitimacy to the National Transitional Council, and used the NTC's rejection of Qaddafi as justification for regime change. NATO's actions stretched the UN mandate, changing the international mission from protecting civilians to deposing and replacing Qaddafi. In several Security Council meetings following the resolution of the conflict, Russia and China expressed anger at NATO's leadership of the intervention, and repeatedly

requested investigations into NATO's operations, (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6528 and 2012: S/PV.6731, S/PV.6772).

The adverse effects of NATO's actions on international conceptions of humanitarian intervention can be seen in the Security Council's reaction to a resolution sponsored by France condemning human rights violations in Syria on October 4, 2011. The resolution was vetoed by China and Russia, and Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa abstained on the grounds of "respect for sovereignty and non-intervention into state affairs." Russia cited NATO's abuse of Resolution 1973 in Libya as proof of the "non-acceptability of military intervention... [which] should be excluded from global practice," (UNSC 2011: S/PV.6627).

Although R2P temporarily overcame counter-hegemonic resistance to intervention through a redefinition of sovereignty, it did not prevent hegemonic states from abusing the opportunity of intervention, and thus it did not address the root causes of resistance. In this sense, R2P can be seen for what it is: a short term and superficial co-option of counter-hegemonic resistance to intervention. Although it was effective in securing international approval for the intervention in Libya, it could not prevent the ultimate politicization of the intervention and the conceptual reattachment of Western imperialism to humanitarian intervention.

Although R2P ultimately failed to maintain the depoliticization of humanitarian intervention, it created an opportunity in Libya for post-conflict neoliberal reconstruction, to be managed by the newly reformed IMF. On September 16 2011, the Security Council unanimously voted to establish a United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), to assist the NTC in the reconstruction of the state. Within the same resolution, the Council

requested that the IMF and the World Bank recommend steps to aid Libya's economic recovery. The IMF's policy recommendations show that despite its internal reforms, the Fund's neoliberal economic philosophy has not changed.

At the conclusion of the IMF staff visit to Libya in 2012, the Fund laid out a series of policy recommendations to aid Libyan authorities in economic reconstruction. The IMF criticized the efforts of Qaddafi's regime to appease its discontented citizens through public wage increases and universal subsidies. The IMF mission report stated that maintaining "a high level of public sector wages will reduce the incentive for individuals to seek employment in the private sector," while the universal subsidies "affect consumption and production patterns as well as the allocation of resources, with negative implications for the budget, expenditure composition, and private sector development" (IMF 2012: Concluding Statement). The report cautioned that the new government must not give in to "short term spending pressures" like public demand for wages and subsidies, in order to maintain longer-term fiscal sustainability characterized by private sector development. To encourage such development, the IMF recommended streamlining Libya's civil services and removing state obstacles to the development of a business environment and a competitive private sector, (Ibid).

Where the IMF strayed from the familiar neoliberal path, however, was in its advocacy for the creation of a social safety net to shield low-income Libyan households from the repeal of high public wages and universal subsidies. The Fund advocated government regulation to ensure that subsidies primarily benefitting low-income families were removed gradually instead of immediately repealed. In addition, the IMF recommended increased public spending to benefit poor households (Ibid). Such policies

are a break from the Fund's history of ruthlessly gutting civil governance and reducing federal spending. I argue that these moderate policy recommendations are a pragmatic choice to foster a stable political environment for the growth of capitalism, rather than reflective of a change in the IMF's economic philosophies as a result of internal reforms.

An analysis of the IMF's policy trajectory before and after the Arab Spring shows that Fund still believes the Washington Consensus holds true despite the political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, neoliberal development policies just need some minor tweaking. Following the fall of Qaddafi's government, the IMF's mission chief in Libya, Ralph Chami, condemned Qaddafi's economic policies, stating that the Libyan revolution occurred because economic opportunities were "not shared fairly among different segments of the population," resulting in unemployment and poverty rates that were "surprisingly high for such a resource-rich country," (IMF 2012: Libya on Recovery Path). Chami claimed that IMF policy recommendations would help the Libyan people more evenly distribute wealth through the diversification of the economy away from reliance on oil, and through the growth of private sector-led development (Ibid). Yet just a few weeks before the revolution began, the IMF's Executive Board had praised the "ambitious reform agenda" of Qaddafi's administration, and encouraged the country to continue on its promising path of economic development, (Briancon and Foley 2011). This shows that before the revolution, the IMF had not included domestic support in its criteria for evaluating the economic performance of its member countries. The IMF's quarterly magazine *Finance & Development* clearly stated exactly what the Fund had learned since the Arab Spring. "The failure in the Middle East of the so-called Washington Consensus of market-based reforms is one of omission. The old policies

were not necessarily wrong, but rather insufficient. They ignored the interdependence of political and economic development,” (Mausher 2013). The populist protests throughout the Middle East have shown the IMF that the *populations*, not just the governments, of subordinate states must be appeased to ensure political stability and protect the growth of capitalism. The social safety nets sweeten neoliberal policies in Libya to co-opt popular resistance.<sup>4</sup>

## **VI. Conclusion**

For capitalism to remain a viable and profitable economic model for the emerging hegemony, it must expand. This need for expansion, combined with efforts of the transnational capitalists to gain class power, has led to a global wave of privatization and deregulation, driven by the neoliberal economic development policies of IFIs and Western states. Leading elements of the emerging hegemony of transnational capitalism have sought to assimilate subordinate state and non-state actors by universalizing their economic model via humanitarianism.

Transnational capitalism faces a barrier, however, of global resistance to the hegemony’s expansion, motivated by the widespread inequality and impoverishment created by its economic model. The hegemony’s efforts to depoliticize the conditions of capitalism through humanitarianism are threatened by the controversies surrounding the use of humanitarian intervention.

---

<sup>4</sup> In addition, Libya’s oil exports generate enough income that the country did not need any loans from the IMF to fund reconstruction. Thus the IMF has been acting in a purely advisory role, without the help of loan conditionalities to coerce cooperation from the state. This also may have had a moderating effect on the IMF’s policy recommendations.

In an attempt to co-opt counter-hegemonic resistance, hegemonic actors have introduced changes within the hegemony's governmental structures. The IMF Executive Board announced reforms to the Fund's governance model and lending frameworks to increase representation of developing states, and the UN ratified the R2P initiative, opening a legal space for intervention by redefining sovereignty as conditional upon a state's protection of human rights. These concessions won over subordinate approval for the intervention and neoliberal reconstruction in Libya, but as I have shown, NATO and IMF actions in Libya have proven these changes to be superficial.

NATO's hijacking of the UN-mandated intervention in order to depose Qaddafi led to international criticism and the UNSC's refusal to consider intervention as an option in Syria. The IMF's internal reforms were not approved by the organization's governing body, and they did not prevent the Fund from recommending neoliberal development policies for Libya's new government. Although the IMF produced a development plan for Libya more moderate than the shock therapy strategies it has employed in the past, this can be traced to a new awareness within the organization of the need to accommodate popular as well as elite and government interests within subordinate states. The Arab Spring has demonstrated that domestic support for a government, along with the government's acquiescence to hegemonic rule, is important in facilitating the growth of capitalism.

The failure of the emerging hegemony to co-opt counter-hegemonic resistance threatens the continued expansion of the hegemony. Karl Polanyi characterized the 19<sup>th</sup> century as a double movement between expanding market forces and societal resistance to capitalism's inherent perils. That movement continues today. As international

markets grow, so too does global resistance to the negative social, economic, and environmental ramifications of transnational capitalism. The resilience of counter-hegemonic forces in a “war of position” within the emerging bloc presents capital hegemony with a future, but not far off dilemma: hegemonic actors must introduce meaningful changes in economic and governmental structures that truly incorporate subordinate interests, or face an insolvable problem of capital surplus absorption and perhaps a revolutionary realignment of social forces within the historic bloc.

This thesis perhaps offers a small clue to which course the hegemony will take. The Arab Spring awakened within the IMF an awareness of the power that popular protests have to destabilize the growth of capitalism. This acknowledgement led to a shift in IMF policy recommendations, and a moderation of its development strategy to accommodate popular interests. Although this shift is insignificant in relation to the scale of hegemonic domination, it shows that the emerging hegemony is not invulnerable to influence by *certain* subordinate interests. Hegemonic theory is a useful tool in analyzing international relations, but neo-Gramscians risk equating state governments and their citizens as a single subordinate actor on the global stage. In reality, the emerging bloc is a tumultuous conglomeration of social forces and actors that do not fit neatly within sovereign borders, and popular opposition represents a potent force for change. While upper-class ambassadors of state governments have proven to be vulnerable to co-option within the UN and IMF, the world’s “second superpower” has socialized the political landscape in Latin America, organized the largest global anti-war protest in history, and forced the IMF to revise its development policies in the Middle East. Global civil society

is stretching its legs, and the emerging hegemony must truly accommodate its interests in order to survive.

## **Bibliography**

Ali, Tariq. 1999. "NATO's Balkan Adventure," *Monthly Review*, 51: 9-14.

Barnett, Michael and Weiss, Thomas G. 2008. "Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present." In *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, edited by Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, 1-48. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bellamy, Alex J. 2009. *Responsibility to Protect*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bellamy, Alex J and Williams, Paul D. 2011. "The New Politics of Protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect" *International Affairs* 87: 825-850.

Briancon, Pierre and Foley, John. "I.M.F. Reviews Praised Libya, Egypt and Other Nations." *New York Times*, February 22, 2011.  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/business/23views.html?\\_r=2&](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/business/23views.html?_r=2&) (accessed March 30, 2013).

Chandler, David. 2009. "Unraveling the Paradox of 'The Responsibility to Protect'" *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 20: 27-39.

Charlip, Julie A and Burns, E. Bradford. 2011. *Latin America: An Interpretive History (9<sup>th</sup> Edition)*. Boston: Prentice Hall.

Chomsky, Noam. 1999. *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*. Monroe: Common Courage Press.

Cox, Robert W. 1993. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method." In *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, edited by Stephen Gill, 49-66. Cambridge: University Press.

Cox, Robert W. 1986. "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." In *Neorealism and its Critics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane, 204-254. New York: Columbia University Press.

"Excerpts from Libya Contact Group Chair's Statement." *Reuters*, July 15 2011.  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/15/libya-meeting-excerpts-refile-idAFLDE76E0W120110715> (accessed March 30, 2013).

- Ferris, Elizabeth G. 2011. *The Politics of Protection: The Limits of Humanitarian Action*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Ferguson, James. 2006. *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Forsythe, David P. 1993. *Human Rights and Peace: International and National Dimensions*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Friedman, Milton. 2002. *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Friedman, Thomas L. *The World is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Picador/Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Gill, Stephen. 2008. *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Gill, Stephen and Law, David. 1993. "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital." In *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, edited by Stephen Gill, 93-126. Cambridge: University Press.
- Gramsci, Antonio. "Selected Writings, 1916-1935." In *An Antonio Gramsci Reader*, edited by David Forgacs. New York: Schocken Books.
- Group of 77, South Summit. *Declaration of the South Summit*. 10-14 April 2000. [http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration\\_G77Summit.htm](http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm) (accessed March 29, 2013).
- Hall, Stuart. 1986. "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity." *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, 10:5: 5-27.
- Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, David. 2011. *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- International Monetary Fund. *IMF Executive Board Approves Major Overhaul of Quotas and Governance*. 5 November 2010. 10/418. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10418.htm> (accessed Feb. 13, 2013).
- International Monetary Fund. *IMF Executive Board Recommends Reforms to Overhaul Quota and Voice*. 28 March 2008. 08/64. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr0864.htm> (accessed Feb. 13, 2013).
- International Monetary Fund. *IMF Overhauls Lending Framework*. 24 March 2009. 09/85. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr0985.htm> (accessed Feb 13, 2013).

International Monetary Fund. *Libya-Concluding Statement of the 2012 Staff Visit*. 26 January 2012. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2012/012612.htm> (accessed Jan. 28 2013).

International Monetary Fund. *Libya on Recovery Path but Faces Long Rebuilding Effort*. 16 April 2012. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/CAR041612A.htm> (accessed Jan. 28 2013).

Krugman, Paul. 2012. *End this Depression Now!*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Leyne, Jon. 2011. "Libya: Gaddafi Must Step Down, Says Contact Group," *British Broadcasting Corporation*, April 13, 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13058694> (accessed April 12 2013).

Manokha, Ivan. 2008. *The Political Economy of Human Rights Enforcement*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mausher, Marwan. 2013. "Freedom and Break go Together." *Finance and Development*. 50:1. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/mausher.htm#> (accessed March 30, 2013).

McInerney-Lankford, Siobhán and Sano, Hans-Otto. 2010. *Human Rights Indicators in Development*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *Press Briefing on No-Fly Zone*. 25 March 2011. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_71781.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_71781.htm?selectedLocale=en) (accessed March 30, 2013).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *The Situation in and around Kosovo*. 12 April 1999. M-NAC-1(99)51. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-051e.htm> (accessed March 29, 2013).

Pannel, Ian. "New Phase in NATO Strategy as Gaddafi's Compound Bombed," *British Broadcasting Corporation*, April 25, 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13187924> (accessed March 30 2013).

Pargeter, Alison. 2012. *Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi*. Padstow: TJ International Ltd.

Patel, Raj. 2009. *The Value of Nothing*. New York: Picador.

Polanyi, Karl. 2001. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Rupert, Mark. 2000. *Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a New World Order*. London: Routledge.

- Sachs, Jeffery. 2012. *The Price of Civilization: Reawakening American Virtue and Prosperity*. New York: Random House.
- Schwartz, Michael. 2011. "Military Neoliberalism: Endless War and Humanitarian Crisis in the Twenty-First Century." *Societies Without Borders*. 6:3: 190-303.
- Steger, Manfred B. 2003. *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Steger, Manfred B and Roy, Ravi K. 2010. *Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Steger, Manfred B and Wilson, Erin K. 2012. "Anti-Globalization or Alter-Globalization? Mapping the Political Ideology of the Global Justice Movement." *International Studies Quarterly*. 56:3: 439-454.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Toussaint, Eric. 2008. *The World Bank: A Critical Primer*. London: Pluto Press.
- Tyler, Patrick E. "Threats and Responses: News Analysis; A New Power in the Streets," *New York Times*, February 17, 2003. <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/17/world/threats-and-responses-news-analysis-a-new-power-in-the-streets.html> (accessed March 29, 2013).
- U.N. Development Program. 2007. *Human Development to Eradicate Poverty*. [http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr\\_1997\\_en\\_overview.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1997_en_overview.pdf) (accessed March 29, 2013).
- U.N. General Assembly, 15<sup>th</sup> Session. *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*. 14 December 1960. (A/Res/1514). <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml> (accessed March 29, 2013).
- U.N. General Assembly, 25<sup>th</sup> Session. *Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations*. 24 October 1970. (A/Res/8082). <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed March 29, 2013).
- U.N. General Assembly, 60<sup>th</sup> Session. *2005 World Summit Outcome*. 24 October 2005. (A/Res/60/1). <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed March 29, 2013.)

U.N. General Assembly, 66<sup>th</sup> Session. *Summary Report of the 2nd Meeting*. 16 September 2011. (GA/11137) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ga11137.doc.htm> (accessed March 30, 2013).

U.N Security Council, 3989<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 3989<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 26 March 1999. (S/PV.3989) [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.3989](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.3989) (accessed March 29, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6491<sup>st</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6491<sup>st</sup> Meeting*. 26 February 2011. (S/PV.6491). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6491](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6491) (accessed Jan. 23, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6498<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6498<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 17 March 2011. (S/PV.6498). <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm> (accessed Jan. 23, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6527<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6527<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 3 May 2011. (S/PV.6527). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6527](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6527) (accessed Jan 23, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6528<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6528<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 4 May 2011. (S/PV.6528). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6528](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6528) (accessed Jan 23, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6555<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6555<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 15 June 2011. (S/PV.6555). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6555](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6555) (accessed Jan 23, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6566<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6566<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 27 June 2011. (S/PV.6566). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6566](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6566) (accessed Jan 23, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6595<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6595<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 28 July 2011. (S/PV.6595). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6595](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6595) (accessed Jan 23, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6606<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6606<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 30 August 2011. (S/PV.6606). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6606](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6606) (accessed Jan 23, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6627<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6627<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 4 October 2011. (S/PV.6627). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6627](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6627) (accessed Jan 23, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6640<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6640<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 27 October 2011. (S/PV.6640). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6640](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6640) (accessed Jan 23, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6731<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6731<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 7 March 2012. (S/PV.6731). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6731](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6731) (accessed Jan 24, 2013).

U.N. Security Council, 6772<sup>th</sup> Meeting. *Summary Report of the 6772<sup>th</sup> Meeting*. 16 May 2012. (S/PV.6772). [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6772](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6772) (accessed Jan 24, 2013).

U.S. Department of State. *Mass Graves of Iraq: Uncovering Atrocities*. 19 December 2003. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/27000.htm> (accessed March 29, 2013).

White House. Office of the Press Secretary. *Remarks by the President to the KFOR Troops*. 22 June, 1999. <http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Europe-9906/html/Speeches/990622d.html> (accessed March 29, 2013).

Wood, Ellen M. 1999. "Kosovo and the New Imperialism" *Monthly Review*, 51: 1-8.

Wotipka, Christine M and Tsutsui, Kiyoteru. 2008. "Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2001" *Sociological Forum* 23: 724-754.